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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 
Understanding the legal principle of human dignity 
 
1.1. Hypothesis 
With the entering into force of the Lisbon Reform Treaty on December 1
st
, 2009, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
1
 (EU Charter) has become law. 
With it, the legal principle of human dignity is enshrined in EU law: article 1 of the EU 
Charter reads:  
 
―Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected‖.  
 
The term “human dignity” also appears in the preamble of the EU Charter, whilst articles 
25 and 31 speak of the dignity of the elderly and the worker. Since however article 1 is 
the “master principle” of human dignity in the EU Charter, we will focus on this article. 
The legal concept, or Rechtsbegriff, of human dignity has served as the basis of the 
European human rights system only since the end of World War II. We make a 
distinction in this study between the legal concept and the legal principle of human 
dignity. A legal concept refers to a fundamental idea or philosophical notion that 
underlies a certain legal instrument. A legal principle refers to an operational legal term 
or an actual rule of law that is directly enforceable in a court of law, which could also be 
referred to as a legal norm. In its legal context, human dignity appears in both forms in 
Europe. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Convention) is based on the legal concept of human dignity, whereby the 
protection of human dignity is not referred to directly in the document itself, but only the 
rights deriving from it. The German Basic Law introduced the legal principle of human 
dignity protection as the highest duty of the state to protect, whereby the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (BVerfG) directly applies this principle in its rulings. There is, 
                                                 
1
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was proclaimed by the European Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Commission on December 7, 2000 and again on December 12, 
2007 and incorporated in article 6 of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) through a revision implemented 
by the Lisbon Reform Treaty that itself entered into force on December 1
st
, 2009 
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however, no fundamental agreement on the definition of human dignity, neither as a 
philosophical notion, nor as a legal term. Article 1 of the EU Charter, the new European 
legal principle of human dignity, could therefore prove problematic because it leaves 
much uncertainty as to the exact scope of its application and it is open to broad 
interpretation.  
 
In order to be able to protect human dignity under the EU Charter, it is necessary to 
achieve a better understanding of the roots and realities of this principle and its 
application in the EU. If this is not achieved, as a consequence the stated legal principle 
itself can become a threat to that which it is trying to protect. Developments over the past 
decades, especially where it involves dealing with issues pertaining to the beginning and 
end of human life and biomedicine, as well as religious freedom, are the clearest 
examples of this threat. All too often human dignity is invoked on both sides of an 
argument that deals with the protection of fundamental human rights such as the right to 
life and the right to freedom of religion. When it comes to understanding the legal 
concept or the legal principle of human dignity, modern-day relativism and legal 
positivism can collide with the post-War European revival of Christian and natural law 
thinking as well as the further development of the Kantian concept of human dignity in 
that same period. The Christian and Kantian schools of thought – as most authors would 
agree - provide the philosophical foundation for the notion of human dignity in its legal 
context as it developed in post-War Europe. These two traditions form the basis for such 
ground-breaking documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration), 
the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), the various other national constitutions in Europe, 
the Convention and the EU Charter itself. Equally relevant are the application of these 
documents by the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) in Karlsruhe, the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (EctHR) and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ) in Luxembourg. These philosophical and legal traditions and 
documents comprise the defining elements of the current European human rights system 
and form the basis for article 1 EU Charter. 
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1.2. Objective and scope of the research 
 
Objective of the research 
This research aims to provide an insight into the genesis, application and consequences of 
article 1 EU Charter and the legal concept of human dignity in general, by analyzing the 
main post-War schools of thought and related (legal-) historical developments that have 
shaped the notion of human dignity in Europe today. This research should contribute to a 
better understanding of the legal principle of human dignity now enshrined in EU law as 
well as the legal concept of human dignity in Europe in a broader sense. 
 
Scope of the research 
Our focus will be on the post-War period because, as is generally agreed in literature, it 
has been during this time that human dignity was decisively shaped in its legal context. 
Until the beginning of the Second World War, the use of the human dignity notion as a 
political or legal concept was mostly limited to counter the negative effects of Europe‟s 
rapid industrialization through which ordinary workers suffered inhumane conditions and 
were used as objects in the production process. Pope Leo XIII addressed the urgent need 
to take measures to protect the dignity of the worker as early as 1891 in his ground-
breaking Encyclical ―Rerum Novarum‖, also called “the encyclical on the condition of 
the working classes”.2 In 1919, the International Labor Organization (ILO) was founded 
as an agency of the League of Nations with much the same purpose in mind and 
concluded various conventions to that extend. Pope Pius XI further expanded the 
Catholic Church‟s social doctrine on the inherent human dignity of the worker in his 
1931 Encyclical ―Quadragesimo Anno‖.3 However, human dignity as a broadly 
applicable political and legal concept or as a legal principle does not have a long history. 
It was in response to the horrors of Nazism and Communism ravaging the European 
continent and many parts of the world in the 20
th
 century that various European political 
and legislative initiatives were introduced to avoid a repeat of this massive and organized 
                                                 
2
 Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical letter on Capital and Labor “Rerum Novarum”, 15 May 1891. Published at 
www.vatican.va 
3
 Pope Pius XI,  Encyclical letter on Reconstruction of the Social Order “Quadragesimo Anno”, 15 May 
1931. Published at www.vatican.va 
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disregard of fundamental human rights. It was held to be self-evident, at least in the West, 
that these totalitarian systems and their actions violated human dignity. In the years 
immediately following the Second World War, Europe therefore saw the creation of 
various legal instruments recognizing and protecting human dignity as the basis for 
human rights. The United Nations Charter (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950), the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and various related UN human rights documents as 
well as the German Basic Law (1949) all addressed human dignity, albeit in different 
ways and forms. The German Basic Law enshrined human dignity in article 1.1. as the 
state‟s “highest duty to protect”. The various UN fundamental rights‟ treaties, such as for 
example the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966), speak 
of human dignity and the need to protect it mostly in the preambles. The Council of 
Europe‟s European Convention refers to it indirectly only through referral to the 
Universal Declaration, but the later “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine” 
(Oviedo Convention, 1997) makes repeated mention of the legal concept and the legal 
principle of human dignity. Today the legal concept of human dignity has thus become 
generally accepted as foundational for international human rights law, especially in 
Europe. The legal principle of human dignity only appears in a small number of legal 
instruments and in different forms, both as a general and as a specific norm. The most 
recent and prominent example is the EU Charter already quoted above, whereby both the 
concept and the principle are included in the document: it speaks of the inviolability of 
human dignity in the preamble and in article 1. But none of these documents actually 
define what human dignity is and how it should be applied in a legal context. At best, 
human dignity is an ambivalent notion that is applied inconsistently. At worst, it is a 
vague political slogan that can be used at will and with varying content for the most 
diverse purposes. When we look at laws passed and judgments rendered on cases 
involving beginning and end of human life questions, the ambivalence of the notion of 
human dignity becomes very clear, as is demonstrated in the fact that it is commonly used 
to both support and reject the same argument. McCrudden summarizes this problem well: 
 5 
 
―In practice, very different outcomes are derived from the application of dignity 
arguments. This is startlingly apparent when we look at the differing role that dignity has 
played in different jurisdictions in several quite similar factual contexts: abortion, 
incitement to racial hatred, obscenity, and socio-economic rights. In each, the dignity 
argument is often to be found on both sides of the argument, and in different jurisdictions 
supporting opposite conclusions.‖ 4 
 
So it is all the more relevant that the EU Charter has now entered into force introducing 
human dignity protection as an operational legal principle of EU law. Yet a clearer 
understanding of what human dignity entails is not automatically achieved with this. The 
EU Charter only once more highlights the need for clarification of this notion in general 
terms and within the framework of European law as such.  
 
1.3. The roots of human dignity in its legal context 
In order to better understand the legal concept and legal principle of human dignity as it 
is known today, especially in the EU Charter, we will first analyze their philosophical 
roots as they developed in post-War Europe. We will then look at the historical setting 
within which the notion of human dignity became relevant in a legal context. Finally, we 
will look at the legal-historical development and case law in post-War Europe that has 
shaped the human dignity legal concept and legal principle into how it is currently 
applied. 
 
The main philosophical roots 
The two main schools of thought having shaped the development of human dignity in its 
legal framework in post-War Europe are the Christian tradition with its revival of natural 
law thinking on the one hand, and enlightenment rationalism inspired by Kantian thought 
and its further development in post-War Europe on the other hand. We will analyze these 
traditions in Part I and focus on how these traditions developed during and after the 
                                                 
4
 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and the Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, in : The 
European Journal of International Law – EJIL 19, 2008, p. 698 
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Second World War. In the area of Christian thought we have selected a number of 
important Catholic writers predominantly (but not exclusively) from the German-
speaking countries due to the fact that in post-War Europe these writers have had such an 
important impact on the development of the legal concept and the legal principle of 
human dignity. Apart from the post-War Kantian tradition – especially in Germany -, the 
Catholic tradition of that same period and the German post-War constitutional tradition 
are the largest resources available on the development of the human dignity notion. Two 
factors explain this: the 1949 Basic Law of Western Germany being the first post-War 
constitution in Europe to enshrine human dignity protection as a constitutional principle, 
and secondly the important developments that were made in Catholic thinking on human 
dignity after the War at a time when the Catholic Church was still very influential in 
Europe. It is also no coincidence that the president of the convention that drafted the EU 
Charter was Roman Herzog who during his career served both as president of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court and as federal president of Germany. 
 
The historical setting 
The two main historical developments that most contributed to the notion of human 
dignity becoming legally so broadly relevant in post-War Europe were the bloodletting of 
the totalitarian and unspeakably inhuman regimes of Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany and 
Josef Stalin in the communist Soviet Union. In Part II we will study the actual violations 
of human dignity under Nazism and Communism and analyze the subsequent broad 
political movement leading to human dignity developing into a legal concept and a legal 
principle no longer limited to mostly worker‟s issues. Without a thorough historical 
understanding of the deep impact the Second World War and its aftermath had on the 
European soul and the fabric of society, it is impossible to understand the meaning of 
human dignity today. Historical awareness is therefore the key to effective human dignity 
protection. The German philosopher Heiner Bielefeldt summarizes this point well when 
he says that “die apriorische Rechtsidee nur in der geschichtlichen Auseinandersetzung 
inhaltliche Bestimmtheit und positiv-rechtliche Wirklichkeit Erlangen kann.“5.  
                                                 
5
 Heiner Bielefeldt, Neuzeitliches Freiheitsrecht und politische Gerechtigkeit. Perspektiven der 
Gesellschaftsvertragstheorien, Würzburg 1990, p. 115 
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The legal-historical development 
The milestones in the development towards article 1 EU Charter and the legal concept of 
human dignity in general are on the one hand the various national constitutional traditions 
in Europe and on the other hand the key post-War international documents (and related 
legal mechanisms) including the human dignity notion. These latter are the Charter of the 
United Nations (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the German 
Basic Law (1949), the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000, 
2007, 2009). These documents and their legal evolvement, as well as the resulting case 
law by German and European courts, will be discussed in Part II. 
 
1.4. The uniqueness of article 1 EU Charter  
Although the notion of human dignity is not new in the European legal landscape as such, 
article 1 EU Charter is the first time in the history of the European Union that human 
dignity becomes an operational legal term on the supranational level of EU law. 
According to article 51 of the EU charter, it will be exclusively applied for the time being 
in matters relating to the operations of the EU institutions as well as the implementation 
and application of EU law in and by member states. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union in Luxembourg (ECJ) will have the final word on the application of this article. 
The Court herewith assumes a new role with which it has so far only had limited 
experience, other than generally following the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg and translating it into its own rulings where appropriate. 
 
To speak with the French jurist Béatrice Maurer, human dignity is a mystery, always 
incompletely understood by human beings themselves. It can only be better understood 
by “participating in it”, by it becoming progressively more accessible by human 
experience itself – not by rigid legal definition6. This study hopes to contribute to this 
participation in human experience as a way to better understand human dignity. 
                                                 
6
 Béatrice Maurer, Le principe de respect de la dignité humaine et la Convention européenne 
des droits de l‟homme, La documentation Française - Paris, 1999, pp. 7-8 
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PART I: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN 
ARTICLE 1 CHARTER 
 
Chapter 1: The revival of natural law thinking 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The inalienable dignity of the human being was mostly considered a philosophical and 
theological concept before it became a general legal concept
7
. Article 1 EU Charter is 
rooted in a long intellectual and spiritual tradition without which the legal concept of 
human dignity as we apply it today cannot be fully understood. It is the political 
development in Europe in the years after the Second World War combined with the 
strong influence of the émigré European intellectuals residing in the United States during 
the War that gave the broad acceptance of the human dignity notion its main forward 
thrust towards how it is regarded today. The protection of human dignity would not have 
become an article of EU law, were it not for the rapid and simultaneous strengthening of 
this concept in philosophical discourse, in national and international politics and in 
national law throughout Europe from the post-War period onwards. But what is often 
overlooked in the discussions about the thinking behind and the meaning of the legal 
concept and the legal principle of human dignity is what the authors of the original 
human dignity provisions and those that influenced them had in mind. Knowing this will 
help us understand their true meaning and envisaged consequences. We will therefore 
first discuss a number of influential thinkers of the post-War era that advanced a revival 
of natural law thinking in relation to human dignity and human rights. We will then 
discuss the relevant Catholic doctrine on human dignity, followed by modern Christian 
thought and finally the development of post-War Kantian thought on human dignity and 
the law. 
 
                                                 
7
 As we discussed in the introduction, the human dignity notion was a political and legal concept of only 
limited applicability until the beginning of the Second World War 
 10 
In dealing with the total destruction of the Second World War, a return to natural law 
theories was in fact already prompted by a more or less practical reason: the absence of 
functioning legal systems. Jacques Maritain notes this pointedly: 
 
―Be it finally noted that when it comes to the application of basic requirements of justice 
in cases where positive law‘s provisions are lacking to a certain extend, a recourse to the 
principles of Natural Law is unavoidable, thus creating a precedent and new judicial 
rules. That is what happened, in a remarkable manner, with the epoch-making Nazi war 
crimes trials in Nuremberg.‖8  
 
Rémi Brague observes: 
 
―Seit einigen Jahrzehnten, und schon gleich nach dem 2. Weltkrieg ist ein neues 
Bedürfnis nach Natürlichem und Objektivem in der Letztbegründung der Normen 
aufgetaucht. Der NS-Staat hatte sein eigenes Rechtssystem entwickelt. Die Henker und 
Kriegsverbrecher richteten sich nach den Normen dieses ursprünglich völlig legitim zur 
Macht gelangten und international anerkannten Staates. Wie konnte man sie etwa 
während der Nürnberger Prozesse anklagen? Sie seien nur pflichtgetreue Diener eines 
Staates gewesen. Dieses sehr konkrete, zeitgebundene Problem bildete den Hintergrund 
für eine Wiederentdeckung des Naturrechts gegen den einseitigen Rechstpositivismus, der 
zwischen den Kriegen das Feld behauptet hatte.―9 
 
But already during the rise of the Nazi regime and the first years of the war, and as more 
details started emerging about its massive crimes against humanity, important European 
intellectuals that had gone into exile started working on post-War models for a peaceful 
and just European society
10
. The natural law argument played a primary role in these 
deliberations. The idea of natural law as the foundation for the notion of human dignity 
                                                 
8
 Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, Washington D.C. 1998, p. 95 – footnote 12. First published in 1951. 
9
 Rémi Brague, Naturrecht heute – Editorial, in: Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift Communio (IKaZ) 
39 (2010), where he is summarizing Mey and Hillgruber, p. 114 
10
 The list of influential European thinkers that fled Europe for the United States not only included Heinrich 
Rommen and Maritain, but also Yves R. Simon (France), Eric Voegelin (Austria) and Leo Strauss 
(Germany), to name but a few 
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and the human rights based on it became widespread, although not long-lived as Verdross 
notes
11
. The main 20
th
 Century revival of natural law thinking took place mostly between 
1930 and 1950, being driven for an important part by those philosophers, theologians and 
lawyers that fled to the United States after the rise to power of Hitler. Some of the main 
writers of this period who all suffered personally from the consequences of the Nazi 
persecutions will be discussed here. 
 
1.2. Heinrich Rommen (1897-1967) 
The German lawyer and professor Heinrich Rommen was a civil and canon law specialist 
who also studied philosophy and political science. Apart from his academic work, he also 
practiced law. Rommen had a keen interest in Catholic social action, both as an answer to 
the disintegration of the Weimar Republic, as well as in opposition to the rise of National 
Socialism. His outspoken views on the danger of the Nazi power system already landed 
Rommen in jail in 1933. He emigrated to the United States with his family in 1938. 
Rommen was quickly recognized there as a leading émigré thinker and almost 
immediately started teaching, lecturing and publishing. During the last 15 years of his life 
he amongst others held a “distinguished professorship” at Georgetown University in 
Washington, D.C. His most influential work ―The Natural Law‖ was published in 1947, 
it being a revised edition of his 1936 work ―Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts‖. 
Another important work was ―The State in Catholic Thought‖, published in 194512. Until 
today Rommen is mostly neglected by scholarship, with the exception of the keen 
attention he got from some of his contemporaries and fellow refugees in the United States 
during and after the Second World War, like for example Leo Strauss. When discussing 
natural law thinking in post-War Europe, it is however important to discuss Rommen‟s 
thought as he was quite influential in his time and a proponents of returning to a legal 
system that builds upon natural law, especially in relation to the Catholic tradition in 
political and social philosophy. Throughout his career he was mostly engaged in studying 
the relation of the Catholic Church to the modern constitutional democracy and proposed 
that these two were perfectly compatible. Rommen was of the opinion that Catholic 
                                                 
11
 See for example on the revival of natural law after the wars: Alfred Verdross, Statisches und 
Dynamisches Naturrecht, Freiburg 1971, p. 9 
12
 Heinrich Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought, St. Louis, 1945 
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thought was the best possible defense against totalitarianism
13
. This conviction was 
inspired by the fact that the Catholic tradition contains a strong natural law component 
which, as we will see when studying its various other proponents, very much influenced 
the human dignity movement after the War. 
 
As Hittinger
14
 puts it, every generation finds a new reason for the study of natural law. 
For Rommen and many of his contemporaries the reason was the rise of totalitarianism in 
the forms of both Nazism and Communism
15
. His book The Natural Law was clearly 
written as a response to what Rommen considered an acute political and legal crisis. 
Hitler was using – aided by organized intimidation and violence- the formal democratic 
process, not a revolution, to grasp power through the laws of the land. That he succeeded 
is in itself a clear indication that a merely positivistic legal system carries great dangers if 
it is not founded on strong pre-positive principles. Rommen saw this and therefore made 
the case for reapplying natural law. We need to understand the ultimate and highest 
principles of law, which means the essence or nature of law, Rommen says. Only then are 
we able to discern whether or not to apply the positive law. This process of discernment 
asks what are the sources of the law‟s obligatory character – what is the intrinsic 
difference between right and wrong, justice and injustice?
16
 For Rommen it is very clear: 
the mere fact that a law has been democratically decided and then promulgated by the 
state does not automatically mean the citizen has to submit to this law. The law has to be 
tested for compliance with the “highest principles of law” and only this will lead to the 
right conclusion whether the law is just. An unjust law is not a law as Augustine says
17
, 
and Rommen equally sees compliance with the unjust law as unfitting. Once again, 
Rommen was responding here to a political and legal crisis developing before his eyes in 
Germany and of which he himself had become a victim. But also today we would agree 
                                                 
13
 See William P. Haggerty, Heinrich Rommen on Aquinas and Augustine, Laval Théologique et 
Philosophique, 54, 1 (février 1998): pp. 163-174 
14
 Russel Hittinger in the Introduction to the 1998 Liberty Fund reprint of Rommen‟s The Natural Law, p. 
xii 
15
 Also: Ibid. Haggerty, Heinrich Rommen on Aquinas and Augustine, p. 164 
16
 See. Ibid. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought, pp. 109-111 
17
 Saint Augustine, On Free Choice of Will, translated by Benjamin and Hackstaff, New York/London 
1964, p. 11 
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with him that the Nürnberg Race Laws of 1935
18
, which will have been a specific cause 
of concern to Rommen, were unjust laws that could not be obeyed. The natural law is for 
Rommen the source of these ultimate principles of law that show us whether a law is just 
or unjust. In the face of totalitarianism it can only be the natural law that counterbalances 
a morally corrupt system.  
 
But legal positivism – one of the pillars of Nazi ideology - regards the natural law as a 
non-law in the proper sense of the word, because it is not the result of state intervention
19
. 
To put it differently, law can only be law if it is by statute and recognized by the state, 
more precisely the constitutional and legislative order. New legislation in this sense is 
inspired only by popular will and guided by those ideal norms that are generally accepted 
at that time, often summarized as “ethics”. The difference with the understanding of the 
natural law lies in the fact that the latter is considered for ever unchangeable and the 
former is not, since it depends on the continuously changing social and cultural 
circumstances, or as Herdegen puts it, on “situational considerations” when he denies that 
there is a pre-positive order that underpins human dignity
20
. 
 
But Rommen is much more accepting of the obvious need for positive law than the legal 
positivist would ever be about the need for the natural law and he in no way sees them as 
opposed. For Rommen it is only logical that the natural law calls for the positive law. The 
positive law in a sense – ideally of course - writes down and actually enforces the natural 
law. Even where the natural law is the enduring foundation of the positive law, it should 
progressively recede “behind the curtain” of the positive law as the latter develops into 
greater perfection
21
. Inversely, this then also means that whenever the positive law 
becomes grossly unjust, like is the case with totalitarian regimes, the natural law 
reappears naturally – thus Rommen‟s original title for his work: “Die Ewige Wiederkehr 
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des Naturrechts”. The reality of the history of humanity is that it always falls back into 
injustice. Rommen and many of his contemporaries responded to this reality they were 
living by calling for the re-application of natural law. This then also inspired the authors 
of such important documents as the Universal Declaration as we will discuss below. 
 
Rommen goes on to explain
22
 that natural law should be seen as a framework law that 
does not ordinarily set directly applicable and enforceable norms for the given society we 
live in. It doesn‟t say for example that democracy is the only correct form of government. 
The natural law only proposes that every political system should respect human dignity 
and the fundamental rights of the person and the family. This would then of course 
automatically exclude political systems like totalitarianism. The natural law is 
“unvarying” as Rommen puts it, and thus elevates it above “the changing historical 
positive law”. This elevation makes it an ideal to pursue for the legislator and a critical 
principle to apply to the positive law, leading to the natural law being able to govern 
political power itself. The defense against the totalitarian system should be based on 
justice and the rule of reason confirming the natural dignity and rights of the human 
person. The rule of law, Rommen says, is the law that binds both the ruler and the ruled 
as it stems from the natural law. The natural law doctrine exists to show the connection 
between morality and law. In his concluding chapter Rommen summarizes the relevance 
of the natural law for the post-War world: 
 
―The hope of a peaceful change of the legal status quo within each nation as well as in 
the community of nations depends on the acceptance of such a higher law that measures 
both the legal rights of the status quo and the claims of those who alter it; and it 
measures them because it is based on natural reason, in which all men participate.‖23 
 
1.3. Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) 
Jacques Maritain is best known for his important role in the drafting of the 1947 
UNESCO human rights catalogue that for the most part found its way into the Universal 
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Declaration of 1948, the latter which he co-authored with amongst others Eleanor 
Roosevelt and the French jurist René Cassin. Maritain fulfilled this influential role during 
his tenure as French ambassador to the UNESCO. He also served as the French 
ambassador the Holy See from 1944-1948. Maritain was a devout Catholic, converted 
from Protestantism, which greatly impacted his writings. He married his Russian wife 
Raissa in 1904. She was Jewish and converted to Catholicism along with her husband in 
1906. Maritain was amongst others a professor of Philosophy at the Institut Catholique in 
Paris before the Second World War and visiting professor at Princeton University and 
other renowned US universities like Yale and Harvard during and after the War. All these 
facts of Maritain‟s life are relevant for understanding his deep convictions as expressed in 
his writings. What makes Maritain such an interesting and in his time very influential 
philosopher is his ability to integrate classical philosophical principles with the historical 
and cultural realities of his time. Maritain was in no way disconnected from the events 
and its consequences during and before his lifetime and he had the remarkable capability 
to react to those developments with answers that were taken from the writings of great 
masters of Western thoughts such as St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and Hugo 
Grotius, whilst grounded in a profound historical awareness. 
 
Before entering into Maritain‟s natural law approach, some explanatory comments have 
to be made
24
. When the philosopher speaks about natural law, the term “law” has to be 
understood in the Thomistic sense of being “an ordinance of reason for the common 
good, made by one who has care for the community and promulgated”25. Thus it is a 
“directive” on how one should act in the future. The term “law” is used here in its 
primary sense and not in the analogous sense as is the case when one speaks about “the 
laws of nature” in a scientific and physical context. The latter use does not tell us how we 
should act but rather how nature or human beings are likely to act based on experience 
and research. So this already implies the moral element of the primary sense of the word 
“law”. The term “natural” as Maritain uses it has to be understood to have two 
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components: the first is that of human nature, namely how we function as human beings 
and what is our end. The second component is the way in which it –the natural law- is 
known by us, for example through reason or observation. The processes of reason and 
observation are facts of human existence and in themselves independently functioning. 
Maritain thus describes two elements of the natural law: the ontological element that is 
the existence of human nature by which every human being is endowed with reason and 
is capable to pursue and end in complete freedom. This then, forms the basis for man‟s 
judgment. The second element Sweet calls the “gnoseological”, which refers to the actual 
knowledge of the ontological element through the experience of life itself
26
.  
 
Maritain describes the idea of natural law as the heritage of Christian and classical 
thought and traces it back as far as the Greek writer Sophocles, one of the great 
tragedians of Antiquity
27
. He calls Antigone –title and main character of one of the great 
dramas written by Sophocles- the “eternal heroine of natural law” because she was aware 
of the fact that as humans we must always obey a higher law that can even mean 
disregarding a human law that contradicts it. Antigone knows not the source of this 
higher law, only its existence before her and the fact that it will continue to exist after she 
dies – eternally. The passage from the tragedy Antigone to which Maritain refers shows 
particularly clearly the understanding of the meaning of natural law already present in 
Antiquity
28
. It is the reply of Antigone to King Creol, whose edict not to give her dead 
brother Polyneicis the customary full burial rites Antigone has disobeyed repeatedly. She 
now stands accused before him and replies to Creol‟s question why she dared break those 
laws: 
 
―Yes. Zeus did not announce those laws to me. 
And Justice living with the gods below 
sent no such laws for men. I did not think 
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anything which you proclaimed strong enough 
to let a mortal override the gods 
and their unwritten and unchanging laws. 
They‘re not just for today or yesterday, 
but exist forever, and no one knows 
where they first appeared. So I did not mean 
to let a fear of any human will 
lead to my punishment among the gods.‖29 
 
Maritain refers to the Ancients calling the natural law the “unwritten law” and finds this 
indeed the most useful term. He then goes on to define natural law in his own words as 
there being by virtue of human nature “an order or a disposition which human reason can 
discover and according to which the human will must act in order to attune itself to the 
necessary ends of human being. The unwritten law, or natural law, is nothing more than 
that.”30 What the great philosophers of Antiquity and the later Christian thinkers have in 
common is that they know and accept that the natural order, including human nature, 
comes from God. This is the core of Maritain‟s understanding of natural law and which 
makes it so difficult to accept for secular European society. But Maritain was aware of 
this already during the War. He underlines that at the very least one could accept that 
there is an unwritten law if one believes in human nature itself and in the freedom of the 
human being, be it that the person who believes in God has a “firmer and more 
unshakable” understanding of the principle of an unwritten law. This is important to note 
here, since it is precisely from post-War Christian thinkers like Maritain that the revival 
of natural law thinking and the subsequent development of human rights law and the 
emphasis on the notion of human dignity has come. Throughout history it has been the 
Catholic Church that most strongly promoted natural law, in recent times expressed 
through the writings of Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI. Both pontiffs refer to 
natural law as the basis of a correct understanding of the human person, the meaning of 
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human dignity and the universal human rights derived from it. More will be said about 
this later. Maritain was however keenly aware of the reality of limited and developing 
knowledge of natural law and says that it can be known to different human beings in 
different degrees with the unavoidable risk of error as well. He thus scales back to that 
which all men have in common naturally and infallibly, which is the practical knowledge 
that we must do good and avoid evil. Maritain refers to this as the “preamble and 
principle of natural law”. The natural law itself is what one should do and not do 
following from this primary principle in a necessary way. The understanding of natural 
law, Maritain explains, because it is unwritten, has gone through a process in which 
man‟s knowledge of it has grown in small steps as man‟s conscience has developed. This 
process continues, throughout the existence of humanity and the development of each 
individual person. According to Maritain, full and perfect knowledge of natural law will 
only be achieved then when the Gospel “has penetrated to the very depth of human 
substance”.31 
 
Natural law is a moral law because there is always the free choice to obey it or disobey it. 
The natural law does not need to be obeyed necessarily, as is the case with the laws of 
nature, like for example gravity: if I let go of the stone in my hand, it must fall. If I 
choose to ignore the natural law, nature‟s physical realities will not stop me from doing 
so. Human behavior is thus ruled by an order that is not reducible to the general order of 
the cosmos
32
. 
 
From here the link to the rights of human beings can be easily made: if we believe that 
the preamble and principle of natural law is the common knowledge that we must do 
good and avoid evil, we can also recognize the rights that are inherent to the nature of the 
human being. The human being possesses these rights because of the fact that it is a 
human being with personhood – master over its own life and to be treated as such. Here 
we come to the notion of the dignity of the human being, which Maritain finds to mean 
nothing if it is not recognized that by virtue of natural law the “human person has the 
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right to be respected, is subject of rights, possesses rights”33. But, as Jones puts it in his 
interpretation of Maritain on this point, the discussion of rights only makes sense if the 
participants involved hold to a proper anthropology, one that contemplates what man is in 
his nature and what his destiny is
34
. The human being has the right to fulfill its destiny 
and to do the things necessary for this purpose. The true philosophy of the rights of the 
human person, therefore, is based on the idea of natural law. As much as its duties are 
laid down in this law, so are its rights. This philosophy is opposite to that which bases the 
rights of the human being on the claim that it is subject to no other law than that of its 
own will and freedom. Rousseau proposed this in his paradigm that “man should only 
obey himself”. What was said by Antigone to King Creol, namely that the human law is 
always superseded by “a higher law”, the concept of Rousseau clearly rejects. It ignores 
the fact that such an understanding of rights, in which the unfolding of these rights would 
ultimately go at the expense of others, is in fact disconnected from the duties of the 
human being that are equally important and part of the natural law. 
 
The human person is constituted first to be part of a family and then to participate in 
political society, Maritain goes on to say. It nevertheless transcends family and political 
society because it has a destiny that is superior to time, place and the social order. In 
other words: the human being has its end beyond human society, namely in God, because 
man and woman are created in the image and likeness of God. This is the constitutive 
element of the Christian understanding of human dignity and it is also the basis on which 
Maritain builds his thought on the subject. The so-called “imago Dei” concept finds it 
source in the following part of the Old Testament, Genesis I, verses 26-28: 
 
“26. Then God said, "Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness; and let 
them rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over the cattle and 
over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth."  
 27. God created man in His own image, in the image of God He created him; male and 
female He created them.  
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 28. God blessed them; and God said to them, "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, 
and subdue it; and rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over 
every living thing that moves on the earth."
35
  
 
This transcendent quality of the dignity of the human being was and is most clearly made 
visible by religious thought, in Antiquity but even more strongly in the Christian message 
of the Book of Genesis and the Gospels. Maritain also quotes the example of the Apostles 
in the Sanhedrin defending their spreading the message of Jesus. The Apostles basically 
repeat what Antigone said long before them as they hold “We must obey God rather than 
man.”36 So where the preamble and principle of natural law is to do good and avoid evil, 
one could say that the source of natural law is God himself, who is our creator and the 
creator of the universe and thus the author of the natural law. Human dignity thus finds 
its basis and its explanation here. The concept of “imago Dei” has formed the basis for all 
further developments throughout the history of Christian thought on the notion of human 
dignity. The starting point of this philosophy is that the human dignity of each individual 
human being is to be respected at all times regardless of its stage of development or its 
perceived value for society. Since the human being is created for an end that lies beyond 
the society in which it lives, its intrinsic value can never be measured according to the 
standards of that same society which is temporary by its very nature. 
 
Learning of the Nazi use of forced labor during the War but also the generally bad labor 
conditions throughout Europe since the Industrial Revolution, Maritain frames his 
discussion on the practical implications of human dignity within the rights of the working 
person. The working person, through its labor, directly affects the economic life and the 
temporal order. Because of this, it affects both the spiritual and the moral order as well. 
Here, Maritain says, the offended and humiliated human dignity has become the 
inspiration for emancipation towards liberty and the respect for the individual person on 
the work floor. The worker is no longer a tool –as the Nazi‟s practiced, but also much of 
the industry independent of the War- but a vital expression of the community of people 
closest to the material realities of human life and thus in need to be respected as such. As 
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Maritain puts it “In a word, this historic gain is the consciousness of the dignity of work 
and of the worker, of the dignity of the human person in the worker as such.”37 In saying 
this, he criticizes both the Nazi and Communist ideologies, where the former used “lesser 
race” persons to do forced labor under deplorable conditions, whilst the latter saw the 
need to –even violently- oppose the workers‟ class against all other classes. The dignity 
of the human being required however that the worker be enabled to educate and organize 
so that he or she can move forward in life and contribute to the common good. That is 
also why slavery violates human dignity, as it does not allow the individual to take 
responsibility for its own life and make the necessary choices to fulfill its destiny. 
Maritain forwards his personalist vision of human dignity that we will later on see with 
John Paul II as well, in contrast to the more common liberal-individualistic and 
communist perceptions of it that are prevalent today. In a personalistic type of society 
Maritain sees “the mark of human dignity first and foremost in the power to make these 
same goods of nature serve the common conquest of intrinsically human, moral and 
spiritual goods and of man‟s freedom of autonomy.”38 
 
Maritain makes a number of insightful distinctions that are useful today for the debate on 
natural law and its relevance for the understanding of human dignity. He quotes 
Laserson
39
 who explains how theories of natural law should not be confused with natural 
law itself. Different kinds of theories of natural law – like any other theory – might 
present different arguments and conclusions to support or reject natural law. But 
disproving such theories does not mean that natural law itself is disproven. This 
distinction is especially important to make when looking at the philosophical roots of the 
notion of human dignity today: we cannot understand human dignity if we do not go 
beyond the many theories and doctrines of natural law to what can be clearly seen as the 
true idea, the reality, of natural law itself. Maritain is very aware of this and underlines 
the point by quoting Richter who ironically but quite rightly says that “every fair and 
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every war brings forth a new natural law”40. This was said in the 18th century! Maritain 
stresses, as we already discussed above, that natural law itself does not change or 
progress, but rather the human knowledge of it does. This is the root of the confusion 
between natural law theory and natural law itself. Put differently: the ontological basis of 
natural law should be distinguished from one‟s knowledge of the natural law. It means 
there can be a natural law with some people not knowing it and many only knowing it 
partly, depending on the development of moral principles in a given society, which in 
turn is influenced by historical and sociological developments
41
. It is precisely at this 
point where our current debate on human dignity often fails: the roots of the notion are 
not known and modern-day developments are exclusively applied as interpretative norms 
leading to new theories, whereas it is meant to include both aspects to come to a correct 
understanding of human dignity. When the foundation is not recognized, building on it 
becomes problematic. Maritain takes as an example the rights doctrines of Kant and 
Rousseau which in his opinion turned individual rights into too absolute and unlimited 
rights that could only lead to those rights clashing violently with the rights of other 
beings
42
. Understanding the foundation of these rights leads to the knowledge that rights 
also have certain limitations that are rooted in the reality of the human person necessarily 
being part of a larger community. 
 
Maritain is a strong proponent of natural law as the foundation for the rights of man, or in 
today‟s terminology, (fundamental) human rights. In his 1951 work “Man and the State” 
he puts it unequivocally: “The Philosophical foundation of the Rights of Man is Natural 
Law. Sorry that we cannot find another word!”43 Still he was realistic enough to know 
through his intensive work on drafting the Universal Declaration that this did not mean 
that all humankind agreed on the primacy of natural law, its role as foundation for human 
rights or on its correct interpretation. He explains how in drafting the Universal 
Declaration, the rational arguments for claiming these rights had to be left aside, and the 
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committee instead focused its efforts on coming to a “merely practical agreement 
regarding a list of human rights”44. This did not mean Maritain did not hold on to his 
outspoken opinion on the importance of natural law as its indisputable basis. He merely 
accepted that in a world with as diverse philosophical, cultural and religious traditions as 
the one he lived in – and we still do-, the next-best solution was to at least agree on the 
outcome that should be achieved in any case. This outcome therefore is ambiguous when 
it comes to more deeply understanding human dignity. 
 
Maritain‟s concrete application of human rights also starts with human dignity: the 
essential characteristic of any civilization should be the respect for the dignity of the 
human person, he says.
45
 He takes the notion of human dignity to the higher realm where 
it belongs by explaining that “in the flesh and bones of man there lives a soul which is a 
spirit and which has a greater value than the whole of the physical universe”46. This 
notion of human dignity sets a clear boundary to the human being: because of its great 
value the human being itself cannot limit, change or suspend neither one‟s own human 
dignity, nor that of another. In a 2010 speech before members of Parliament in London, 
Alveda King, niece of the late Martin Luther King and herself an active civil rights 
campaigner, put it like this: “that at no time does anyone‟s life become less human or 
more human”47. There is nothing greater than the human soul than God himself. This 
means that because of the intrinsic dignity of the human being, any society is in its 
existence subordinate to each human being
48
. The revival of natural law thinking during 
and after the Second World War started from this perspective.  
 
1.4. Alfred Verdross (1890-1980) 
Alfred Verdross was a contemporary of Jacques Maritain. An Austrian legal philosopher, 
university professor, diplomat and a judge on the European Court of Human Rights, he 
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was especially influential in the area of the theory of international law
49
. Like Maritain, 
he was a Catholic and amongst others strongly rooted his writings in the works of 
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius. He was also especially influenced by the 
15
th
 century Salamanca School which puts natural law in an international context and 
underlines its universality to all human beings. Verdross was a great admirer of and much 
influenced by the founder of the ―Wiener rechtshistorischen Schule‖, Hans Kelsen. 
 
Verdross traces back the recognition of human dignity in natural law theory to the late 
Sophists and the Stoics. Still, he concedes it would take many centuries to anchor the 
human rights based upon it constitutionally and make them enforceable through the 
courts. It would furthermore take until the Second World War for a public affirmation of 
the need for a system of international recognition and protection of human dignity
50
.  
 
For Verdross there is no doubt that the philosophical roots of human dignity are the 
natural law and the fact that the human being is created in the image and likeness of God. 
In Verdross‟s writings on the subject, one quote stands out underlining his conviction that 
human dignity is a through and through Christian notion. The theory of human dignity, he 
says, is rooted in Christian patristic philosophy and its terminology was first presented by 
the Catholic Church
51
. The quote is a text from the Christmas prayer of the Latin rite 
Liturgy that introduces the term ―dignitas humana‖ and summarizes in one sentence the 
entire Christian understanding of human dignity: 
 
―Deus qui humanae substantiae dignitatem mirabiliter condidisti et mirabilius 
reformasti―52 
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Here not only referral is made to the Old Testament imago Dei concept as discussed 
above, but also to the rebirth of the human being through Christ, who came to renew the 
face of the earth and return the human being to God its creator, from whom it was 
estranged. This reconciliation with God reinvigorated the understanding of the inviolable 
dignity of the human being, through its reconfirmed “Godly” basis. Any worldly power is 
thus limited by the fact that it does not share with the human being this divine dimension 
of its existence; as Psalm 8 says it: 
 
―What are humans that you are mindful of them, mere mortals that you care for them?  
Yet you have made them little less than a god, crowned them with glory and honor.  
You have given them rule over the works of your hands, put all things at their feet (...)‖53 
 
Alfred Verdross gives a clear definition of natural law when he says that it is “ein dem 
Wesen des Menschen entsprechendes Normengebilde‖54. But the human being has to be 
seen as a whole, not limited to only certain of its aspects. Therefore, it is important to see 
what these different elements are that constitute the whole of the human being
55
:  
1. the biological being: already from the moment of conception the human being is 
unique and pre-programmed to be human, rather than for example the animal 
2. the social being: for its whole development and survival, the human being needs 
to be part of a larger whole, a community of some sort. Life in its early stages is 
defenseless and unable to take care of itself. 
3. the independent being: even when the human being needs its social environment 
for survival, it is created to think and act independently. It can for example choose 
at some point to be no longer part of the community it grew up in. 
4. the historical being: humanity advances and learns, while the human being 
develops itself through history and comes to understand certain things better, 
whilst forgetting others. The evolving understanding of human dignity is an 
example of this development throughout history.  
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5. the transcendental being: Man possesses the ability to transcend the elements of 
space and time of this world and inquire about its origins. This no animal can do. 
It is a key aspect of human dignity, although often misunderstood as to mean that 
as long as the human being cannot (yet) use this ability, its dignity can be called 
into question. The problem with this reasoning is that it overlooks the fact that 
whether or not a human capability is actually used or fully developed does not 
change its essence.  
6. the cultural being: not only is the human being in need of a community to live in 
(the social being), it also needs structures and institutions for its development, like 
science and technology, but also laws and political and administrative institutions. 
 
Human dignity then is what crowns and includes all these separate elements of the human 
being in its essence. What is interesting is that Verdross does not dwell in greater detail 
on reason as the human being‟s core aspect – the rational being - and the fact that linked 
to this it is also a religious being, a being that is in search of its creator. Verdross 
discusses this only briefly when outlining the transcendental being. But exactly because 
of the transcendental aspect of the human being, it is not only capable to ask after its 
origin, but also after the higher order bringing the world in which the human being lives 
into existence: here reason and faith come together because every human being always 
comes to a point where reason and science alone cannot explain certain things. But it is 
here only reason that can decide whether or not to accept faith as the answer. This is why 
we find one should add here the element of the religious being. 
 
For Verdross natural law has the object to enable the harmonious living together of 
people with diverse backgrounds through their acceptance of the fact that they have all 
been given the same dignity as free and responsible people
56
. Reaching back into Greek 
Antiquity and quoting philosophers like Herakleitos, Plato, Aristoteles and Cicero, he 
explains how their ideas where further developed and brought onto a new level by the 
biblical imago Dei theory. Through grounding the dignity of the human being in the 
image and likeness of God, not only does the meaning of the notion itself deepen, at the 
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same time the human being‟s relationship to earthly communities changes radically.57 
Verdross points out that this concept, in its origin Hebrew and extensively developed in 
Christianity brought with it a rethinking about the relation between the human being and 
the state. Now the state is no longer the ultimate goal of the human person, nor is it the 
highest human reality. The Church, as a universal body representing man‟s journey to 
God, points towards a heavenly or supernatural reality whilst not considering itself to be 
that reality. This lead to a radical change of political reality: in Antiquity the state was 
both a sacred and an earthly institution, whilst with the rise of Christianity these two 
became more and more separated and the state was limited to its earthly dimension. 
Through this, the human being is no longer only a citizen of the state, ―Er wird zugleich 
Glied des auf Erden pilgernden Gottesreiches‖58. 
 
Here we come to what is probably one of Verdross‟s most important contributions about 
natural law and its meaning for the notion of human dignity. When the human being is 
“on pilgrimage” to the Kingdom of God, or put differently, merely on earth to pass into 
another world, then he or she already possesses rights that cannot be taken away by that 
earthly community which only serves as a transit route. This is the root of the Christian 
understanding of the inviolability of human dignity and human rights stemming from it. 
Such inviolability and the rights rooted in it can only exist if they find their origin outside 
of the state, namely in what Verdross calls the ―überpositive Ordnung‖. This order limits 
the state because it existed before the state and will exist after it. This however means 
that, when the state is seen as the highest order, human dignity cannot be protected as 
inviolable. This idea of the limitation of the state was the core message of the 15
th
 and 
16
th
 centuries‟ Salamanca School and especially the Spanish moral theologian Francisco 
de Vitoria and the writer Fernando Vasquez de Menchaca. Vasquez de Menchaca on the 
basis of this principle explicitly condemned slavery as an affront to natural law
59
. 
 
Verdross refers to the German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf (1632 – 1694) as another 
important advocate of human dignity, especially regarding the philosophy behind the 
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American independence movement. Pufendorf links the inherent dignity of the human 
being to the duty to treat one another as equal (“gleichberechtigt”). This was of course a 
relatively new thought in a time where slavery and colonialism worked with the idea that 
men and women are not born equal. The 1776 American Declaration of Independence 
reflects Pufendorf where it states:”We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights 
(...)”. The authors of the Declaration of Independence believed that what is self-evident is 
in no need of definition. But this then also prolonged an imperfect understanding of 
human dignity, for example highlighted by the fact that slavery and racial discrimination 
remained widespread in the United States after its independence from colonial rule. It 
shows, as Verdross points out, that a clear distinction needs to be made between the 
catalogue of human rights that sprout from the inherent human dignity of the human 
being and the step-by-step process of actually recognizing these rights
60
. Maritain and 
Verdross seem to agree this is a slow process that coincides with the development of the 
human being‟s conscience throughout time. Historically speaking, this process intensifies 
in the face of totalitarian regimes and their aftermath as the vulnerability of human life is 
most apparent then. This was clearly the case in post-War Europe. Verdross gives the 
1948 Universal Declaration as an example. Here one also finds his most convincing 
argument for the universality of natural law when he describes how the General 
Assembly of the United Nations - in representing the most diverse of cultures - was still 
able agree on the recognition of fundamental human rights: 
 
―Diese Übereinstimmung zeigt uns, dass es sich dabei um Rechte handelt, die zur 
Führung eines menschenwürdigen Daseins notwendig sind. Das bedeutet aber nichts 
anderes, als dass sie einen naturrechtlichen Charakter aufweisen.―61 
 
Verdross is concerned that with the “codification” of human dignity and the cataloguing 
of human rights that started with the 1776 American Bill of Rights, followed by the 
Declaration of Independence, the French Declaration des Droits de l‘Homme and other 
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documents, human dignity was so much written into positive law that its pre-political 
origin was forgotten or at least diluted. In post-War Europe, the 1945 UN Charter and the 
1948 Universal Declaration for the first time specifically refer to the pre-positive 
character of human dignity and rights – in Verdross‟s opinion this is the natural law. Here 
he follows the same line of reasoning as Maritain who also regards natural law as the 
foundation of human dignity and human rights. For Verdross human dignity is clearly 
predefined to positive law, even if the legal concept and the legal principle of human 
dignity are now included in legislation. This is why the distinction between the existence 
and the actual recognition of human dignity is so important. The fact that there are 
different theories of human dignity does not change the notion of human dignity itself, 
only its application. This is equally the case, as we discussed above, for the 
understanding of natural law –the foundation of human dignity, where Verdross like 
Maritain distinguishes between natural law theories and natural law itself
62
. Verdross is 
adamant that the understanding of human dignity and the spread of human rights 
throughout the world by the West is to be firmly rooted in the fundamental principles that 
are the natural law: 
 
―Diese kann aber durch das Abendland, trotz seiner weltpolitischen Entmachtung, ja 
vielleicht gerade dank dieser Erscheinung, wesentlich gefördert werden, wenn die 
fundamentalen Werte, die allen Menschenrechten zugrunde liegen, klar herausgearbeitet 
und von ihren bloß zeitbedingten Anwendungen, die dem historischen Wandel 
unterliegen, unterschrieben werden.―63 
 
It is as if Verdross echoes his contemporary, the writer Romano Guardini (1885-1968) 
who in his 1962 speech accepting the “Erasmus Prize”, asserted that Europe is entrusted 
with a primary duty in humanity to protect freedom because “it gave birth to the concept 
of freedom”64. It is a lofty goal, but one that fits in well with the post-War development 
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of human dignity protection that finds its origin in a free Europe and its Christian 
understanding of the human being. 
 
1.5. Johannes Messner (1891 – 1984) 
The Austrian priest, theologian, jurist and economist Johannes Messner was influential in 
the post-War revival of natural law thinking, especially in the German speaking countries 
of Europe. He represented what is referred to as the “Viennese natural law school”. Like 
so many of his contemporaries he had to flee Austria in 1938 because of his outspoken 
criticism of National Socialism. He settled in England where he amongst others authored 
one of his most important works “Social Ethics”, in German known as ―Das 
Naturrecht‖65. It goes beyond the scope of this research to discuss his extensive natural 
law theory in detail. Instead, we will focus here on Messner‟s thought on human dignity 
in relation to natural law. 
 
Messner first of all observes there is incontestable evidence that mankind as a whole has 
a moral consciousness of human dignity. This evidence can be found in the 1948 
Universal Declaration, he says.
66
 The document clearly surpasses national, cultural and 
religious differences and, Messner emphasizes, founds human rights on the pre-positive 
foundation (“überpositivrechtlicher Grundlage”) of human dignity. It affirms attributes 
that are inherent to human beings, for example in article 1 it says: “They are endowed 
with reason and conscience (…)” What Messner points out here is very relevant: even a 
secular consensus document such as the Universal Declaration is rooted in the notion of 
universal principles of humanity. Some would call this natural law – like Messner himself 
does -, others would call it “universal values”. But the point Messner makes here is that 
human dignity is a concept that exists independently of the state or the legislator and is 
valid for all. He goes further in this line of reasoning by clearly stating – something that 
we have not yet found so directly expressed with other Catholic writers – that the human 
dignity notion such as represented in the Universal Declaration can be directly attributed 
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to the Book of Genesis and the three verses in which the human being is presented as 
created in God‟s image and likeness (chapter 1 verse 26ff; chapter 5, verse 3 and chapter 
9 verse 6). To counter the common argument that the Book of Genesis was only written 
for the Israelites and can therefore not have such universal significance, Messner 
remarks: ―Zu beachten ist, dass diese Mitteilung Gottes keineswegs nur an das Volk 
Israel gerichtet war, sondern and die ganze Menschheit; denn erst vom 12. Kapitel an 
redet die Genesis von Israel.―67 Messner sees Genesis not as the only source of the 
human dignity notion, he just stresses that without it and the further development of 
Christian thought on the subject, human dignity cannot be understood correctly. 
Elsewhere Messner puts it even stronger:  
 
―Nichts von dem, was die Wissenschaft über den Menschen gefunden hat und zu sagen 
vermochte, reicht an das heran, was ihm am Anfang seiner Geschichte durch Gottes 
eigene Mitteilung gesagt wurde: nämlich dass er nach dem Bild und Gleichnis Gottes 
geschaffen ist.―68 
 
One of the attributes of this unique aspect of human life is the potential ability of the 
human being to reason, through which it can be creative and subdue the earth. Subduing 
the earth is the assignment which the human being has received upon creation and in it 
lays the potential for self-realization
69
. It is in these three components: reason, creative 
power and self-realization that one finds the essence of human dignity in action. But also 
Messner cautions here, along with other authors we have discussed, that the mere 
potential – inherent to every human being - of these three capabilities constitutes human 
dignity, not its actual use or fulfillment. The complete fulfillment of human dignity as the 
consequence of the human being created in God‟s image and likeness is only to be found 
in Christ who is the perfect visible image of an invisible God
70
. The human being is born 
fragile and in need of care and protection to be able to grow towards living ever more 
fully the dignity it has been given. Messner furthermore stresses, unlike most other 
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authors on the subject, how much the family is of vital importance to this human 
development in dignity. It is in the family that the individual learns what it means to be 
human and what this implies for responsibility, justice, truth and many other principles of 
life bringing order to the lives of individual human beings
71
. It is in the family that the 
human being comes to more fully understand the meaning of human dignity and its 
implications in daily life. With this important point Messner shows how marriage and the 
family are a necessary surrounding for very human being and a school for human dignity 
itself. 
 
In concluding our discussion of Messner we can summarize his thought in the four 
foundations of human dignity he proposes
72
. The first is the theological foundation that 
anchors human dignity in the human being‟s creation in God‟s image and likeness. The 
second is the metaphysical foundation that is the human being‟s freedom and self-
realization rooted in the responsibility for its conscience. Thirdly, there is the ethical 
foundation that lies in the fulfillment of those duties that are necessitated by its being. 
Fourthly, there is the ontological foundation that lies in the human being‟s experience 
that derives from human nature and the human being recognizes as such. 
 
1.6. Karl Rahner (1904 – 1984) 
The renowned 20
th
 century theologian and Jesuit priest Karl Rahner has written 
extensively and is often described as one of the giants of his age. He made an important 
contribution to the preparation of the Second Vatican Council. Rahner‟s primary 
approach to human dignity is that its most important attribute consists in man being 
capable of speaking to God at any occasion and in doing so not loosing any of its being. 
We may actually face God without in any way losing our unique identity. There is a lot to 
this approach as it describes from another angle the fact that the human being is created 
in the image and likeness of God. When a being is able to retain its own unique identity 
directly facing God himself, its Creator, there must be something “God-like” about this 
being. In the presence of its creator the human being is able to be and to speak and whilst 
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not being equal to God, existing in his image allows for direct contact with him. This fact 
gives the human being a profound and exclusive dignity, something no other earthly 
being possesses since these beings, although created by God, have not been created in His 
image and likeness. What is the background of this far-reaching notion of human dignity 
described by Karl Rahner himself when he unfolds his theory of “Christianity and the 
new Man”: ―Das Christentum versteht sich als die Religion der Zukunft, als die Religion 
des neuen und ewigen Menschen.‖73 Because the Christian is focused on eternity through 
the eternal dimension of life it has been given by God the creator through the human soul, 
the full meaning of human dignity can be better grasped
74
. Rahner is quite clear in his 
writings on human dignity that this notion can simply not be fully understood outside the 
framework of reason and Christian revelation. Only in the “knowing-believing-loving” 
dialogue of the human being with God, the former‟s dignity becomes truly visible and it 
can therefore never be the subject of purely objective considerations or, for that matter, of 
positive law
75
. As for most other writers on the subject, also for Rahner human dignity is 
a given for each human being, ―vorgegeben‖ he calls it. To put it in other words of 
Rahner: ―Sie ist letzlich sachlich identisch mit dem Sein des Seienden, (..)―76. The 
German philosopher Josef Bordat puts its like this: ―Er muss seine Würde nicht erwerben 
oder bestätigen, er kann sie gar nicht erwerben oder bestätigen, weil er sie nicht hat, 
sondern weil er sie in sich trägt und erst dadurch zum Menschen wird.―77 The dignity of 
the human being is thus understood through the duality of the human being, in both its 
physical and spiritual dimensions. But decidedly the mere existence of the human being – 
―Sein des Seienden‖ – already establishes this human dignity indiscriminately. This 
means that, taking Rahner‟s argument to its practical application, regardless of the state 
in which the human being finds itself – whether unborn or born, handicapped, old, young 
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or brain-dead, to name but a few examples – its human dignity enjoys exactly the same 
worth and should therefore enjoy the same protection. Either human dignity is, or it isn‟t. 
There are no categories in human dignity. It is the same for all, from the very moment of 
conception to the person‟s last breath. Rahner would subscribe to this interpretation of his 
work when he writes: 
 
―Dieser Schlüsselbegriff hat noch eine zweifache Eigentümlichkeit: er bezeichnet sowohl 
ein Vorgegebenes wie auch ein Aufgegebenes; weil der Mensch, gleichgültig, welche 
Anlagen, Funktionen er in einer Gesellschaft hat, gleichgültig, welche Rasse er angehört, 
wie viel er an materiellen Gütern hat, welche Macht er besitzt, er hat eine Würde, die 
immer schon gegeben und unabdingbar und unverlierbar ist; sie ist vorgegeben. Und 
gleichzeitig aber ist eine solche Würde seine Aufgabe: er soll sie in Freiheit annehmen, 
entfalten, verteidigen, er soll werden, was er ist: ein Mensch mit seiner Würde, die eine 
unendliche Aufgabe bedeutet.―78 
 
It is important to note that Rahner does not say here that this would mean that the actual 
human experience would not play any role in understanding or even determining human 
dignity. He goes on to explain that it is actually through the experience of life itself – 
Rahner fittingly calls this the ―unauslotbare Tiefdimension‖ - that the individual human 
being comes to grasp more fully what this “given” dignity means and how the living 
experience is the basis for the free choice to also live in dignity. Rahner refers to this as 
the ―aufgegebene Würde‖. As examples for human experience Rahner gives culture and 
the sciences, but above all, he stresses, religion is the defining factor in both 
understanding the given dignity as well as the ability to freely choose to actually live this 
dignity. The message of Christianity is that the human being can experience its dignity in 
fullness because it is rooted in God who is the origin and purpose of the whole of 
creation. For this very reason human dignity is not dependant on or changeable by 
external and ideological circumstances and considerations
79
. This also means that when 
the human being accepts and embraces its dignity in all its dimensions, it will eventually 
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encounter God himself. It is what Rahner calls the Christian message of the ―radikale 
Unbedingtheit seiner Würde‖. But this can only be achieved when “er die Würde des 
Nächsten ebenso unbedingt bejaht, wenn er ihn liebt wie sich selbst, wenn er immer aufs 
neue der schrecklichen Versuchung widersteht, den Andern zum Mittel für die eigenen 
Zwecke zu machen und so eben seine Würde zu erniedrigen.“80 Human dignity is a 
notion that cannot be understood or applied correctly when it is limited to the opinion of 
individual person only, or interpreted as such that each person decides for itself what his 
or her human dignity means. The fact that human beings live in community with each 
other leads to a situation in which human dignity can only be fully understood and 
radically lived when each individual human being also respects the inviolability of the 
dignity of every other. Any different approach, as we have seen very clearly in modern 
history, will always lead to gross violations of human dignity. When some human beings 
decide that other human beings are not entitled to the same respect for human dignity as 
they themselves feel entitled to, the notion of human dignity becomes rapidly eroded. 
History and modern society offer numerous horrendous examples of what this can lead 
to. Rahner would answer this observation with an appeal to embrace the Christian 
understanding of the human being, because when the human experience of any individual 
or society does not include clear examples of this radical embrace of human dignity 
Christianity proposes, how else would people come to know the full potential of their 
inherent dignity?
81
 Probably without intending to do so, Rahner has laid bare here the 
fundamental weakness of the post-War European human dignity discourse in politics and 
in law: it let itself mainly be inspired by the purely negative experience of the horrors of 
the Second World War and the massive violations of human dignity that were 
perpetrated. When it comes to the Universal Declaration it is understandable that this was 
the only politically attainable solution due to the wide range of religions and philosophies 
represented at the United Nations. In Europe however, at the time still a fundamentally 
Christian continent, one wonders whether the process of including human dignity in law 
and politics could not have been more strongly rooted in this radical Christian 
understanding of human dignity. Many European leaders in post-War Europe, like Robert 
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Schumann, Konrad Audenauer and Alcide DeGaspari, certainly had this in mind but 
probably felt that they could not too explicitly mention these Christian principles for 
wont of alienating Europe‟s non-Christian leaders whose support they needed to bring 
about the post-War rebuilding of a peaceful Europe. 
 
1.7. Eric Voegelin (1901 – 1985) 
The German political philosopher Eric Voegelin – born Eric Vögelin in Cologne – was 
yet another of the intellectuals and opponents of Nazi ideology that needed to flee the 
regime. At the time of the Anschluss in Austria, when Voegelin was teaching at the 
University of Vienna, he was already known to be an outspoken critic of Nazism, 
especially through four works he published between 1933 and 1938
82
. He narrowly 
escaped arrest by the Gestapo when he left Austria in 1938 and went to the United States.  
 
Voegelin is relevant for the discussion on the development of the notion of human dignity 
in post-War Europe because he proposed the thesis, discussed extensively in his 
numerous writings covering the philosophy of history
83
, that there is a “true order of 
being” originating in God and expressed through the order and development of human 
history. Previously discussed thinkers would call this the natural law. Although this true 
order of being can never be perfectly known or mastered by human beings, history is the 
“revelation of God‟s way with man”. This means - here Voegelin echoes Maritain and 
Verdross - humankind goes through a process in history where step by step it better 
understands this order of existence, however in the process being increasingly confronted 
with the gap that lies between the truth of the human being‟s transcendence and its 
immanent existence here on earth. The human being can grasp that its life is directed 
towards what is beyond this world, yet sees itself confronted by the realities and limits of 
earthly existence
84
. This process of coming to know the truth about the human being is, 
                                                 
82
 See Eric Voegelin, Hitler and the Germans, translated, edited, and with an introduction by Detlev 
Clemens and Brendan Purcell, 2003. This is a collection of lectures Voegelin gave in 1964 in which he 
analyzed the reasons for and consequences of Hitler‟s rise to power.  
83
 For example: Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, An Introduction; University of Chicago Press 
1987. This is considered one of his most influential works and was an introduction to his most important 
work “Order and History”.  
84
 See John A. Hallowell, Eric Voegelin (1901-1985), The Intercollegiate Review – Spring/Summer 1985, 
pp. 3-4 
 37 
according to Voegelin, conducted through common sense and reason, whereby reason is 
necessarily allied with the love of the Good. It is precisely reason that unites the human 
being and God, because it is common to them. In turn it is this uniting aspect of reason – 
connecting the human and the divine – which is fundamental to understanding the 
Christian notion of human dignity. The essence of being human, Voegelin often says, is 
human-divine participation. It is both reason itself and the fact it unites the human being 
with God that matter. “The truth of man and the truth of God are inseparably one.”85 The 
central role the concept of imago Dei plays in the Christian tradition finds its origin in 
this reality. Glenn Hughes paraphrases Voegelin to explain this notion further: “Thus it is 
only the Christian vision of imago Dei that establishes the absolute spiritual equality, and 
thus the equal spiritual dignity, of all human beings – a recognition that underlies all later 
political affirmations of universal human dignity and universal human rights.”86 It is 
therefore understandable that this notion of equal spiritual dignity is only acceptable to 
those, as Hughes rightly points out, that are personally open to “the experience of one‟s 
own participation in divine transcendence”. Because when the soul is truly open to the 
transcendent reality, it finds a source of order that pre-dates that of the established order 
of society created by man, and that is also superior to it
87
. The fact that every human 
being is capable to arrive at this conclusion allows it to “share” in this superiority which 
is the characteristic element of human dignity itself. In our discussion of the social 
doctrine of the Catholic Church this aspect will be further studied. In discussing 
Voegelin‟s emphasis on the transcendent element of human existence and the need for 
humans to be open to it, we see that a correct understanding of human dignity depends on 
it. Hughes pointedly summarizes Voegelin in explaining what the consequences are of 
denying the human-divine relationship: 
 
―The closure of consciousness to its own transcendent divine ground is the rejection by a 
person of his or her own personhood. (…) Closed existence is personal deformation, 
resulting from the frightened, or despairing, or rebellious, or lazy refusal on the part of 
consciousness to orient itself on the basis of its innate awareness of its own divine ground 
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and through the cultural legacy that explores the meaning of human-divine 
relationship.(…) And from such acts of existential closure there emerge into public 
discourse deformed images of what a human being is—images that, when accepted and 
internalized, undermine human dignity by eclipsing its basis in transcendence, by 
distorting the search for meaning, and by disrupting the sense of human solidarity. 
Images of the human that publicly replace the participatory imago Dei with images of a 
completely world-immanent self, the good citizen of a totalitarian or communist state, or 
the ―absolute self‖ of atheist existentialism or philosophical materialism, are not 
harmless, because from them flow ambitions, decisions, actions, habits, and policies. 
Dehumanized self-interpretation issues into dehumanizing behavior.‖88 
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Chapter 2: Catholic doctrine and social teaching  
 
2.1. Introduction 
The notion of human dignity has had primary attention in the development of Catholic 
thought
89
 throughout the centuries but it has enjoyed renewed and more central attention 
only since the Second World War
90
. The first official papal document after the War that 
deals extensively with human dignity is Pope John XXIII‟s encyclical ―Pacem in 
Terris‖91 which set the stage for even deeper reflection on this topic by the Second 
Vatican Council that had commenced its proceedings in 1962. This encyclical further 
developed the Church‟s doctrine on the inherent dignity of every human being which 
started gaining prominence with the encyclicals ―Rerum Novarum‖ of Pope Leo XIII in 
1891 and ―Quadragesimo Anno‖ of Pope Pius XI in 1931. The influence Catholic 
thought had and still has on the development of the notion of human dignity in its legal 
context is however mostly underestimated or ignored. This is unfortunate, because the 
Catholic understanding of the human person and its view of human dignity is one of 
absolutes that does not leave room for doubt or negotiation about the profoundness and 
consequences of human dignity, seeking to protect the dignity of every human being from 
conception onwards, regardless of any human valuation. This strict view of the notion of 
human dignity can only benefit human kind as a whole – Christian or not – as it does not 
exclude anybody. Aguas
92
 summarizes well the relevance of Catholic thought in modern 
times when he points out that the dignity of a human being is not bestowed on it by 
somebody else, it is “incommunicable, inviolable and absolute” leading to a radical 
freedom. It is the human being‟s complex constitution of material and spiritual aspects 
that makes it so uniquely different from all other species
93
. It is also the Christian 
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tradition, following in the footsteps of Judaism, which made human dignity a notion of 
universal application, even when this happened late in history
94
. This broad concept was 
for example not shared by the ancient Greeks or Romans, as they reserved dignity for 
certain classes of people, not including slaves and other groups of “lesser” human beings. 
Full dignity in these latter traditions was attributed only to free men and women. So when 
trying to understand human dignity, it is vital to include a thorough analysis of Catholic 
thought on the subject. 
 
Four sets of modern-era Catholic Church documents can be identified as especially 
relevant in contributing to the legal-philosophical understanding of human dignity in 
post-War Europe: the 1965 Pastoral Constitution ―Gaudium et Spes‖; the 1968 
―Declaration on Religious Freedom ―Dignitatis Humanae‖‖ by Pope Paul VI and the 
(social) encyclicals written by Pope John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla), whom as a Pole 
personally experienced both Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes and thus knew all 
too well what happens to a society that disregards human dignity. As already noted, 
human dignity was one of the main themes of his 27-year pontificate. Finally the writings 
of Pope Benedict XVI (Joseph Ratzinger) are also relevant for our human dignity 
understanding as they pay special attention to the relationship between reason and 
modernity. 
 
2.2. The Pastoral Consitution Gaudium et Spes 
This document was one of the outcomes of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, the 
most important gathering of senior representatives from the Catholic Church worldwide 
in the 20th century. The Council lasted from 1962 to 1965 and was amongst others aimed 
at taking stock of the rapid social, cultural, political and technological developments of 
the time and see how the Church should respond. Gaudium et Spes, published in 1965, 
deals with the question of what is the relation of the Catholic Church to the changing 
modern world. This question was especially relevant with regard to technological 
advances and political developments that profoundly impacted both the adherence to the 
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moral teachings of the Church, as well as its influence on world affairs. The moral 
guidelines of the Church for its members were now, and continue to be, increasingly 
rejected or questioned as to their validity in modern times. A strong downwards trend in 
the number of practicing Catholics in Europe that started in the 1960‟s also had a 
profound impact on the influence Catholics and through them the Catholic Church could 
have on society. The authors of Gaudium et Spes were well aware of these changes as the 
following excerpt shows: 
 
―Today, the human race is involved in a new stage of history. Profound and rapid 
changes are spreading by degrees around the whole world. Triggered by the intelligence 
and creative energies of man, these changes recoil upon him, upon his decisions and 
desires, both individual and collective, and upon his manner of thinking and acting with 
respect to things and to people. Hence we can already speak of a true cultural and social 
transformation, one which has repercussions on man's religious life as well.‖95 
 
The first chapter of the document is titled “The Dignity of the Human Person” and forms 
the introduction to a thorough discussion of the Church‟s understanding of human dignity 
and its implications for the human being and society. The dignity of the human being is 
clearly seen by the authors as the basis of the teachings of the Catholic Church as 
outlined in this document
96
. The fundamental element of the human being‟s dignity, the 
document says, is the ability to listen to its conscience and to be able to choose to do 
good and avoid evil. Obeying conscience is “the very dignity of man”. The human being 
also rebels against death because it is created with a soul that has been made to live 
eternally and thus cannot be limited to its earthly dimension. Therefore, no matter the 
great technological advances and the ability to prolong human life in its biologic sense, it 
does not take away the longing of the human being for the “higher life”. This longing is 
such an important element in understanding human dignity because it makes very clear 
that the human being is never limited by this world, and can thus also never be fully 
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under the control of the earthly institutions. This is why human dignity is inviolable. The 
root reason for its human dignity, says Gaudium et Spes, “lies in man's call to 
communion with God”.97 The authors point out that when a divine dimension is missing 
from human life, when there is no hope for a hereafter, the human being sinks into 
despair and despondency. This leads to a loss of human dignity through actions that 
reflect a lack of understanding of the human being‟s eternal dimension, like for example 
“whatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder, genocide, abortion, 
euthanasia or willful self-destruction”98. The Council leaves no doubt as to how it regards 
human dignity in its full force and meaning, especially in what we today call the social 
dimension: 
 
―Coming down to practical and particularly urgent consequences, this council lays stress 
on reverence for man; everyone must consider his every neighbor without exception as 
another self, taking into account first of all his life and the means necessary to living it 
with dignity (..)‖99 
 
Human dignity also means that a person that errs, or for example adheres to another 
religion, does not loose any of its dignity. One has to distinguish here between the error 
and the person that makes the error. One can reject the former but not the latter, says 
Gaudium et Spes. This counts especially for the freedom of expression and the freedom 
of religion. The authors state that the Gospel and the role given in it to the Church are the 
best guarantors of human dignity. When the divine law is rejected - the higher order to 
which the human being is on pilgrimage as Verdross also puts it - human dignity is in 
danger of being annihilated because it will then become a matter of debate and 
interpretation rather than based on an untouchable truth. Therefore, especially Christians 
should participate in social, political and cultural activities that bring human life and 
society “in conformity with the dignity of the human person without any discrimination 
of race, sex, nation, religion or social condition”100. This should of course also be 
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reflected in the reform of legal and political rights that enable the human being to live in 
full dignity. Gaudium et Spes refers here to the various initiatives that had already been 
taken or were under way at the time to include human dignity and human rights in laws 
and international treaties. 
 
2.3. The Declaration on Religious Freedom ―Dignitatis Humanae‖ 
As was already noted, the Second Vatican Council was primarily aimed at helping the 
Catholic Church find its place in a rapidly changing world, a world in which the 
traditional influence of the Church, religiously and politically, was undergoing major 
changes. Whereas the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes can be seen as the Church‟s 
key document in outlining its tradition and further development of human dignity theory, 
the declaration on religious freedom Dignitatis Humanae
101
 by Pope Paul VI would best 
be described as a practical application of the Church‟s human dignity theory in the 
modern world. It should also be noted that Dignitatis Humanae drew much of its 
inspiration from another important document from the time of the Second Vatican 
Council, Pope John XXIII‟s abovementioned 1963 encyclical ―Pacem in Terris‖102. As 
Grasso
103
 points out, the importance of Dignitatis Humanae – mostly ignored today – is 
vast, although at the time of its promulgation it was quite controversial
104
. Pope Paul VI, 
addressing the world‟s leaders at the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council on 8 
December 1965 called Dignitatis Humanae one of the Council‟s “major texts”, whilst 
also calling it “one of its greatest documents” in an address to representatives from 
various nations and international organizations a day earlier. In his message to rulers he 
says: 
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―What does the Church ask of you today? She tells you in one of the major documents of 
this council. She asks of you only liberty, the liberty to believe and to preach her faith 
(...).‖105 
 
Religious freedom was then and is now much proclaimed in constitutions and 
international treaties, but still a fundamental right violated on a large scale today. Not 
only the Second World War, but even more the communist dictatorships behind the Iron 
Curtain and in Asia were and - in the case of Asia (including the Middle East) and parts 
of Africa – still are prime examples of such violations. It is especially the communist 
dictatorships that Pope Paul VI was referring to in both Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis 
Humanae when lamenting the lack of religious freedom in the world. But more 
importantly, and this was the real controversy, with Dignitatis Humanae the Church 
made a big step in its doctrinal development. She publicly broke with an ambivalent and 
increasingly unsustainable notion of religious liberty that had in the past been used by 
some to be harshly intolerant of other religions
106
. This departure is starkly underlined 
when Paul VI writes that “there has at times appeared a way of acting that was hardly in 
accord with the spirit of the Gospel or even opposed to it.”107  
According to the declaration, the right to religious liberty finds its foundation in the 
dignity of the human being. This dignity, it states, can be known through the revealed 
Word of God and through reason. Human dignity consists of human beings being gifted 
with both reason and a free will. This then enables them to take personal responsibility 
for their lives and for what they do. The importance of Dignitatis Humanae lies therein, 
that it clearly sees religious liberty as one of the defining aspects of human dignity itself. 
More than a consequence, it is a vital component of human dignity
108
. Pope John Paul II 
notes with regard to religious liberty and its relation to human dignity that it is ultimately 
the personal convictions of the human person that lead it to recognize and follow a 
religious or metaphysical concept that involves the whole of the human life and thus all 
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the fundamental decisions that are a result of adhering to this concept. But this process 
can only take place when the individual conscience is fully respected and its searching is 
not hampered by the judgment or interference of others
109
. 
 
The American theologian Neuhaus summarizes this concept of Dignitatis Humanae as 
“the dignity of the human person, and of the person in community, requires religious 
freedom.”110 Without it, Paul VI seems to say, it is hardly possible to uphold human 
dignity at all. This argument is supported when one takes a close look at the following 
passages from Dignitatis Humanae discussing the human being‟s search for truth - a 
defining aspect of human life: 
―Truth, however, is to be sought after in a manner proper to the dignity of the human 
person and his social nature. The inquiry is to be free, carried on with the aid of teaching 
or instruction, communication and dialogue, in the course of which men explain to one 
another the truth they have discovered, or think they have discovered, in order thus to 
assist one another in the quest for truth. Moreover, as the truth is discovered, it is by a 
personal assent that men are to adhere to it‖. 
and further on: 
―Injury therefore is done to the human person and to the very order established by God 
for human life, if the free exercise of religion is denied in society, provided just public 
order is observed.‖ 111 
 
Put differently, human dignity cannot be upheld if civil society does not uphold the 
freedom to exercise a religion, since religion – in the Catholic view at least – is a matter 
of faith and reason and thus only possible as a completely free and deliberated choice, 
either to accept it or to reject it. Denying the freedom of religion would take away the 
essence from the notion of human dignity that is the gift and use of reason that can lead to 
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faith. No government should therefore interfere with the religion its citizens chose to 
practice or they chose to turn their backs on. No one can be forced to embrace any given 
faith, including the Christian faith, because by its nature the act of faith is a free act. Man 
serving God means that it acts by personal conscience, not under compulsion. That is the 
dignity of the human person as given by God
112
. Dignitatis Humanae emphasizes that the 
recognition of this primary aspect of human dignity in society – the freedom from any 
coercion in matters religious – is the fruit of a process of human development over the 
course of time
113
.  
Essential to reading this document is the understanding Paul VI promotes of the limits of 
government: his core message is a vision of political life that is one of limited 
government. Since human dignity comes from the pre-political order, it is the human 
being that should watch over the state, not the state watching over the human being. 
Liberty and a right to immunity from coercion are, as John Murray puts it „”resident in 
the person as such” and thus cannot be granted, regulated or taken away by the state114. 
Religious freedom can thus not be seen as a form of tolerance, because it isn‟t. This 
liberty is God-given and grounded in the dignity of the human person, as well as in 
natural law
115
. Here we are reminded of what both Maritain and Verdross had to say 
about natural law and human dignity, whereby the former is the unchangeable source and 
basis of the latter over which the state cannot have control, as it is a pre-positive order 
enjoying universal application.  
 
Now that nations and men of different religions and cultures grow ever closer together, 
the declaration concludes, it is even more important that this fundamental element of 
human dignity – in which every man and woman has personal responsibility - be 
constitutionally anchored and adhered to in order that peace be established
116
. Without 
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freedom, one can conclude from this principle, there can be no peace. The Christian 
understanding of religious freedom – unfortunately historically not always practiced as 
such - can thus best be summarized as was done in Dignitatis Humanae: 
 
―For He bore witness to the truth, but He refused to impose the truth by force on those 
who spoke against it. Not by force of blows does His rule assert its claims.‖117 
 
2.4. The encyclicals of Pope John Paul II 
Pope John Paul II, already known for his numerous writings as Karol Wojtyla before he 
became Head of the Catholic Church, repeatedly stated that human dignity is the “pivot 
on which the entirety of Catholic social doctrine rests.”118 This conviction is also 
apparent from what is referred to as his „social encyclicals‟ and the various other 
documents discussing human dignity and human rights. Karol Wojtyla was a philosophy 
and ethics professor at the Catholic university of Lublin in Poland before he became 
bishop, archbishop and then pope and put the themes of human freedom and human 
dignity at the center of his writings. As a young man he had personally experienced the 
trampling of human dignity by the Nazi occupiers of his country, followed by the 
installation of a communist dictatorship that was equally disrespectful of the dignity of 
the human person. Wojtyla‟s main concern was the rising prominence of various new 
visions of the human person in post-War Europe. All these visions had in common that in 
one way or the other – again – they denied what is the essence of being human, namely to 
be able to exercise free will
119
. Marxists claimed that human beings are merely the 
product of their class and only driven by economic interests, and thus not free to exercise 
their will. Or in other words: determinism. This view was of course strongly present in 
Wojtyla‟s direct environment. But his concern also went to other forms of determinism 
that were – apart from Marxism – popular in Europe, both East and West, such as the 
Freudian understanding of the human person‟s sexual determination. Also important to 
mention here is the Nietzschean notion embraced by the Nazis. They claimed that human 
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dignity in the Christian understanding had severed the link between dignity and power 
and instead –other than for example Plato, Aristotle and Cicero did – bestowed full 
dignity on every single human being, regardless of age, race, public status, sex or 
religion. It is in response to those ideologies that Wojtyla set out to develop a 
philosophical anthropology that focused on the capacity of the human person to rise 
above the determinism described by amongst others Marxism, Freudian thought and 
Nietzsche‟s ideas, by focusing on the mere aspect of being and the exercise of a free will. 
Wojtyla linked human dignity to the (developing) capacity of the human being to 
transcend itself, to overcome cultural conditioning and to choose to do the good. This can 
however not take place effectively without including the component of the human being‟s 
relations to others, the social dimension
120
. These elements can be seen as the foundation 
for Wojtyla‟s later writings on human dignity, which found their first expression in his 
1969 phenomenological work ―The Acting Person‖121. The key to this work was that 
every action has an internal effect and an external effect – and that the person‟s dignity is 
in fact best expressed though the exercise of a free will and as a consequence also the free 
gift of oneself to others. Human dignity in the thought of Pope John Paul II therefore also 
has a strong social component. This underlines the Christian understanding of dignity 
being exclusively reserved for the human being, and not for example for animals, because 
it is only the human being that has the capacity of self-giving. Dignity in this sense can 
only be human. 
 
Now we come to the encyclicals of John Paul II in which the notion of human dignity 
was further developed. Due to the innumerable writings of Karol Wojtyla after he became 
Pope John Paul II, we will focus on these encyclicals specifically discussing human 
dignity as well as related natural law theories, most important of which are Veritatis 
Splendor, Evangelium Vitae and Fides et Ratio, as well as two of the social encyclicals 
Laborem Exercens and Centesimus Annus. Since John Paul‟s intellectual and pastoral 
endeavors were centered on the protection of human dignity, many of his other writings 
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also allude to the theme
122
. The social encyclicals deal more with the practical 
implications of human dignity relating to the development of the human being in society 
and the role of work. The former three encyclicals are focused on providing the theory or 
otherwise present the moral and natural law argument for the protection of human 
dignity. These writings should be seen in the light of dramatic new developments in 
science and medicine that led to the need for the Catholic Church to more thoroughly 
explain and reaffirm its teaching on matters involving the dignity of the human being. 
 
In his first encyclical as leader of the Catholic Church, Redemptor Hominis
123
, Pope John 
Paul II sets out the agenda for his pontificate. The document already outlines his views on 
human dignity in clear terms. Referring to Christ becoming man, John Paul II explains 
the enormity of human dignity: “Human nature, by the very fact that it was assumed, not 
absorbed, in him, has been raised in us also to a dignity beyond compare.”124 With this 
statement John Paul establishes a framework of a human dignity understanding that 
essentially knows no limits as to how much it should be respected – because of its divine 
dimension. This comprises the most generous understanding of the basis of fundamental 
human rights existent in today‟s human dignity discourse, a fact that has been mostly 
overlooked. Dignity belongs to humanity and is inseparable from it, whereby freedom is 
its precondition and basis
125
. It is worth noting that the Pope highlights two key areas in 
this encyclical in which the protection of human dignity is of special concern to him. It is 
religious freedom, where he refers to the declaration Dignitatis Humanae discussed 
above, and the rights of workers. These are recurring themes in the writings of this Pope: 
The need for the human being to be able to freely express a religion and the freedom to 
work under conditions that are human. With this he provides the constitutive elements for 
the notion of human dignity, namely that it includes freedom itself and the possibility to 
express that freedom by choosing to believe or not and being able to provide for one‟s 
life in a dignified way. 
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To simply classify the post-War encyclical letters of John Paul II and other Church 
documents discussing natural law as part of the 20
th
 century movement of a revival of 
natural law thinking would not be accurate. The Catholic Church has a long and well-
documented tradition in natural law discourse and it has played a decisive role in its 
development throughout history. It would hardly be possible to identify any pope that did 
not pay close attention to the subject in at least part of his writings. Still, one could say 
that all the post-War popes, and especially John Paul II and Benedict XVI - both of 
whom were personally affected by the Second World War and its impact on Europe - felt 
an especially urgent need to reaffirm and where necessary reintroduce natural law 
thinking. It is within this perspective that we discuss John Paul II‟s thought on human 
dignity. 
 
Encyclical Letter Veritatis Splendor (1993) 
In writing “The Splendor of Truth”126 John Paul II wanted to challenge the pervasive 
trend of moral relativism both within and outside of the Catholic Church that continues 
until today. The Pope warns how the rupture between truth and freedom promoted by 
many in modern society is in fact undermining society itself. The document is a solid 
treatise on the Catholic tradition in the field of morality and in the first part outlines in 
detail the foundational importance of the natural (moral) law. The second part also deals 
extensively with the relationship between human dignity and natural law. 
 
In his introductory chapter John Paul notes the fact that the teachings of the Catholic 
Church are no longer simply questioned by occasional dissent, but called into question in 
an “overall and systematic” way. Along the way the natural law, its universality and the 
permanent validity of its precepts is rejected. This rejection is mostly based on 
anthropological and ethical considerations that have disconnected human freedom from 
“its essential and constitutive relationship to truth”.127 The core of many of today‟s 
problems lies here, he notes, since those human issues involving moral reflection that are 
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most frequently debated are in fact related to human freedom in one way or the other
128
. 
As was discussed above, there is an unbreakable link between human freedom and human 
dignity. As Dignitatis Humanae highlighted it, “the dignity of the human person is a 
concern of which people of our time are becoming increasingly aware”129. John Paul in 
quoting this points out and applauds the heightened sense of human dignity he sees in 
modern society, where one also sees an increasing awareness of the uniqueness of the 
human being and respect for its conscience. But at the same time, there is the problem of 
an over-exaltation of freedom that makes it an absolute end and itself therefore becoming 
the sole source of values. Truth is consequently considered a creation of freedom and 
becomes an issue of pure individual choice and not accountable to any other reality. This 
radically changes the understanding of conscience, since a universal truth about the good 
that is knowable to human reason is no longer accepted; this is what we call moral 
relativism
130
. This then leads to an individualistic ethic that disconnects human nature 
from its universal truth that is applicable to all. It is precisely at this point where the 
weakness in the current human dignity and human rights discourse lies: where there is no 
universal understanding of human nature, how can there be sufficient protection of 
human dignity that is the core of being a human? If we all exclusively abide by our own 
truths, inspired by our purely individualistic conscience about what it means to be human, 
how can we expect others to know what our human dignity consists of and where and 
when it would be violated by them? This question can be read clearly in Veritatis 
Splendor, where the Pope pleads for reestablishing the link between truth and freedom. 
The need for this link can best be seen in the relationship between freedom and the law: if 
law is only that which the human being in an exclusively autonomous way lays down for 
itself, having its source only in human reason, then arbitrariness and abuse of power are 
likely consequences. Here John Paul refers to the need to subject the human law to the 
natural moral law, the latter not established by the human being but by God himself and 
which the human person can come to know by the use of reason. The natural law is 
nothing else than the understanding we have received from our Creator allowing us to see 
what must be done and what must be avoided. However, this “autonomy of reason” does 
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not mean that this same reason with which we can understand the natural law can itself 
create values and moral norms
131
. Our reason is to be applied in a process of thought and 
deliberation that brings us to see and understand these norms having always existed. Here 
we see that the Thomistic doctrine of natural law has played an important role in the 
Church‟s teaching on morality and John Paul II continues this tradition. Thomas Aquinas 
points out that reason and human law need to be subordinated to the Wisdom of God and 
his law, the divine law. It is here that natural law finds its origin
132
. Coming from this 
understanding, John Paul II points to what he considers the true meaning of natural law: 
 
―it refers to man‘s proper and primordial nature, the ‗nature of the human person‘, 
which is the person himself in the unity of soul and body, in the unity of his spiritual and 
biological inclinations and of all the other specific characteristics necessary for the 
pursuit of this end. ‗The natural moral law expresses and lays down the purposes, rights 
and duties which are based upon the bodily and spiritual nature of the human person.‖133 
 
This law is not simply a set of norms on the biological level, John Paul II explains, but 
rather a rational order in which the Creator calls the human person to direct and regulate 
its life and actions whilst making use of its own body and mind. He explains the meaning 
of this with a concrete example: absolute respect for human life finds its origin not 
merely in the natural inclination to preserve one‟s own life – as determinism would have 
it -, but in the dignity proper to the person. The human being must be affirmed for its own 
sake. So yes, there are objective norms of morality. The natural law is universal and 
immutable, and human dignity finds its foundation therein. This law obliges all men and 
women never to offend in anyone the personal dignity common to all – at all cost. This 
dignity, John Paul II reiterates, is asserted when the human person lives in accordance 
with “the profound truth of his being”134. It is beyond doubt that there is a need to find 
the most fitting formulation for these norms because of the different cultural contexts our 
world is comprised of, but this does not diminish their content or historical relevance. 
                                                 
131
 See Ibid, Veritatis Splendor, §36, 40 
132
 See Ibid. Veritatis Splendor, §44 
133
 Ibid. Veritatis Splendor, §50 
134
 See Ibid. Veritatis Splendor, §§52, 53 
 53 
The Catholic Church, as John Paul underlines, is in no way the author or the arbiter of 
these norms, she only sees herself in obedience to the “truth which is Christ, whose 
image is reflected in the nature and dignity of the human person” to explain and propose 
the fullness of these norms
135
. The categorical defense of the personal dignity of each 
human being and the essential moral demands that come with it are the condition for 
freedom to exist at all. Thus, moral norms, especially the negative ones, are meant to 
protect the inviolable dignity of the human being and to help preserve the social fabric in 
which we live and develop. Neither civil authorities, nor fellow human beings, have the 
right to at any time or for any reason violate these fundamental and inalienable rights of 
the human being. This, John Paul asserts, is only sustainable when there is a morality 
which acknowledges “certain norms as valid always and for everyone, with no 
exception”136. This also means he goes on to say, that no nation or state and even not the 
majority of any social body or ruler may (decide to) disregard or violate these norms that 
are the natural law. To put it once again in the words of Antigone quoted earlier: “They 
are not just for today or yesterday, but exist forever, and no one knows where they first 
appeared.”137  
In explaining the meaning of Veritatis Splendor, Gerard Bradley
138
 underlines the notion 
of “no exceptions granted” that is the core of these fundamental norms explained by John 
Paul II. In the Encyclical Pacem in Terris Pope John XXIII already wrote “The same law 
of nature that governs the life and conduct of individuals must also regulate the relations 
of political communities with one another (...) Political leaders are still bound by the 
natural law (...) and have no authority to depart from its slightest precepts."
139
 Bradley 
sees a reaffirmation and strengthening of this essential aspect in the application of moral 
norms by Pope John Paul‟s statement in Veritatis Splendor: "When it is a matter of the 
moral norms prohibiting intrinsic evil, there are no privileges or exceptions for 
anyone”140. These precepts, Bradley goes on to explain, are by no means meant for 
Christians only, they are specifically addressed to all humankind since they express 
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universal moral truths. For John Paul II these norms are the only true foundation and 
guarantee of a just and lastingly peaceful society and the necessary roots of a genuine 
democracy where inalienable human dignity and the basic rights that flow from it can be 
protected. Janet Smith echoes this in her commentary on the encyclical by saying: 
 
 ―[The] natural law and natural rights are linked by their shared grounding in the 
dignity and nature of the human person (...). Natural law, rooted in human nature shared 
by all mankind, is a guide to morality accessible to the Christian and the non-Christian 
alike. It is the great natural unifier of mankind; it allows men from different cultures and 
traditions to arrive at some consensus on morality.‖141 
 
When John Paul speaks about the moral relativism that is so strongly present in modern 
society and its rejection of any form of universal truth, he critiques the fact that objective 
reality is no longer acknowledged, because that is what these universal moral norms are. 
This objective reality which we can all see and understand through reason is replaced by 
the human person subjecting the world according to its egocentric personal choices on the 
one hand and the dictate of the majority opinion on the other hand. In concluding his 
discussion of natural law and human dignity, John Paul II makes a stark analysis of the 
future of democracy and the rule of law - both necessary to uphold the protection human 
dignity – in a society that goes down the path of moral relativism: 
 
―This is the risk of an alliance between democracy and ethical relativism, which would 
remove any sure moral reference point from political and social life, and on a deeper 
level make the acknowledgement of truth impossible. Indeed, ‗if there is no ultimate truth 
to guide and direct political activity, then ideas and convictions can easily be 
manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy without values 
easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism‘‖142. 
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Encyclical Letter Evangelium Vitae (1995) 
This encyclical was published within two years of Veritatis Splendor and as a text builds 
upon the philosophical and theological foundations that were outlined in the 1993 
document. The “Gospel of Life” sets out what should be the place of human dignity in 
political, legal and social matters. It furthermore focuses on the practical implications of 
the development of actual human dignity and human rights „practice‟ against the 
backdrop of increasing moral relativism and secularization. The document singles out the 
inviolable right to life for all – from the unborn to the dying - as the primary consequence 
of a true understanding of human dignity. The active practice of abortion and euthanasia 
are proof for John Paul II that a correct interpretation of the notion of human dignity is in 
need to be reaffirmed, especially where it concerns the alarming developments through 
which formerly forbidden practices are now increasingly claimed as a „right‟. As John 
Paul II sets out to introduce his topic, the notion of human dignity is put at the center of 
his thesis. He affirms that every person can come to recognize 
 
― (..) the sacred value of human life from its very beginning until its end, and can affirm 
the right of every human being to have this primary good respected to the highest degree. 
Upon the recognition of this right, every human community and the political community 
itself are founded‖143 
 
In various passages in the encyclical John Paul II speaks in even stronger terms of human 
dignity by referring to “the almost divine dignity of the human person”. The 
incomparable dignity of the human being is considered by the Pope as such an essential 
element of the fabric of society that any threat to human dignity itself is necessarily a 
central concern of the Church
144
. This is even more so in modern times where there is a 
vast increase in what John Paul II considers “new forms of attacks on the dignity of the 
human being”, especially the weak and defenseless added to the list of long-existing 
victims of poverty, hunger, disease, coercion and war. But these new threats are so much 
more dangerous to society because they involve incomparably larger numbers of human 
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beings that are being killed or otherwise affected, whilst broad sectors of public opinion 
and legislation justify these actions as the mere result of the right to individual autonomy 
and freedom. Increasingly these claims to individual freedom as the justification for 
killing human life go as far as actually calling it a fundamental human right to do so. 
What was once universally held as criminal – the practices of embryo experiments and 
destruction, abortion, euthanasia and certain cases of infanticide-, has now become 
socially acceptable in many countries. The basic value of human life is no longer 
considered sacred and therefore inviolable. The introduction concludes with stating the 
specific object of this document, which is to be a “precise and vigorous reaffirmation of 
the value of human life and its inviolability”145. 
 
Evangelium Vitae is meant to bring attention to what John Paul calls a massive increase 
in the violation of human dignity, often framed in scientific, medical or social arguments 
that claim to alleviate suffering or improve living conditions. The Pope, when addressing 
millions of youth in Denver in 1993, remarks: 
 
"(..) with time the threats against life have not grown weaker. They are taking on vast 
proportions. They are not only threats coming from the outside, from the forces of nature 
or the ‗Cains' who kill the ‗Abels'; no, they are scientifically and systematically 
programmed threats. The twentieth century will have been an era of massive attacks on 
life, an endless series of wars and a continual taking of innocent human life.‖146 
 
A clear example of this development of crumbling respect for inherent human dignity is 
those situations when life is only accepted under the condition that it is free of certain 
limiting conditions such as handicap or illness. This phenomenon is increasingly present 
in so-called „therapeutic interventions‟ that abort the unborn child with such 
„deficiencies‟147 or in assisted suicide procedures. It is a generally known fact that in the 
past decade the number of children born with Down-Syndrome has become a fraction of 
the number it used to be due to the large majority of parents aborting the child because of 
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its specific condition
148
. Perversely, the argument of the „impossibility‟ of a „dignified 
life‟ is most often used to justify such killing. 
 
John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae notes a remarkable contradiction in modern thinking 
between on the one hand a society that puts ever greater emphasis on the protection of 
human rights and its grounding in human dignity, whilst at the same time rejecting the 
respect for dignity and the right to life of massive numbers of the most defenseless of 
human beings: the unborn, the handicapped and the dying. John Paul II famously 
described this as a “culture of death”. The increasing importance of international human 
rights treaties is the pride of Western society. Yet, at the same time, the people, countries 
and institutions that proclaim these „inviolable‟ rights are also the active promoters many 
life-ending procedures clearly violating human dignity and the right to life. Why this 
contradiction in the understanding and implementation of human dignity protection? John 
Paul II gives the following analysis of the understanding of the human being that is 
prevalent in today‟s thinking: 
 
―(..) and recognizes as a subject of rights only the person who enjoys full or at least 
incipient autonomy and who emerges from a state of total dependence on others. But how 
can we reconcile this approach with the exaltation of man as a being who is "not to be 
used"? The theory of human rights is based precisely on the affirmation that the human 
person, unlike animals and things, cannot be subjected to domination by others. We must 
also mention the mentality which tends to equate personal dignity with the capacity for 
verbal and explicit, or at least perceptible, communication. It is clear that on the basis of 
these presuppositions there is no place in the world for anyone who, like the unborn or 
the dying, is a weak element in the social structure, or for anyone who appears 
completely at the mercy of others and radically dependent on them, (..)‖149 
 
John Paul II here directly touches upon Kant‟s human dignity theory as developed in 
post-War Europe and on which we will dwell later in greater detail. At this point it is 
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important to note that John Paul clearly warns for an erroneous use of Kant‟s human 
dignity theory in which autonomy as the basis of human dignity is decoupled from the 
moral imperative that one human being cannot be used for the end of another human 
being. Yet this is precisely what seems to be happening. 
John Paul then goes on to explain how this understanding of the human person is 
connected to a distorted sense of the meaning of human freedom. If freedom only means 
to be able to do whatever one wants without regard for others, it becomes a form of 
slavery to the mere desires or whims of the self and leaves no room for charity and 
community. “This view of freedom leads to a serious distortion of life in society. If the 
promotion of the self is understood in terms of absolute autonomy, people inevitably 
reach the point of rejecting one another. Everyone else is considered an enemy from 
whom one has to defend oneself.”150 John Paul II observes. Equally, human dignity 
cannot be understood as something that stands purely on itself and has no regard for 
others. Human dignity finds part of its definition in the regard for the dignity of every 
other human being – meaning that in the defense of my own dignity the dignity of the 
other is as important to protect lest it become an arbitrary notion. How else can I 
successfully defend the right to the respect of my own human dignity if at the same time I 
disregard the dignity of my neighbor who is entitled to equal rights?  This Christian 
notion of strict equality in dignity is generally not accepted due to the currently prevailing 
anthropological understanding of the human being that is dualistic in nature: modern 
culture tends to make a (scientifically questionable) distinction between the actual living 
human body and the conscious and experiencing autonomous person
151
. Bodily life is in 
this context seen in mechanical terms, as inspired by Descartes‟ thought on the subject, 
whereby the concept of the rational soul being an integral part of bodily life is rejected. 
The teleological understanding of human life however “affirms that the human body is 
the locus of a unified life such that the whole of that life is shaped and informed by a 
developmental dynamic directed to human fulfilment”152 whereby the unifying principle 
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of this dynamic is the rational soul. Dualism denies this and this denial is what ultimately 
serves as the justification for the discriminatory application of human dignity protection 
between for example the unborn child diagnosed with Down-Syndrome and its mother 
(the right to life as „opposed‟ to the right to privacy and freedom). In this approach, the 
unborn life is not yet „conscious‟ and autonomous, and according to some will never be, 
and is therefore not naturally entitled to the same protection as is the autonomous and 
fully conscious mother. The right to life can therefore not have precedence over the 
mother‟s freedom to choose what to do with the child in her womb, even when in other 
circumstances a right to life could prevail. Taking this way of looking at human dignity 
even further was Joseph Fletcher who stated “Death control, like birth control, is a matter 
of human dignity. Without it persons are like puppets.”153 This is yet another illustration 
of what was already observed in the introduction, namely that the notion of human 
dignity is used in the same argument but for opposing positions both to defend and reject 
equal dignity and the inviolable right to life. 
 
In his encyclical, John Paul II makes the case for a human dignity understanding that 
takes into consideration all human beings, without limitation and exception and excluding 
any form of intentional killing of innocent human life or „death control‟ as Fletcher calls 
it. The personal dignity of every human being lies therein that it always is, like its 
parents, irreplaceable and non-substitutable
154
. Evangelium Vitae presents as an 
alternative to the prevailing dualistic anthropology an integral anthropology that sees the 
dignity of the human being originate in its wholeness: body and soul, heart and mind. 
Each human being is a bodily person of incomparable worth and the bearer of rights that 
must be respected and protected by society. Or, as Robert Spaemann interprets the core 
message of Evangelium Vitae in simple terms, “(..) the being of a person does not consist 
in consciousness but in life. (..) persons are living beings and living beings are persons
155
 
and “the preciousness of human life is not primarily a function of some „quality of life‟ 
                                                 
153
 Joseph Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, Philadelphia - Lippincott, 1967, p. 151 
154
 See: Ibid. May, Philosophical Anthropology and Evangelium Vitae, p. 10 
155
 Robert Spaemann, On the Anthropology of the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, in: Five Years of 
Confrontation with the Society, Proceedings of the 6
th
 Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life – 
Vatican City 2000, Libreria Editrice Vaticane, edited by Juan de Dios Vial Correa and Elio Sgreccia, §§11, 
12 (published on www.academiavita.org). Spaemann also points out here that this integral view of human 
life, whilst rejected by modern liberal thinking, is confirmed by biological anthropology. 
 60 
but first and foremost the preciousness of life itself”156. A clearer understanding of the 
scope of human dignity can hardly be given. The age-old Christian view of human life 
and its inherent dignity is that human beings are an end in and of themselves and 
therefore can never be the subject of the ends of other human beings. The respect for the 
dignity of human life is thus a pre-condition for lasting human freedom and is therefore 
not at the disposition of this freedom itself
157
. John Paul underlines that a human being – 
in whichever state of development it is, would never be made or become human if it were 
not human already. Any argument in favor of abandoning the equal respect for human 
dignity for all human beings undermines human dignity itself
158
. Once again Spaemann 
offers an excellent grasp of the essential teaching of Evangelium Vitae: 
 
―The correlation of personhood and life is the crux of this encyclical. Human beings are 
not living beings in one half and persons in the other, so that being a person could be 
considered just one of many possible states of these living beings, but it is as persons that 
they are living beings; and as living beings, they are persons. Life is neither pure 
subjectivity, nor is it pure objectivity. It is an inseparable unity of inside and outside, of 
interiority and exteriority; it is an inseparable unity of being-for-itself and being-for-
others. As a living being, the human being is part of the community of all that is living, 
including animals and plants as well. As person the human being is the peak and the end 
of the entire evolution of life.‖159 
 
As also the official summary issued by the Holy See along with the encyclical asserts, the 
primary goal of this document is to assert the value and dignity of each human life. In this 
effort, two main guiding principles can be seen. The first is John Paul II‟s clear rejection 
of any concept of thought that does not see human life as one integral whole; the body 
and the soul form an inseparable unity in their earthly dimension. The second is the 
argument that human dignity is a hollow notion if it does not find it‟s first and foremost 
application in the inviolable right to life for every human being, from conception to 
                                                 
156
 Ibid. Spaemann, On the Anthropology of the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, §5 
157
 Ibid. Spaemann, On the Anthropology of the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, §6 
158
 Ibid. Evangelium Vitae, §60 
159
 Ibid. Spaemann, On the Anthropology of the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, §7 
 61 
natural death. Without it, the defense of human rights will always be based on arbitrary 
power only, namely the might of the strong against the right of the weak. Human dignity 
can only be an effective legal concept or legal principle if the inalienable right to life is 
not the subject of opinion or parliamentary vote, even if it represents the majority. If the 
right to life is not an absolute, neither can be the respect for human dignity
160
. Instead, 
John Paul calls for a new style of human life in which the dignity of every individual, 
especially the weakest, is respected and protected. Without an uncompromising regard 
for the dignity of the human being, the fabric of society itself is in danger. Pope John 
Paul II therefore concludes his encyclical pointing out there can be no true democracy 
without this radical stance on human life: 
 
―A society lacks solid foundations when, on the one hand, it asserts values such as the 
dignity of the person, justice and peace, but then, on the other hand, radically acts to the 
contrary by allowing or tolerating a variety of ways in which human life is devalued and 
violated, especially where it is weak or marginalized. Only respect for life can be the 
foundation and guarantee of the most precious and essential goods of society, such as 
democracy and peace.‖ 161 
 
Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio (1998) 
―Fides et Ratio seeks to restore to humanity the courage to seek the truth, that is, to 
encourage reason once again in the adventure of searching for truth.‖ 
 
In this way Joseph Ratzinger
162
 summarizes the essence of the encyclical “Faith and 
Reason”. It is also the vital component for beginning to understand the meaning of 
human dignity. An understanding of the truth about the human being is indispensable for 
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applying the notion of human dignity as it is meant: inviolable and equal for all. This 
document deals specifically with the need to accept the vital role in human affairs of faith 
and reason together, not as opposing forces but as “two wings on which the human spirit 
rises to the contemplation of truth”163. John Paul looks at truth not exclusively from a 
Christian perspective, but rather from a universal perspective. In speaking about criteria 
for enriching Christian tradition with certain aspects of other traditions that are 
compatible, he says: “The first of these is the universality of the human spirit, whose 
basic needs are the same in the most disparate cultures.”164, and: “When they are deeply 
rooted in experience, cultures show forth the human being‟s characteristic openness to 
the universal and the transcendent.”165 What Fides et Ratio is trying to say – using as a 
starting point the example of the people of Israel as described in the Old Testament - is 
that culture needs to be and can be continually transcended “in order to open itself and 
enter into the expansiveness of a truth common to all”166. All people are invited to join in 
this process of transcending culture and subjective experience. When doing so they are 
enabled to direct themselves to God, who has “broken into the world” through his son 
Jesus Christ. In this context Ratzinger, echoing John Paul II, goes on to deliver a strong 
critique of modern philosophers‟ tendency to abandon both metaphysics and faith and 
revert to appearance or experience only. There is a need for the mere empirical and 
factual to be transcended to arrive at something absolute, which is foundational in the 
search for truth. The human being is capable of attaining knowledge of this transcendent 
reality and truth, even if this knowledge is imperfect and analogical
167
. But without this 
transcendent knowledge, Ratzinger stresses, the human person is cut off from its 
innermost self and by the reduction to experience only traps it in the subjective
168
.  
 
Especially relevant in relation to the theme of human dignity, Fides et Ratio provides 
John Paul‟s ultimate argument for the understanding of human life in its fullness– and 
thus of human dignity: the human being‟s search for truth and meaning and its capability 
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to do so, unlike all other species. Both faith and reason are needed to conduct this search 
in a meaningful way. But without first accepting the mere existence of an objective truth 
as opposed to relativistic, subjective truths, it will not be possible to come to a full 
understanding of the concept of human dignity. Yet this process of searching for the 
objective truth about the human being can never be successful without applying both 
faith and reason. The reformed-protestant philosopher Wolterstorff here sees the 
encyclical as a “vigorous and visionary call to boldness”169. The boldness lies in the 
explicit call for both the use of reason and the exercise of faith, he continues. Not 
“either/or” – as John Paul notes that many modern philosophers propose, but “both/and”. 
The relevance of this specific thesis cannot be underestimated for the development of 
human dignity thinking. Looking at the application of human dignity arguments today, 
one often sees a strong tendency to focus exclusively on circumstantial evidence and 
arguments - thus subjective – only, that are taken from the specific and often individual 
experience of one‟s personal dignity. For example: when a terminally ill person who 
suffers unbearably requests for euthanasia to be able to die „with dignity‟ rather than 
continue suffering (which in this line of reasoning is seen as opposing that dignity), this is 
obviously very much based on personal experience and opinion. Other people in the same 
situation would say the opposite: they find there is dignity in accepting and carrying that 
suffering and reject prematurely ending life because it would be in violation of that same 
dignity. But as the Pope writes: “We cannot stop short at experience alone; even if 
experience does reveal the human being's interiority and spirituality, speculative thinking 
must penetrate to the spiritual core and the ground from which it rises.”170 In applying a 
philosophical concept such as human dignity it therefore follows that it needs to be 
grounded both in faith and reason so that it surpasses and rises above the mere subjective. 
Without these two the core of the concept will not be found. It is this core and this 
foundation that are necessary to understand human dignity as inviolable. Human dignity 
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depends on thinking rightly about God and the human being – this seems to be the main 
argument of Fides et Ratio
171
. 
 
Encyclical letters Laborem Exercens (1981) and Centesimus Annus (1991) 
Pope John Paul II devoted a considerable amount of his writings to the further 
development of what is commonly referred to as the “Social Doctrine of the Catholic 
Church”, a doctrine that was formally introduced by the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum 
in 1891. John Paul continued a tradition started by his predecessors to mark the 
anniversary of Rerum Novarum in the area of social thought with a new encyclical on the 
topic discussing further developments which have taken place in the field. This has led to 
a well-developed Catholic tradition on a wide range of social issues, such as for example 
work, health and political activity. The core element of the Church‟s social doctrine is the 
Christian understanding of the human person, whereby the notion of human dignity plays 
a central role and is further developed. In John Paul‟s social encyclicals, human dignity 
features prominently. The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church says it as 
follows “The whole of the Church‟s social doctrine, in fact, develops from the principle 
that affirms the inviolable dignity of the human person”172 
The first of Pope John Paul II‟s social encyclicals, Laborem Exercens173, was published 
in 1981 at the occasion of the 90
th
 anniversary of Pope Leo XIII‟s monumental encyclical 
―Rerum Novarum‖. The latter document was the Church‟s response to the great social 
injustices that accompanied the Industrial Revolution at the end of the 19
th
 century. It 
sought to defend the dignity of the individual worker. Laborem Exercens takes stock of 
the improvements for workers since and analyses the current and future challenges facing 
workers. As is to be expected from this pope considering the “battle cry” of his papacy, a 
reaffirmation of the inviolable dignity of every human being stands at the center of John 
Paul‟s argument in this encyclical. He develops the notion of dignity and work from the 
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perspective of two passages in the Book of Genesis: the creation of the human being in 
God‟s image and the specific assignment to subdue and dominate the earth. In Laborem 
Exercens the notion of the human being‟s dignity in work is developed– not as something 
that stands by itself, but as a logical consequence of the understanding of the human 
person in Christian thought: that only human beings have been created in the image and 
likeness of God himself and therefore they have a dignity no other creature on earth 
possesses. The Pope goes even further by saying that “man's life is built up every day 
from work, from work it derives its specific dignity”174, thus making work another 
constitutive element of human dignity itself, provided of course the worker is not 
subjected to inhumane conditions through this work. The encyclical reiterates the 
foundation of human dignity according to Christian tradition and what role the Church 
has to play in pointing out that dignity: “Relating herself to man, she seeks to express the 
eternal designs and transcendent destiny which the living God, the Creator and 
Redeemer, has linked with him.”175 “Eternal” and “transcendental” are descriptions 
distinguishing the human being from every other creature on earth. Created in the image 
and likeness of God, the human being has received a soul that is made for eternity and a 
life enabling it to contemplate God its creator and to be open to the world around. It is the 
human person‟s ability to contemplate that which is beyond itself which gives it its 
unique transcendent quality. Then God, telling the human to go forth and multiply, 
subdue and dominate the earth
176
, passes on an authority and power that previously only 
the Creator himself possessed. This gives further meaning to the human being‟s God-
given dignity: 
 
―Man is the image of God partly through the mandate received from his Creator to 
subdue, to dominate, the earth. In carrying out this mandate, man, every human being, 
reflects the very action of the Creator of the universe.‖177 
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In fact, the human being continues and perfects the work started by God, along the way 
learning more about how to apply the gifts of the earth through human development. So 
work being the “fundamental dimension of man‟s existence on earth” and “something 
that corresponds to man's dignity, that expresses this dignity and increases it”178 as John 
Paul II puts it, helps us understand the practical implication of human dignity. The 
dominion of the human being over the earth is an essential notion, since it distinguishes 
the human being from other creatures that do not have the capability to develop the earth 
and its resources in the active and reasoned way in which only humans are able to do it. 
An illustration of how central this element of human dignity is to the Catholic tradition is 
the fact that the most important of all Christian prayers, the Eucharistic Prayer, mentions 
it specifically: “Father, we acknowledge your greatness: all your actions show your 
wisdom and love. You formed man in your own likeness and set him over the whole 
world to serve you, his creator, and to rule over all creatures.”179 Each individual human 
being has been created to participate in this process of subduing and dominating the 
earth, which can be achieved only through work – any work. In other words: there is no 
distinction of rank in the sort of work humans do: in God‟s plan, the encyclical says, each 
worker and every type of honest work has its unique place in continuing the work of the 
Creator. This latter notion that has been developed throughout Christian tradition is a 
clear departure from the ancient understanding of dignity and work where certain types of 
work were reserved for certain classes. For example: the Romans would find manual 
labor below their dignity and it would be passed on to the slaves, who were considered to 
be lower humans. The Christian concept of dignity and work is – even when it has not 
always been adhered to by Christians themselves - that each human being has the same 
dignity simply because of being human, regardless of the nature of its work. This is the 
“dignity of the human person, the indestructible image of God the Creator, which is 
identical in each one of us.”180 Therefore, what is primarily relevant is whether the 
dignity of the person doing the work is not violated by it, like for example the numerous 
victims of forced or inhumane labor in European history. John Paul II makes an 
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important point by stressing the need to focus on the subjective aspect of work and 
dignity, not the objective. The human person is at the center, not the object for which the 
work and the human being performing it can be used. The human being is someone, not 
just something. John Paul II explains it as follows in relation to the challenges of the 
relationship between technology, work and dignity: 
 
―The very process of "subduing the earth", that is to say work, is marked in the course of 
history, and especially in recent centuries, by an immense development of technological 
means. This is an advantageous and positive phenomenon, on condition that the objective 
dimension of work does not gain the upper hand over the subjective dimension, depriving 
man of his dignity and inalienable rights or reducing them.‖181 
 
What the Pope says here put in the broader context of human dignity is this: when 
looking at human dignity, the primary consideration is this: the human being‟s dignity is 
inviolable because it is a fact of creation – non-negotiable and non-changeable- that is an 
inherent element of each individual human life itself which cannot be given nor be taken 
away. Human dignity is because the human being is. The commentators of Laborem 
Exercens at the time generally agreed that with this notion of human dignity the 
encyclical introduced a much deeper perception of human life and human nature that 
lifted Catholic social teaching to a new height
182
. Labor in this document is presented and 
further developed as the axis of human self-making
183
 and comprises another core 
element for understanding the fuller meaning of human dignity itself. 
 
John Paul II‟s encyclical letter Centesimus Annus of 1991184 is a commemoration of Pope 
Leo XIII‟s encyclical Rerum Novarum, the latter a document that started the tradition of 
social encyclicals. In it, Leo XIII makes a strong appeal to the industrializing world of the 
late 19
th
 Century to respect the rights and improve the conditions of workers by actively 
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acknowledging that “no man may with impunity violate that human dignity which God 
himself treats with great reverence”185. Centesimus Annus analyses the effect of Rerum 
Novarum over the preceding hundred years and discusses new challenges to the dignity 
of the human being in general and that of the worker specifically. It is important to note 
here that although the encyclical seems to be focused on economic issues, for a large part 
it discusses economics and related issues exclusively to place this aspect of human life 
within the framework of the Christian understanding of the human person. This is the 
thrust of the Pope‟s document and it is relevant for other areas – such as politics and law 
– as well186: “It is a point of view that treats each individual as uniquely valuable in 
himself, yet takes account of our social nature, which finds its expression in the complex 
networks of groups and associations – familial, juridical, economic, social, political – that 
compose society”187. John Paul makes these observations against the background of the 
fall of the iron curtain in 1989 and specifically addresses the failure of socialism and 
communism and how these systems fundamentally ignore the uniqueness, individual 
freedom and dignity of every human being. John Paul II having personally suffered under 
the dictatorship of the Nazis and of communist Poland has some poignant observations 
about these systems: it leads to his conclusion that there still exist serious threats to 
human dignity through new ideologies and new forms of totalitarianism, albeit in 
different and more elusive forms. This elusive totalitarianism and these new ideologies 
are equally - if not more - threatening to human dignity because they deny the 
transcendence of the human being and the need for a certain moral order: 
 
―Thus, the root of modern totalitarianism is to be found in the denial of the transcendent 
dignity of the human person who, as the visible image of the invisible God, is therefore by 
his very nature the subject of rights which no one may violate — no individual, group, 
class, nation or State. Not even the majority of a social body may violate these rights, by 
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going against the minority, by isolating, oppressing, or exploiting it, or by attempting to 
annihilate it.‖188 
 
To this strongly worded observation one might add this also means – something John 
Paul II has repeatedly stated throughout his papacy – that even democratic majorities, be 
it parliamentary or by referendum, cannot in any way limit or redefine what it means to 
be human or what is human dignity. Human dignity is not granted by human beings. It is 
an inherent component of life itself, manifested in the being of each human life. The right 
to the protection of human dignity and life, according to the social doctrine of the 
Catholic Church, is not dependant on anything other than the mere fact of being a 
human
189
. This, John Paul II notes, is also where the fundamental flaw of socialism lies: it 
regards the human being not as a free and independent individual with personal dignity, 
but rather as a mere element of a social organism in which that person is fully 
subordinated to the socio-economic structure and where it does not need to make a choice 
between good and evil, which is delegated to the state. This in turn leads to a denial of the 
importance of private initiative and private property and as a consequence a forced 
dependence on the state
190
. Here lies a fascinating indirect criticism of the modern 
welfare state by John Paul II that is of vital importance to the meaning of human dignity. 
He observes: “A person who is deprived of something he can call "his own", and of the 
possibility of earning a living through his own initiative, comes to depend on the social 
machine and on those who control it. This makes it much more difficult for him to 
recognize his dignity as a person, and hinders progress towards the building up of an 
authentic human community.”191 This means that an over-bearing state, or a state where 
the human being is not sufficiently enabled or motivated to earn its own living without 
too much interference, actually violates human dignity. Without the freedom to work, to 
take the initiative and to develop one‟s capacities and ideas, authentic human life is not 
possible. This sheds an interesting light on what the unlimited social welfare state or the 
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over-regulated society does to its citizens: it hinders authentic human development
192
. 
This stands in contrast with the Christian understanding, which acknowledges that human 
fulfillment cannot be found entirely in the state, but is achieved through the various 
realities in which the human person is engaged, starting with the family and followed by 
the participation in social, economical, political and cultural groups, each of them in their 
own way aiming at the common good which should be their unifying purpose. The role of 
the state is much more to facilitate or at least not hinder the exercise of this freedom of 
human development. But then, John Paul II argues extensively in his encyclical, as long 
as a society rejects God it will never be able to fully grasp the limitless concept of human 
dignity, because it is not able to see its transcendence. When the human person and the 
realities it lives in are only looked at in a mechanistic or consumerist way, as for example 
materialism proposes, then also the true capacities of the human being are overlooked, 
namely those of going “beyond itself”, the capacity to surpass the limits of every social 
order in search of that which is greater than us humans. Only when understanding this 
transcendence by answering to the God that has given this dignity and who is above and 
beyond all earthly structures and notions, can one fully grasp the inviolability and 
indivisibility of the dignity of every human being from the moment of conception 
onwards. Taking this a step further towards the functioning of society as a whole, only a 
democracy rooted in a rule of law based on a correct understanding of the human person 
and its inherent dignity can function properly
193
. The human being itself alone can 
respond to the personal vocation in life that each person has, John Paul explains as the 
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element that enhances every individual‟s dignity194. The basic role of the state in 
defending human dignity starts from this premise: that the state does not create obstacles 
for integral human development. This brings us back to what Dignitatis Humanae said: 
religious liberty and the freedom of conscience are the cornerstones of human dignity and 
integral human development: “No authentic progress is possible without respect for the 
natural and fundamental right to know the truth and live according to that truth.”195 
Concretely, this means integral human development includes the full right to believe or 
not to believe, regardless of the religion and how it is perceived by others. In brief: “the 
source and synthesis of these rights is religious freedom, understood as the right to live in 
the truth of one's faith and in conformity with one's conscience and transcendent dignity 
as a person”196. Dulles summarizes the principle message of Centesimus Annus that there 
is a need for a renewal of culture – a culture that accepts the transcendence of the human 
being. A restoration of the order of culture is called for that is directed towards the 
pursuit of truth, beauty and goodness
197
. A culture oriented at pursuing this in earnest 
necessarily includes religion and moral principles necessary to understand human dignity. 
 
2.5. The encyclicals of Pope Benedict XVI 
The tradition of papal encyclicals on social issues and including a discussion on human 
dignity has continued with Pope Benedict, who as Cardinal Josef Ratzinger served as one 
of Pope John Paul II‟s closest advisors in the function of prefect of the Vatican 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. In this position Ratzinger was closely 
involved with many of John Paul II‟s writings. Still, it is interesting to see that the popes 
have a distinctly different style of writing, but even more importantly, different academic 
backgrounds. Where Karol Wojtyla was a philosopher in the personalist tradition, Joseph 
Ratzinger is a theologian in the Augustinian tradition. Although this does not lead to 
fundamentally different views on the notion of human dignity, the methodology they 
apply to come to broadly the same conclusions on human dignity is different. Both 
authors however repeatedly stress in their writings the vital importance of natural law and 
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its relevance for understanding the inviolable dignity of the human being: “The Church's 
social teaching argues on the basis of reason and natural law, namely, on the basis of 
what is in accord with the nature of every human being.”198 There is also an important 
historical fact that unites the two: both popes as young men lived through the period of 
Nazism, in Poland and Germany, and both saw the results of communist totalitarianism. 
They share the same concern for the constant threat to human dignity, the effects of 
which they experienced personally. It is therefore a theme, although not as often as with 
John Paul II, returning regularly in Benedict‟s writings. 
 
Encyclical Letter Deus Caritas Est (2005) 
This is the first encyclical of Pope Benedict XVI and it presents the foundation on which 
he wants to build his teaching as the head of the Catholic Church: God is love and this 
love is expressed through the ability God has given human beings to “partake in this 
love”199. We will see this concept is a further element needed to understand the full 
meaning of the notion of human dignity as developed in the Christian tradition, especially 
in Catholic Social Teaching. Because God is love and human beings are therefore created 
out of love, the human dimension itself gets a much deeper meaning owing to this new 
aspect: the desire to be one with God. Benedict illustrates this as follows in his discussion 
of the Old Testament Book of the Song of Songs and its mystical allusions to love: 
 
―(…) that man can indeed enter into union with God—his primordial aspiration. But this 
union is no mere fusion, a sinking in the nameless ocean of the Divine; it is a unity which 
creates love, a unity in which both God and man remain themselves and yet become fully 
one. As Saint Paul says: ―He who is united to the Lord becomes one spirit with him‖ (1 
Cor 6:17).‖200 
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Building upon the thought of John Paul II on human dignity, Benedict provides a further 
deepening of the understanding of the contours of human dignity. Not only are we 
created in the image and likeness of God, not only have human beings been given 
dominion over the earth and the capability to continue the work of creation itself, union 
with God himself is contemplated here. Not a union out of mere necessity because of the 
role of “co-creators”, but a union out of love, thus in freedom to choose or to reject. 
When this dimension is appreciated and accepted, it is not difficult to understand why the 
Christian notion of human dignity as developed and explained through Catholic tradition 
is so wide-ranging and, in fact, radical. A human being incorporating the image of God, 
the creative power of God and the love of God himself, is indeed entitled to possess such 
profound dignity. Because even if the human being is not, and can never be, God himself 
or fully equal to him, it has been given the attributes that bring it closer to God than any 
other creature. It underlines the profound “otherness” of the human being compared with 
all other living creatures. Yet, it is understandable that a society which does not recognize 
this God and the Christian understanding of God has great difficulty with fully 
appreciating and accepting human dignity in all its elements. When one doesn‟t believe in 
God, in a God having created humans out of love and having bestowed them with his 
most precious divine gifts, how could one grasp the extend of the dignity given to the 
human being itself? This is the core message of the encyclical. 
 
Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate (2009) 
This third encyclical of Pope Benedict XVI
201
 - his second encyclical ―Spe Salvi‖ will 
not be discussed here – is a continuation and more concrete development of the concept 
of Christian charity and the way this should be operational and visible in society. It 
however misses the clarity of argument that could be found in the two previous 
encyclicals and shows the result of various authors having worked on the document. This 
makes it more difficult to distill the central line of reasoning from the encyclical.  
The encyclical discusses that “charity in truth” or truthful charity requires us to see and 
act upon what are the real needs for an authentic and integral human development in 
today‟s interdependent world. Due to an ever more globalized world it is necessary to 
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revaluate what is needed to come to such an integral development of the human being, 
whether rich or poor. The encyclical develops this theme from the foundation that was 
established in the Pope‟s first encyclical: “Love is God's greatest gift to humanity; it is 
his promise and our hope.”202 In order for true integral human development to be able to 
take place in the now global dimension of human life, it is necessary that the 
interdependence of people is accompanied by interdependence of consciences and minds 
and from the perspective of love that leads to charity. This starts with a fidelity to the 
universal truth of human life, the prerequisite of human freedom, without which no 
authentic human development can take place
203
. Therefore a thorough understanding of 
human dignity is required to come to see the universal truth of human life. As was 
discussed before is now repeated from the angle of integral human development: human 
dignity has two constitutive elements, without which it cannot be protected, these 
elements being the inviolability of human life and religious liberty.  
In chapter two of the encyclical Benedict sets out to explain what the truth about the 
human being means for human development. He starts with asserting that our societies 
have to recognize that the primary capital in need to be safeguarded is the human person 
in his or her full integrity
204
. This means that one can only work towards a true 
development of the human person if life itself is respected and protected under all 
circumstances and in all forms. The acceptance of life itself is necessary to pursue the 
development of peoples. Benedict says: 
 
―Openness to life is at the centre of true development. When a society moves towards the 
denial or suppression of life, it ends up no longer finding the necessary motivation and 
energy to strive for man's true good. If personal and social sensitivity towards the 
acceptance of a new life is lost, then other forms of acceptance that are valuable for 
society also wither away. The acceptance of life strengthens moral fibre and makes 
people capable of mutual help.‖205 
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Referral is amongst others made to the strong anti-conceptive culture prevalent in both 
developed and developing countries today and which includes state-sponsored practices 
of forced abortions and sterilizations in countries like China and India, but also the 
imposition of anti-conception measures by Western donor governments. How is an 
indiscriminate approach to the development of peoples worldwide possible, when there is 
no fundamental right to life for every people and every individual? True development of 
peoples can only take place when every single life, no matter in what state it is, is deemed 
worthy of support. Integral development for the human being can not be successful if it 
does not take place in an environment in which one absolute truth reigns: life is sacred in 
all its stages and every life therefore deserves equal respect and protection under the law. 
If not, discrimination is unavoidable, something history has clearly shown in the form of 
slavery, ethnic cleansing and religious persecution. Benedict clearly sees respect for life 
in tandem with the need for religious freedom. Also the latter is essential in the quest for 
authentic human development. Both the express lack of religious freedom itself, as well 
as the deliberate promotion of practical atheism and religious indifference, constitutes a 
major obstacle in the development of peoples. Because blocking this dimension of human 
life means denying it its transcendent dignity, leading humans to aim for what is beyond 
itself. God has not created men and women randomly, but endowed them with a soul 
destined for union with him
206
. If this element of life is blocked or denied, the human 
being is not capable of authentic development, since its authenticity is given by the 
development of the soul that is always in search of its creator and an integral part of 
human life. Or, as Benedict puts it: “When the State promotes, teaches, or actually 
imposes forms of practical atheism, it deprives its citizens of the moral and spiritual 
strength that is indispensable for attaining integral human development (…)”.207 The 
integral good of the human being has various dimensions and these cannot be 
individually suppressed without losing the integrity of human dignity. This encyclical 
underlines once again, now in the perspective of a globalized world and human 
development, that life and liberty are indispensible for human dignity to be respected.  
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Here we come to the core challenge facing the application of the notion of human dignity 
today: our globalized society displays an equally global collection of interpretations of 
what human dignity consists of. What unites the majority of these interpretations is that 
they all – paradoxically – limit the scope of human dignity by excluding certain human 
beings or limiting certain rights. In Europe the common interpretation is much influenced 
by a secular – and indeed as Benedict describes, often atheistic - mindset that prefers to 
keep God and religious truth out of matters pertaining to the ordering of society. Human 
dignity tends to be seen as a basic regulating value that changes along with human 
development, rather than representing an absolute truth about human life that is 
unchangeable and forms the basis for it. In Caritas in Veritate Benedict XVI points out 
that a treatment of human development not based on an integral view of human dignity is 
doomed to fail, since it lacks a unifying principle. Without a unifying principle, or put 
differently: a common understanding of what it is to be human, the application of the 
notion of human dignity falls prey to the public opinion or pressure groups of the day and 
thus automatically becomes discriminatory against those human beings of whom it is held 
at that particular time that they fall outside the scope of application: “Otherwise, if the 
only basis of human rights is to be found in the deliberations of an assembly of citizens, 
those rights can be changed at any time, and so the duty to respect and pursue them fades 
from the common consciousness.”208 The inviolability of human dignity would be lost in 
the process.  
Caritas in Veritate describes what could be this unifying principle needed for a universal 
application of human dignity protection and the subsequent authentic development of the 
human being. It is the truth about human life that can be understood through reason:  
“(…) truth is not something that we produce; it is always found, or better, received.”209 In 
discussing extensively the implications of this approach to human development in the 
areas of economics and finance and the environment, Benedict XVI points out to his 
readers that a mere technological or material approach which excludes the wholeness of 
the human being is not enough, since body and soul are a unity impossible to separate. 
Therefore, the well-being of the human person needs to include both its spiritual and 
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moral dimensions.
210
 Only from this approach is an understanding of human dignity 
attainable. 
 
2.6. Documents of the International Theological Commission  
By way of concluding the discussion of post-War Catholic doctrine and social teaching 
on human dignity, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss two documents that were published 
in 2004 and 2009 by the International Theological Commission (ITC), the Catholic 
Church‟s influential “think tank” on matters pertaining to its doctrine. The documents are 
relevant because they go back to the source and system of human dignity: the human 
being is created in the image and likeness of God and is gifted with freedom and reason. 
In ―Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God‖211 the 
ITC sets out to discuss the development of the concept of “imago Dei” and how it has 
enjoyed renewed prominence in both theological discourse and magisterial documents, 
especially since the Second Vatican Council. The Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes, 
as we have seen, brought the imago Dei doctrine back to the forefront of Catholic (social) 
thought. Communion and Stewardship paraphrases in clear terms what is the essence of 
the Christian understanding of the human being. The truth that lies at the heart of the 
Christian tradition is that the human being is created in the image and likeness of God 
and therefore “the theme is seen as the key to the biblical understanding of human nature 
and to all the affirmations of biblical anthropology in both the Old and New Testaments. 
For the Bible, the imago Dei constitutes almost a definition of the human being: the 
mystery of man cannot be grasped apart from the mystery of God.”212 This conclusion 
highlights what is the source of the confusion that exists around the notion of human 
dignity today, especially in law: when God is left out of the equation, only part of the 
meaning of human life and of its inherent dignity can be understood. A society that 
understands the human being exclusively as a self-constituting autonomous subject free 
from any relationship with God can obviously not fully grasp the dignity of the human 
being exactly derived from this relationship with God. Because: “(…) the imago 
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Dei consists in man's fundamental orientation to God, which is the basis of human dignity 
and of the inalienable rights of the human person.”213 The imago Dei theology underlines 
the uniquely personal and relational conception of the human being. This is clearly linked 
to the “system” of natural law that is not a rigid fatalistic understanding of the human 
being as subjected to nature, but rather in the Christian tradition a natural moral law. It is 
a set of life coordinates given to human beings and valid for all peoples, regardless of 
religion, sex or race. The ITC document ―Nouveau Regard sur la Loi Naturelle―214 gives 
an in-depth analysis of the historical development and relevance of the concept of natural 
moral law today and proposes a “universal ethic” that it sees is possible because all major 
religions and philosophies have in common at least a limited understanding of this 
universal “moral framework” or philosophy215. This further strengthens the argument 
made earlier, whereby the Christian tradition sees the confirmation and application of the 
“pre-political” or “pre-positive” natural moral law as indispensable to understand the 
notion of human dignity: ―Les droits naturels sont des mesures des rapports humains 
antérieurs à la volonté du législateur. Ils sont donnés dès que les hommes vivent en 
société. Le droit naturel est ce qui est naturellement juste avant toute formulation 
légale‖216. Human dignity, the document underlines, can never be understood in a merely 
legal positivistic way: ―Mais le positivisme juridique est notoirement insuffisant, car le 
législateur ne peut agir légitimement qu‘à l‘intérieur de certaines limites qui découlent 
de la dignité de la personne humaine et au service du développement de ce qui est 
authentiquement humain.‖217 What is authentically human cannot be regulated or 
changed; it can only be understood or not understood. The natural moral law is the 
system, the tool, enabling the human being to come to that understanding, regardless of 
religion or culture. 
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Chapter 3: Modern Christian thought 
 
3.1. Introduction 
We now begin the discussion of some influential Christian writers that, although having 
lived through the Second World War, were either very young or not yet in the 
determining phase of their academic development when war broke out. Their writings 
therefore mainly reflect the post-War European development of human dignity thinking 
whilst at the same time displaying an acute awareness of what misery and destruction the 
totalitarian regimes of their age had brought about. 
 
3.2. Franz Böckle (1921-1991) 
Franz Böckle was a Swiss Catholic priest who is especially known for his writings on 
moral theology. He co-authored some works with Karl Rahner and Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, both whose writings on human dignity are included in this research.  
As to the premise that human dignity is a given which cannot be taken away, Böckle 
seems to represent the same school of thought as Rahner and Böckenförde, although this 
is not entirely clear. In an important text he authored that includes a discussion on human 
dignity, Böckle says ―(..) dass jeden einzelnen Menschen ein personaler Wert eigen sei, 
der ihm unabhängig von seiner Mitgliedschaft in irgendeinen denkbaren Sozialsystem 
zukommt und darum von keinem Sozialsystem abgesprochen werden darf.―218 It is 
interesting to note the use of words by Böckle; the last word of this quote is ―darf‖, a 
conjugated verb meaning in this context “not allowed”. Would he have been willing or 
did he intend to use the verb ―kann‖ instead, meaning that “it cannot be done”. Because 
essentially this is what the application of the pre-positive - as amongst others Maritain 
calls it – notion of human dignity ultimately should lead to: it cannot be limited or taken 
away from any human being, even if laws designed to do so are passed and applied, 
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meaning that such laws should be considered null and void. An unjust law is not a law, as 
Augustine tells us. Spindelböck formulates the answer one would have expected from 
Böckle: ―Der darin liegende Anspruch der Achtung lässt sich zwar verletzen, und zwar 
durch den betreffenden Menschen selber, aber auch durch andere. Dieser mit dem 
Menschsein als solchen verbundene Anspruch auf Anerkennung eben dieser Würde wird 
dadurch jedoch nicht aufgehoben.―219 Did Böckle mean to say this or was his choice of 
the verb deliberate? From the discussion on the subject of human rights in general, as we 
will see below, it seems that Böckle interprets human dignity as not “being allowed” to 
be changed or taken away rather than it not being possible to do so. This is relevant for 
analyzing his human dignity theory, as it implies that it lacks the radical approach to the 
inviolability of human dignity other writers discussed in this research espouse. We will 
return to this theme later when discussing Robert Spaemann. 
Franz Böckle equally sees Christian revelation as essential to understanding the full 
notion of human dignity and analyses it from this perspective. The Christian message 
begins and ends – and here he paraphrases Hans-Urs von Balthasar - with the revelation 
that the eternal God eternally loves each individual human being, which is proven in the 
most dramatic way by his death on the cross. Recognizing and accepting this act of 
ultimate love by God leads the human person to fully appreciate its worth in the eyes of 
the creator and as a consequence conclude its true dignity. A dignity however, which can 
only be accepted in freedom by acknowledging that it originates outside of the self
220
. Or, 
as Böckle puts it pointedly: ―Weil der Christ an diese Liebe glaubt, glaubt er an den 
Menschen, erkennt er seine Not und seine Würde.―221 It is from this perspective we can 
understand the radical nature of human dignity in the Christian understanding as amongst 
others discussed above in relation to Karl Rahner‟s work. However, Böckle stresses that 
this does not mean human dignity can only be understood through Christian revelation. 
He points out it is a notion that can and should be understood by human reason as such. 
Human dignity is not the exclusive reserve of Christians, even when Christian revelation 
reveals its full depth and meaning like no other tradition does. What Böckle wants to say 
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is that the Christian message, also where it concerns human dignity, is meant for all 
peoples, – as repeatedly stated by Jesus himself in the Gospel - which thus includes all 
non-Christians as well. Even more, Böckle explains, the morality of revelation is the true 
morality of reason
222
: ―Die theologische Tradition besagt vielmehr, dass die Moral der 
Offenbarung die wahre Vernunftmoral sei, die gerade auf diese Weise ihre Bestätigung 
erfahre―.223 The content of Christian morality is first of all humanistic (“menschlich”) in 
the sense of being graspable by all human persons through reason
224
. It has very 
meaningful things to say about human life: ―Offensichtlich kann die Theologie hier ihren 
Beitrag leisten, da sie glaubt, dass sich von der Gottesfrage her Entscheidendes über die 
Menschen sagen lässt.―225 The human person‟s search for God the creator of life 
logically reveals essential information about human life itself. But Böckle insists that 
human dignity cannot be understood, or only in a very limited and general way, without a 
transcendental analysis of what it means to be human. The exclusive focus on the self, 
which is a specific tendency of modern society, does not suffice to understand human 
nature comprehensively
226
. Nor is it sufficient to only observe the natural world because 
the natural and supernatural or transcendental dimension of human life are a unity and 
cannot be separated, as we discussed above in the context of the human being‟s dual 
nature. The true nature of human life, and thus its inherent and inviolable dignity, can 
only be grasped when it is considered not as isolated but as part of an Absolute that is 
outside of it: ―Die menschliche Natur ist so durch die Kommunikation mit dem Absoluten 
bestimmt.‖227 From this communication with the Absolute originates the human being‟s 
search for truth which, as Böckle explains elsewhere when talking about a practical 
application of morality, is the sole object of human reason. This search for truth enables 
the human being to differentiate between good and evil, true and untrue and this is the 
ultimate expression of human dignity, even if this is a life-long process needing much 
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learning and many corrections
228
. Böckle then adds his historical-philosophical 
observation that the wars of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries
229
 have shown that the modern 
state cannot decide for its people upon religion or worldview, let alone morality. 
Therefore, the modern democratic state as it has developed until today is founded on the 
principle that human rights are a given to each human being and the state is called to 
protect the human dignity on which these rights are based. At the same time the state 
acknowledges that it cannot itself provide the one and only answer to what is the ultimate 
reason for this inherent dignity, whilst also accepting that various answers can and will be 
given
230
. This, of course is once again, but through a different approach, a warning many 
philosophers and theologians on the subject of human dignity give. The modern state 
stands or falls with recognizing this vital aspect: ―Der freiheitliche Rechtsstaat steht und 
fällt also als dieses äußere Prinzip der Einheit einer pluralistischen zukunftsoffenen 
Gesellschaft mit der von ihm selbst her nicht begründbaren Überzeugung, dass die 
Würde des Menschen, die Würde der Person unantastbar ist.―231 In light of the 
discussion above about Christian revelation, the question remains of course whether a 
truly Christian-democratic state (not in the political sense of the term, but in its 
theological sense) would not be an exception to Böckle‟s rule of the pluralistic 
democratic society. Because if one follows the argument that Christian revelation points 
to the full depth and meaning of human dignity and its implications, which we believe it 
does, could not the truly Christian-inspired society ordered by the appropriate democratic 
institutions offer the ultimate guarantee for the human being‟s inviolable dignity? Böckle 
does not answer this question but at least explains how theology and Christian faith can 
contribute to a better understanding of this concept, whereby the concrete experiences of 
history also play an important role. He stresses how the philosophical and historical 
development of the modern state and its democratic framework is inseparable from 
Christianity and its proper development. This is equally the case for the development of 
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the notion of human dignity, which has been part of this same process. Böckle by way of 
example quotes the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) that places human dignity and 
human rights at its center: this is not only a direct consequence of the bitter experiences 
of the Nazi regime, but also the open adherence to a – basically Christian- system of 
values that identifies as its core principle a human community in which every human 
being can freely develop its unique personality and thus affirm its true dignity
232
. Yet, the 
series of human rights proclamations that started mostly during the 18
th
 century and that 
continue until today, as Franz Böckle rightly points out, shows that the development of 
human rights thinking on a broader scale, even if there would be more clarity on human 
dignity as its foundation, shows that human rights systems are still very much in 
development and these systems cannot therefore be considered as unchangeable
233
. One 
should add here that these proclamations, laws and international treaties are obviously a 
direct consequence of certain historical events, especially where it concerns a distinct 
lack of justice and freedom. Or as Böckle defines human rights: ―Menschenrechte sind 
als Freiheitsrechte Ausdruck elementarer Erfahrungen von Unfreiheit.‖234 This is, as we 
discussed already, a limited concept of human rights which for example Rahner would 
disagree with as he would find this definition lacking the necessary positive experience of 
human rights. But Böckle‟s final analysis ends up being close to what his contemporaries 
say: where on the one hand he clearly emphasizes the changeable nature of the process of 
defining human rights, as well as the fact that the underlying notion of human dignity can 
be understood outside of Christian revelation though reason, he does conclude that 
ultimately only a consistently lived Christian faith can guarantee that the integrity of the 
individual human being and its dignity does not fall victim to changing ideologies and 
consequently its violation
235
. The bloody modern history of Europe alone gives us 
countless examples of the truth of this argument. 
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3.3. Robert Spaemann (1927- ) 
The German philosopher and Roman Catholic Robert Spaemann is well known for his 
many contributions in the field of ethics and he has also written substantively on both the 
relevance of natural law in modern society and on human dignity. He is an academic 
trusted and regularly quoted by Pope Benedict XVI, also when the latter was still a 
cardinal. It is a fact that Spaemann has influenced the writings of Benedict and therefore 
he can be considered as an important contributor to the development of Catholic thought 
on natural law and the Christian understanding of human dignity. 
We have already discussed how the revival of natural law thinking in post-War Europe 
had a distinct impact on the development of the human rights doctrine, including the 
writing into law of the respect for and protection of human dignity throughout Europe. It 
is therefore useful to begin this discussion of Robert Spaemann on human dignity with a 
brief review of his position on natural law and its relevance today.  
Noting the continued debate on the relevance of natural law, Spaemann writes that, 
regardless of this debate or its outcome, it has not been able to change the simple fact that 
the principle on which the natural law is founded is that ―Menschen unterscheiden 
gerechte und ungerechte Handlungen.‖236 This, he points out, is not merely one human 
being judging another human being or situation from the perspective of self-interest. 
There are enough instances where we judge a person or a situation in the absence of any 
self-interest or personal involvement. We are also able to accept situations as in accord 
with just standards when we are denied something in the interest of another person. But 
still, the discussion almost always remains centered on what are the exact parameters of 
what is just and what is unjust. Spaemann acknowledges that this is often the basis for the 
argument against the relevance of natural law, claiming that because of this eternal debate 
one cannot effectively speak of “natural rights” since they are not naturally accessible or 
acceptable to all. He counters this line of reasoning by showing how in fact this argument 
has the opposite effect as its confirms the existence of a natural law: ―Gäbe es kein von 
Natur Rechtes, so könnte man über Fragen der Gerechtigkeit gar nicht sinnvoll 
streiten.―237 and ―Das von Natur Gerechte bezieht sich vielmehr primär gerade auf die 
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Verfahrensvorschriften für diejenige Fälle, wo über Werte eine Einigung nicht erzielt 
werden kann.―238 Spaemann illustrates this point with the following example: when we 
would qualify the classical legal principle ―Nulla poena sine lege‖ as merely positivistic 
and we would subsequently repeal this principle invoking the “higher” natural law, this 
would precisely be a violation of what is objectively just. The positivistic nature of this 
principle is itself a fundamental aspect of natural law. Natural law in fact consists of two 
parts: on the one hand it is the existence of personal liberty and the need for human 
beings to mutually recognize this, on the other hand it is the natural law ―in senso 
stricto‖ which is the human condition that presupposes all forms of human activity and 
which can only be violated at the cost of its own destruction
239
. An example of this 
destructive violation is the widespread denial of the inalienable right to life for every 
human being: it is a right, a condition every human being pre-possesses from conception 
onwards. Even in medical science it is no longer disputed that human life starts with the 
biological event of conception. In violating this right through abortion and other forms of 
embryo destruction and selection, the natural right to life – enshrined in all major human 
rights documents - loses ever more meaning and runs the risk of disappearing completely. 
A forewarning of this danger we see in the development of euthanasia practices in 
countries like The Netherlands and Belgium, where even doctors “legally” performing 
euthanasia complain that the pressure of family members “to bring death about” often 
diametrically opposes the wishes of the patient itself. Where life is not valued at its 
beginning, it is a small step towards also disregarding it at its end.  
But Spaemann takes his argument in favor of the modern-day need for natural law a step 
further with a keen eye for the development of modern society and the globalized world. 
Where in the old days the world mostly comprised of a collection of very different legal 
traditions within closed societies strictly separated from each other, there did not exist so 
much this urge to find common ground to build on. This radically changed in a world in 
which boundaries and borders became ever less relevant. Societies have become rapidly 
interlinked through new forms of communication and mobility, against the background of 
great changes in the entire social fabric of human life. Suddenly the centuries-old 
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localized systems of custom and tradition were no longer able to deal with the challenges 
of the time. This is how the battle for the moral framework itself begun and a wide 
variety of worldviews are now involved. This battle highlighting so many different 
opinions, Spaemann argues, is however not a valid argument against the existence or 
relevance of natural law. The fact that one accepts there is a natural law does not mean its 
content is clear for everybody at all times. It only means that the direction to which the 
natural law points can provide useful answers
240
. What we refer to as “natural law” can 
no longer be seen, Spaemann rightly points out, as a catalogue of norms or a meta-
constitution. It is rather a fundamentally important way of thinking and of analyzing 
human activity grounded in the understanding that the exercise of human liberty that 
disregards the reality of nature is an illusion because it is self-destructive
241
. It is this last 
argument of Spaemann that is so important in understanding his thought on human 
dignity. The natural law is not a philosophical or legal framework in full view of its 
beholders, it is rather a foundational understanding of justice and the good that, especially 
where it concerns human dignity, at least provides a minimal standard unchangeable by 
human intervention and therefore “a given”. 
 
Spaemann proposes a definition of human dignity that on first observation sounds very 
different from the other authors we discussed. However, once more closely studied it is 
not so much different after all but rather a more profoundly expressed view of what 
human dignity really is:  
 
―Würde ist keine empirisch gegebene Eigenschaft. Die eigene Würde geachtet zu sehen, 
ist auch kein Menschenrecht. Es ist vielmehr der transzendentale Grund dafür, dass 
Menschen Rechte und Pflichten haben.―242 
 
This definition of human dignity, saying the respect for human dignity is not a human 
right, seems to go against article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
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Union, the subject of this research, and one could say the whole of the post-War human 
rights movement. In these documents the respect for and protection of human dignity is 
seen as the perennial human right that presupposes all other human rights. But is this 
really what Spaemann means to say? The answer is quite clearly negative because with 
this definition he only wants to underline the importance of understanding the notion of 
human dignity being something much more fundamental and pre-dating of what we today 
call human rights than literature on the subject suggests
243
. Or, to put it differently: 
Spaemann wants human dignity to be understood for what it really is: not a mere “right” 
that can thus be acknowledged or rejected by law, but as an intrinsically human condition 
existing in each and every human being upon conception and irrevocable. We shall delve 
in to this deeper to understand what Spaemann points at here. First of all, the term human 
dignity is itself a transcendental notion, like that of freedom and liberty. Human dignity 
obviously existed long before human rights became important. It is the reason why we 
even have human rights at all. Human dignity also does not have the same operational 
potential as human rights themselves have
244
. For example: it is much more 
straightforward to prosecute a case that deals with the violation of the right to the 
freedom of religion than it is to deal with a case about human dignity violation as such. 
The former is a specific right that is defined; the latter lacks both the specificity and the 
definition. But what Spaemann argues is that one cannot compare these two and that one 
should also not want to treat them in the same way because they are fundamentally 
different. This is the reason why he states that the respect for human dignity cannot be a 
human right itself. That which is the foundation of something cannot at the same time be 
the structure built on it. Citing article 1.1. of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 
Spaemann points out that not acknowledging this fundamental distinction can lead to 
incorrectly understanding what ―Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar‖ really 
implies. The question we raised when discussing Franz Böckle is also taken up by 
Spaemann: does this provision mean that human dignity cannot be violated or that it may 
not be violated? For Spaemann the ambiguity of this constitutional formulation is an 
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indication that ―der Begriff der Menschenwürde in einem Bereich angesiedelt ist, der 
dem Dualismus von Sein und Sollen vorausliegt.―245 This is an essential formulation of 
human dignity which indicates that we should look for an answer to the above question 
not in the context of what our human rights systems today tell us about the respect for 
human dignity or what the word dignity implies etymologically, but rather in the origin of 
the notion of human dignity in both an ontological and anthropological sense. 
Ontologically speaking, Spaemann points out, what makes human dignity something that 
is graspable for us in the first place, is the fact that the human being is worthy in and of 
itself, thus not dependant in this sense on other human beings. This ontological 
dimension makes human life something sacred. This then explains why, 
anthropologically, the notion of human dignity derives entirely from the Judeo-Christian 
understanding of the human being created in the image and likeness of God the creator. 
We discussed this above at length. The notion of human dignity is therefore 
fundamentally religious-metaphysical
246
. The sole reason why the human being is 
attributed that which we call “human dignity” is that in its moral dimension the human 
being is a representative of the Absolute
247
, of that which is beyond and greater than 
itself. Human dignity for this reason is inviolable: it cannot be taken away by other 
human beings because it is exclusively dependent on the Absolute. It can only be violated 
insofar as it is not respected. „A‟, who does not respect and violates the human dignity of 
„B‟, therefore does not take away B‟s dignity; „A‟ only violates its own dignity by 
violating that of „B‟. Spaemann explains this argument by referring to the death on the 
cross of Jesus. Even though the cross was in Roman times the ultimate symbol of 
disgrace through which the crucified died a painful and slow death in full public view, 
Christian theology and art throughout the centuries have been able to turn it into and 
object of adoration. By consistently directing this public gaze on the innermost meaning 
of Christ‟s death on the cross, namely his self-sacrifice for all humankind and his 
voluntary relinquishment of any power, the cross – at least for Christians – has become 
the symbol of ultimate dignity, which is the exact opposite from what the Romans had 
intended. Spaemann says: 
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“Das Kreuz ist der Schritt zur radikalen Verinnerlichung des Würdebegriffs, zur 
Besinnung auf das, was sich im Phänomen des Würdevollen zugleich zeigt und 
verbirgt.“248 
 
What we mean with human dignity can become most visible through the deepest 
humiliation that we experience
249. But we should add that this „presentation‟ of human 
dignity is only possible when the humiliation is accepted and embraced as Jesus did on 
the cross. The dignity of at least one of the criminals, crucified next to Jesus and who 
angrily requested Jesus to use his divine power to get down from the cross, is not in view. 
It is this which is the vital distinction that needs to be made to understand this radical 
concept of acceptance. The free choice of self-sacrifice for the other and in spite of 
oneself is what makes the person enter the realm of the Absolute, the transcendental, 
because it has acquired a moral nature. Maximilian Kolbe, Spaemann explains, was an 
impressive example of how the heroism of saintliness is the highest dignity any human 
being can achieve
250
. The priest Kolbe not only gave his life for the father of a family, he 
also embraced his own slow and painful death with dignity and thus showed the full 
meaning of human dignity as Jesus did on the cross. This basic human dignity is 
inextinguishable because it is rooted in moral freedom, which is the freedom that each 
and every human being has to do good in all circumstances of life. Accepting this 
freedom is what constitutes the fundamental act of respect for human dignity. 
For Spaemann there is a clear distinction to be made between the transcendental-
pragmatic and the metaphysical theories of human dignity. The former theory, which he 
espouses, only accepts the biological affiliation as a “homo sapiens” species as the reason 
for a being‟s human dignity. The latter theory grounds human dignity in the unique soul 
of every human being
251
. The reason for Spaemann‟s preference is that the biological 
question as to when the life of a human being starts is scientifically answered and 
undisputed whilst – at least for non-Christians – the question as to when the soul enters 
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the human body is still much debated. The biological affiliation argument provides for a 
clearer and more easily applicable notion of human dignity. 
Where it comes to the application and inclusion into law of the human dignity notion, 
Spaemann warns against what he considers a dangerous political conception, a legal 
utopia that is found in literature and political discourse on the subject. One should not 
consider human dignity at the same time as something that already is and that still needs 
to come. Allowing this consideration to enter the legal and political process – which we 
see happening on a large scale today - would lead to the protection of human dignity 
being replaced by a never-ending series of optimizations that seek to include ever more 
diverse situations. This, Spaemann rightly points out, would inadvertently lead to the 
boundaries that a constitutional protection of human dignity has set being eroded. One 
should add here that this is so because in that case human dignity becomes a mere 
operational term that stands at the free disposition of its users, whereas what distinguishes 
human dignity from human rights is that it is a basic condition that is unchangeable rather 
than a specific principle that is codified. Speamann summarizes this argument in 
paraphrasing Kant – whom we will discuss later - as follows: 
 
“Die Forderung unbedingter Achtung der Menschenwürde ist inkompatibel mit der 
Forderung ihrer maximalen aktiven Beförderung. Niemand hat das klarer gesehen als 
Kant. Aus dem Selbstzweckcharacter des Menschen folgert er nie, dieser `Zweck` müsse 
auf irgendeine Weise befördert oder ‘verwirklicht‘ werden. Er bezeichnet vielmehr die 
einschränkende Bedingung unter der alle unsere Zwecktätigkeiten stehen müssen. Die 
Würde des Menschen kann so wenig wie die Gottes ‘verwirklicht‘, sie kann nur als immer 
schon wirklich geachtet werden.“252 
 
It is interesting to note that in the end Spaemann comes to the conclusion that there is an 
urgent need to codify human dignity in the context of being the representation of the 
Absolute that is the human being. This is all the more necessary, he argues, because in 
the increasingly scientific – and one should add: atheistic - society in which we live and 
where everything, even human beings, are now the object of the almost limitless power of 
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science, there is the need for a clear Absolute even science needs to respect. This 
Absolute is the human being
253
. “Absolute” also means that human dignity cannot be 
subjected to compromises: the dignity of one human being can never oppose the dignity 
of another since it is always rooted in the human freedom to do good and act justly
254
. It 
would be interesting to know, in view of what we have discussed on Spaemann‟s human 
dignity theory, how he would codify this concept. This we have not found in his writings 
on the subject. 
 
3.4. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (1930- ) 
The German legal philosophers Alexander Hollerbach and Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde 
have many converging views in relation to natural law and human dignity and had an 
important influence on each other‟s writings. They will be discussed here in sequence. 
Böckenförde taught at the universities of Bielefeld, Heidelberg and Freiburg and is a 
former member of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG). Böckenförde‟s 
most well-known dictum is that ―der freiheitliche, säkularisierte Staat lebt von 
Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantieren kann.―255 This is the premise from 
which Böckenförde‟s thought on human dignity must be seen: human dignity is a “given” 
that the liberal-democratic state is built upon, which it however cannot itself guarantee. 
Once again, as at the beginning of our discussion on Robert Spaemann, it seems that this 
statement contradicts the philosophy on which the human rights movement is based. 
Human dignity being one of the key prerequisites for the liberal democracy, post-War 
political and legal efforts have in this regard very much focused on doing exactly that 
which Böckenförde seems to deny is even possible. Both the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz), as well as the more recent EU Charter, include human dignity as the 
highest priority of the state to protect. But as we will see further on, what Böckenförde 
wants to say with this is different: the state cannot guarantee human dignity in the sense 
that it is a pre-state integrated characteristic of the human being that can neither be given 
or taken away, nor changed by the state or any being or institution. The state can however 
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put into place laws and measures that help protect human dignity against violation by 
third parties, including the state itself. The state can also condone or itself undertake 
actions that violate it. The difference lies therein that the state can only protect or deny 
protection of human dignity as a given human condition the actual existence of which it 
cannot control in any way.  
 
Böckenförde discusses human dignity amongst others within the context of religious 
freedom, one of the defining aspects of human dignity itself. He notes that the 
understanding of religious freedom as anchored in human dignity was for the Catholic 
Church herself a difficult thing to come to accept and it took until the end of the Second 
Vatican Council and the declaration ―Dignitatis Humanae‖ for her to do so256. The 
fundamental issue that was at stake here and which is crucial for the development of the 
human dignity understanding is the relationship between truth and human dignity. The 
classical understanding of the Catholic tradition had been that nothing – no rights and no 
duties - can be founded other than in truth. As Böckenförde puts it : ―Nicht mehr der 
Mensch hat Recht, aus seiner Natur und Kraft seiner Würde, sondern die Wahrheit.‖257 
Therefore, those that did not adhere to the true faith could not be granted the actual right 
to reject this faith because this would mean granting them the right to reject the truth. 
Non-believers should therefore be tolerated only because the Christian duty of charity 
and the realities of living together with non-believers required this. Since it is however 
dependant on human judgment to discern and express what this absolute truth is, it can 
easily become an arbitrary concept that undermines the natural law itself because it does 
not recognize that some characteristics of the human being are a given through its nature. 
Böckenförde here delivers a sharp critique of the theory that sets truth above dignity and 
concludes that in the end it was a matter of power only who got to decide what is truth 
and what is not. Human dignity however, as also the Catholic Church understands and 
proclaims today, does not depend on power since it is a given of the human being from 
the moment of its creation onwards. He brings together the argument that religious 
freedom is exclusively rooted in the dignity and liberty of the human being as follows in 
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the theological proposition that ―der Glaube als Akt der Freiheit um seiner selbst willen 
auch die Freiheit, nicht zu glauben, voraussetz.‖258 Archbishop Denis Hurley remarked 
during the discussions on this issue at the occasion of the Second Vatican Council that 
religious freedom does not exist as a means against the truth but rather as a means to 
come to that truth
259
. 
 
Böckenförde‟s most notable discussion on the understanding of human dignity and the 
law can be found in a series of publications
260
 he authored in 2003-2004 as a reaction to 
the new and influential commentary on article 1 paragraph I of the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz) by Matthias Herdegen
261
 in which the latter departed from the fundamental 
post-War notion of German constitutional law that human dignity is an unchangeable pre-
positive legal concept. Böckenförde notes that, although Herdegen stretches the principle 
of human dignity as written in article 1.1. to be applicable as broadly as possible, the 
entire principle is undermined by Herdegen‟s shift towards opening up the human dignity 
provision to varying degrees of actual protection according to the current developments 
and needs in society. Herdegen presents a new view of human dignity that no longer 
accepts what the 1948 parliamentary assembly drafting the Grundgestez intended, namely 
“als Übernahme eines grundlegenden, in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte 
hervorgetretenen ‗sittlichen Werts‘, in das positive Verfassungsrecht, das damit bewusst 
und gewollt ein Fundament vor-positiver Art in sich aufnahm.‖262 Instead, Herdegen 
turns human dignity protection into a legal principle of merely positive law that no longer 
enjoys the special foundational and pre-positive status intended by the fathers of the 
constitution. For Dürig, as Böckenförde explains, the German human dignity provision in 
article 1.1. represented the highest constitutional principle of all law, not only 
constitutional law. It was therefore also not to be considered as a fundamental right itself 
because this would necessarily include limits and the balancing of different interests. The 
human dignity provision however, as its place in the Grundgesetz also makes clear, was 
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formulated deliberately not as a fundamental right but as a universal and inviolable 
overarching principle. Article 79, paragraph 3 of the Grundgesetz underlines this by 
explicitly excluding the possibility for changing article 1.1. through constitutional reform. 
Yet what Herdegen does is to turn the human dignity guarantee into a flexible and 
changeable principle of purely positive law by specifically rejecting the foundational 
relevance today of its pre-positive and philosophical-ethical nature incorporated into the 
positive law
263
. Herdegen says: 
 
―Die im Parlamentarischen Rat herrschende Vorstellung, das Grundgesetz übernehme 
mit der Menschenwürdeklausel ‘deklaratorisch‘ einen Staat und Verfassung 
vorgeordneten Anspruch ins positive Recht hat noch beachtliche Suggestionskraft. (...) 
Für die staatsrechtliche Betrachtung sind jedoch allein die (unantastbare) Verankerung 
im Verfassungstext und die Exegese der Menschenwürde als Begriff des positiven Rechts 
maßgebend.―264 
 
Human dignity herewith becomes a mere positivistic legal principle amongst many 
others, whilst no longer anchored in what is independent of the legislator and which finds 
its origin in the history of European thought, especially Christianity and the natural law 
tradition
265
. The Herdegen Grundgsetz commentary represents a fundamental break with 
German legal tradition on human dignity, yet it comes as no surprise. Herdegen‟s 
commentary and clear departure from this tradition are only an effort to catch up with the 
ever more prevailing moral relativism of European society. Secularization plays an 
equally important role in this development: a system that insists religion is a purely 
private affair which cannot be of relevance for governing a democratic society is not 
capable of accepting a concept rooted in the transcendental nature of the human being. 
The secular state is unable to accept that the source of human dignity lies beyond the 
grasp of the state, since its proponents cannot accept the human being has a destiny 
beyond itself and this life. Since the German constitutional law tradition on human 
dignity was one of the main sources of inspiration for article 1 of the EU Charter, we see 
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this development is also having its effect within the European context. Our later 
discussion of recent case law will illustrate this. Herdegen, as Böckenförde comments, 
basically turns the application of the human dignity provision into a procedural 
deliberation that in its outcome depends on the relevant current developments and 
possibilities within the context in which human dignity protection is requested at the 
time. Concretely this means that not so much the question whether human dignity should 
be protected in a certain case is relevant, but rather if and how it can be done. This 
ultimately also includes a balancing of interests. This approach, Böckenförde warns, can 
only lead to undermining and destroying the inviolability of human dignity itself: when 
the application of the principle is increasingly open to relativity, ultimately the principle 
itself becomes empty and no longer enforceable. The problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that its philosophical and pre-legislative foundation is no longer recognized as an integral 
part of the positive principle itself. Human dignity then becomes merely a legal concept 
based on an ever-changing mutual consent and eventually emptied of any substantial 
meaning. As we know from our discussion above, this is a fundamentally different 
understanding of human dignity than the one grounded in the Catholic natural law 
tradition. It is also an approach Böckenförde firmly rejects as contrary to the intention of 
the men and women who drafted the German Basic Law on the ruins of World War II: 
 
―Was den Parlamentarischen Rat bewegte, war die Übernahme eines geistig-
philosophisch geprägten Begriffs, der seine Konturen aus seinen Wurzeln 
in der christlichen Tradition und im Gedankengut der Aufklärung, insbesondere 
Immanuel Kants, gewonnen hatte, als Rechtsbegriff in das Verfassungsrecht, um ihn so 
als grundlegendes normatives Prinzip staatlichen Handelns verbindlich zu machen. 
Damit wurde etwas vor-positiv Vorhandenes in das positive Recht hineingenommen. Das 
lassen die Beratungen im Parlamentarischen Rat wie auch das Zeitumfeld deutlich 
erkennen.―266 
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The parliamentary assembly that drafted the text, Böckenförde rightly points out, 
deliberately did not want to make the human dignity provision an empty principle that 
could be filled-in according to the specific considerations of any given period of time in 
which it was applied. Rather, it wanted to provide for an inalterable foundation of human 
dignity protection that would rule the application of the principle at any given time. For 
Böckenförde there is no doubt human dignity is a profoundly metaphysical-religious 
concept and in this form the only sustainable basis of human rights
267
. 
 
Böckenförde in his discussion on human dignity finally makes the interesting observation 
that in fact he sees there is no real disagreement as to the fundamental guarantee the legal 
principle of human dignity offers. Its core justification lies in the human being‟s ―Zweck 
an sich selbst‖ as the Kantian doctrine has it. The disagreement on the scope of human 
dignity protection starts with the question whether apart from born human beings it 
should also be extended to the unborn life
268
. Böckenförde argues there is no reason why 
this should not be the case. If we accept the dignity of the human being in its „completed‟ 
dimension after birth, one cannot separate this from its history that led to this stage and 
which started at conception when – and this is scientifically no longer disputed – the 
irreversible essence of that human being was created, the unique chromosomes‟ structure 
which gives each human being its distinct and unchangeable nature. Any dividing line 
one would try to create here would per definition be arbitrary, since biologically speaking 
there is only one identifiable starting point of life and one identifiable ending point of 
life. This is then also why, as we already discussed above, human dignity protection in 
Böckenförde‟s view would best be linked to the biological and scientifically proven start 
and end of life. Only this approach would guarantee human dignity protection for every 
human being under all circumstances. 
 
3.5. Alexander Hollerbach (1931- ) 
Hollerbach was a law professor at the universities of Mannheim and Freiburg im 
Breisgau with amongst others a focus on legal philosophy. Hollerbach‟s writings focus 
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less on human dignity as such but more on the crucial post-War revival of natural law 
theory that formed the basis for the human rights movement and the legal concept of 
human dignity, especially in Germany. He calls “natural law” the flag under which 
society looked for a foundation on which to rebuild itself after the bitter experiences of 
the perversion of law and the state under Nazi rule
269
. National Socialism was a system 
that led to the application of arbitrary and criminal legislation because it espoused an 
interpretation of legal positivism demanding blind obedience because “the law is the 
law”. Hollerbach points out that after such an extreme form of positivism (he calls it 
“Gesetzpositivismus”) it is understandable refuge was sought in its opposite, an unwritten 
common denominator referred to as “the natural law”. What Hollerbach understands as 
“natural law” in this context is ―im idealtypischen Sinne ein Recht, das unabhängig von 
autoritativer Setzung, gewohnheitsmäßiger Übung oder vertraglicher Vereinbarung 
gilt.―270 Something that is valid independently of authority, practice or agreement. We 
deliberately used the term “common denominator” above as Hollerbach describes how 
the post-War enthusiasm for natural law found its inspiration in the broad context of the 
history of the natural law tradition: from Aristotle, Cicero and the Stoics to Christian 
scholasticism with Thomas Aquinas and its neo-scholastic and neo-thomistic 
interpretations. But also the Enlightenment rationalism and especially the concept of 
universal human rights and Kant‟s understanding of the inviolability of human dignity all 
influenced this post-War movement. It is for this reason that Hollerbach holds the opinion 
that one cannot speak of one clearly defined concept of natural law. Yet he concludes that 
the neo-scholastical tradition of natural law as propagated by the Catholic Church and 
Catholic thinkers was certainly the main driving force behind the post-War revival of 
natural law as a relevant legal-philosophical framework for ordering society. He 
paraphrases Kaufmann
271
 in highlighting five main components of natural law: the 
ontological aspect of natural law, the convergence of divine and human reason, the 
unchangeable nature and universal validity of the natural law, its direct applicability and 
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the Catholic Church‟s prerogative of its authentic interpretation272. The 1947 
constitution
273
 of the German state of Rheinland-Pfalz comes closest to this 
understanding of natural law and for the purpose of the subject of our research it is useful 
to quote the entire preamble and first article here, as it is indeed, as Hollerbach points out, 
a very far-reaching application of natural law thinking into positive law and the 
protection of human dignity (highlighting: CAvG): 
 
―Vorspruch 
Im Bewusstsein der Verantwortung vor Gott, dem Urgrund des Rechts und Schöpfer 
aller menschlichen Gemeinschaft, 
von dem Willen beseelt, die Freiheit und Würde des Menschen zu sichern 
(…) 
Artikel 1 
(1) Der Mensch ist frei. Er hat ein natürliches Recht auf die Entwicklung seiner 
körperlichen und geistigen Anlagen und auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit 
innerhalb der durch das natürliche Sittengesetz gegebenen Schranken. 
(2) Der Staat hat die Aufgabe, die persönliche Freiheit und Selbständigkeit des Menschen 
zu schützen sowie das Wohlergehen des Einzelnen und der innerstaatlichen 
Gemeinschaften durch die Verwirklichung des Gemeinwohls zu fördern. 
(3) Die Rechte und Pflichten der öffentlichen Gewalt werden durch die naturrechtlich 
bestimmten Erfordernisse des Gemeinwohls begründet und begrenzt. 
(4) Die Organe der Gesetzgebung, Rechtsprechung und Verwaltung sind zur Wahrung 
dieser Grundsätze verpflichtet.― 
 
It is hard to imagine that in our modern secular and pluralistic Europe there still exists 
today a constitution so visibly drafted in the neo-scholastic natural law tradition. Even 
Hollerbach, himself no enemy of the Catholic natural law tradition, rightly questions the 
usefulness of this constitutional codification of natural law theory. As we will discuss 
later, this development was obviously linked to the historical framework of the time: a 
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German nation completely ruined and utterly desolate as the direct consequence of a 
barbaric regime that – according to Hollerbach – was motivated by an extreme form of 
―Gesetzpositivismus‖. The state and its laws had developed into a murderous machinery 
which existed for its own purposes only and thus completely disregarded the human 
being in its unique dignity and freedom. As the constitutional assembly that drafted the 
new German Basic Law in 1948 put it to cement Germany‟s break with this troubled 
period of its history: ―Der Staat ist um des Menschen willen da, nicht der Mensch um des 
Staates willen.‖274 The law promulgated and enforced by the state is only just when it is 
there for the sake of the human being, not for the sake of the state itself. 
Although the post-War revival of natural law was in no way an undisputed forward 
march of the neo-scholastic or any other specifically identifiable tradition, it can be said 
that the Catholic natural law tradition was leading it in its first stages. Only by 1960 had 
the field – including neo-scholasticism itself – developed to a point where the legal-
philosophical landscape showed a much wider spectrum of natural law concepts as well 
as case law
275
. It is in this period also that the Catholic Church itself made an historically 
crucial step by specifically recognizing as a matter of Church doctrine the freedom of 
religion for all peoples, whether Catholic or not, in the declaration “Dignitatis Humanae”, 
as essential to human dignity as such. We already discussed this document in detail 
above. It is however Hollerbach‟s and Böckenförde‟s explanation of this important shift 
in Church doctrine that deserves further attention
276
. Through quoting scripture and the 
natural law tradition, the document argues religious freedom is a fundamental aspect of 
human dignity. Yet the fundamental shift is to be found in the Church moving form the 
overarching concept of its prerogative of truth to the overarching concept of the 
prerogative of the human person and its dignity. This needs further explanation. Until at 
least the Second Vatican Council, Church doctrine generally held that since the Church – 
and she alone - represents the only true faith, Catholicism should be accepted as the state 
religion. For the sake of the common good of a peaceful society, however, other religions 
needed to be tolerated and be given freedom of religion. On the other hand, due to the 
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often diverse political, legal and cultural realities in which the Church found herself and 
therefore her inability to claim a preferred position, the Church needed to demand equal 
status with other religions on the basis of the same principle of religious freedom. This 
doctrine of the Church was also reflected in the legal sphere: the objective truth had the 
right of preference above all else, including the freedom to be wrong on issues of 
religion. Although the Catholic Church did not depart from the principle of representing 
the true faith, she did come to accept and teach that the individual freedom of religion is a 
fundamental right of every human being and one of the pillars of the correct relationship 
between church and state. Faith in Christ can only be an act of the free will to which 
nobody can be forced, as the Church has held since its foundation, so it is only logical to 
conclude that as a consequence the choice not to believe cannot be excluded either 
because without it there would not be the true freedom to choose for Christ. This 
religious liberty that the Church now embraced explicitly also meant the active freedom 
for the Catholic Church and any religion not to only freely practice its faith, but also to go 
out and spread it amongst others that are not its followers.  
Hollerbach brings together the post-War revival of natural law and the development of 
human rights and human dignity theory by pointing out their interdependence: The 
natural law debate is most of all a human rights debate. The guarantee of liberty is the 
essence of human rights. Human rights in turn set the framework within which positive 
law finds its justification and limitation
277
. When we speak about fundamental rights or 
human rights we essentially speak about questions of natural law, being that which the 
legislator encounters as a given, like for example the existence of human life itself and its 
unique individual characteristic of inherent dignity. The core element of this dignity, 
Hollerbach continues elsewhere
278, is the human being‟s autonomy. As Kant already 
argued, the autonomy of the rational being is the foundation of its human dignity
279
. This 
is then also one of the important premises from which developed the modern concept of 
the rule of law. It has within it the fundamental elements of human dignity: the human 
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capability for autonomy and its inherent freedom
280
. Without these a democracy cannot 
exist and human dignity and human rights cannot be protected. Yet this notion of Kant 
Hollerbach builds on and that continues to play a defining role in modern day human 
dignity thinking, also has serious limitations, for example in that it seems to suggest that 
without such autonomy human dignity cannot exist or only in a limited way. This 
contradicts the classical Christian understanding discussed above that the human dignity 
of the human being exists independent of what it can or cannot be or do, or in the words 
of Böckenförde: ―nicht die jeweilige Verwirklichung im konkreten Menschen, sondern 
die ‗gleiche abstrakte Möglichkeit‘, das heisst die potentzielle Fähigkeit zur 
Verwirklichung ist entscheidend‖281. This approach differs fundamentally from a 
common interpretation of the Kantian autonomy principle: in the latter understanding of 
autonomy, one does not necessarily see the unborn or severely mentally handicapped 
human being as possessing full human dignity, since the full autonomy is not visibly in 
place. Böckenförde however speaks of the potential of autonomy, which is present in the 
human being from the moment of conception through the unique defining composition op 
human nature taking place at that very moment. We will discuss the post-War Kantian 
autonomy understanding later in greater detail. 
 
3.6. Christian Starck (1937- ) 
In concluding this chapter on the revival of the natural law tradition and the development 
of Christian human dignity discourse in post-War Europe, we will have a closer look at a 
specifically Catholic approach to human dignity and the law. In some vital aspects it is 
fundamentally different from Herdegen and it thus illustrates well how much the legal 
principle of human dignity in German law, from which article 1 EU Charter derives much 
of its inspiration, is in need of further clarification. In his own commentary on the 
German Grundgesetz
282
, Christian Starck represents an interpretation of article 1.1. of the 
Grundgesetz and of human dignity in general that openly embraces the decisive influence 
of the Christian understanding of the human being. Starck however warns against 
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generalizations such as the one claiming article 1.1. Grundgesetz being founded on “the 
philosophers” or “the natural law”. The sources of human dignity protection should be 
specified and called by their name, Starck says
283
. For Starck this also means that when 
applying this human dignity provision today, one has to not only take into consideration 
but also accept the Christian roots of this dignity understanding in amongst others the Old 
Testament and the New Testament, such as for example the relevant passages from the 
Book of Genesis (Gen. 1, 27). This does not mean other European schools of thought that 
have developed along with Christianity are not relevant or that it alone has exclusive 
validity. The humanistic tradition as well as the Enlightenment (the latter of which often 
strongly opposed the Catholic Church) and especially Kant‟s concept of human dignity, 
Starck notes, also had an important impact and need to be taken into consideration. But 
the Christian tradition is by all means the major source of inspiration and understanding 
for this legal principle of human dignity. The question is not so much, Starck points out, 
whether or not the human dignity provision is grounded in a secularized version of 
Christian principles or one that is more the product of humanism and the Enlightenment. 
Rather, our notion of human dignity finds its origin and inspiration in both currents of 
thought. Yet the core of human dignity lies in the Christian idea of the human person 
(“Menschenbild”) that has in turn developed through a process of secularization leading 
to the legal status of human dignity today
284
. Starck in this regard explicitly positions 
himself critically towards Herdegen‟s above discussed view in the Maunz/Dürig 
Grundgesetz commentary which holds that human dignity can only be seen as a concept, 
a term of positive constitutional law with its pre-positive roots only given very limited 
importance
285
. Contradicting Herdegen, he stresses that the constitutional assembly of 
Herrenchiemsee did take this core aspect of human dignity into consideration as a 
foundational element of the human dignity principle at various times during the 
deliberations.  We therefore cannot simply “do away” with this fundamental basis on 
which our human dignity principle rests, Starck rightly points out. Acknowledging the 
Christian roots of our modern human dignity understanding by no means forces anybody 
to accept the Christian faith. By recognizing this basis, however, we merely give human 
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dignity the metaphysical foundation that is the ultimate and necessary guarantee for the 
human being against the complete control of the state over humans
286
. Accepting the 
human being as being created in the image and likeness of God does not require 
somebody or the state that protects this fundamental aspect of human life to actually be a 
Christian. All the human being and the state need to accept is that the human being has 
been created by a power that is beyond and above itself and the purely human and limited 
structures humans create. In doing so, we accept that our lives do not depend on the state 
(or other human structures) and therefore it has to respect the inherent dignity and 
autonomy of the human being that it cannot control. Starck says that ―Eine 
metaphysische Grundlage der Menschenwürde bedeutet in ihrem rechtlichen Kern eine 
letzte Sicherung des Menschen vor einer totalen Verfügung durch Staatliche oder 
gesellschaftliche Mächte.―287 Even an atheist should be able to accept that he or she and 
the earth itself have ultimately been created by a “creative power” surpassing history and 
the state. Today‟s structures as they have been created by humans have to accept that 
consequently the free disposition over each individual human life lies somewhere else, 
beyond our reach. This gives a quality of independence and freedom to the individual 
human being that the state could never guarantee: the created cannot be the protector of 
the creator. This is the core of the Christian understanding of human dignity: a given of 
each individual human being that the state or other structures created by those same 
human beings can never alter or take away. All the state can do is to implement measures 
that aim to limit the violation of this dignity. Human dignity legislation is, apart from its 
Christian, Enlightenment and humanistic roots, also deeply rooted in the history of the 
first half of the 20
th
 century that saw such a massive violation of human dignity by the 
state and in the name of “law”. A clear example of why measures to protect human 
dignity are so important. We will discuss this in detail in Part II. 
A fundamental issue Starck also stresses and which is the understanding of human 
dignity ever more being eroded, is that human dignity exists independently of the human 
being‟s actual self-consciousness or the ability to experience its dignity, to live its 
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autonomy or to use its reason
288
. We already quoted Böckenförde‟s similar statement on 
this point above. Human dignity exists whenever a human life exists: ―Denn die 
verfassungsrechtliche Würdegarantie umfasst auch das menschliche Leben, das vitale 
Basis der Menschenwürde ist.―289 In quoting the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(BVerfG) Starck adds: ―Wo menschliches Leben existiert, kommt ihm Menschenwürde 
zu.―290 In the words of Tiedemann: ―Sie ist untrennbar mit der menschlichen Existenz 
gegeben.‖291 Qualifications as to what the human being can and cannot do or experience, 
are irrelevant here. For Starck it is clear that the constitutional human dignity provision 
therefore also fully and indiscriminately applies to all human life, born or unborn, 
including the embryo in whichever state of development or medical use. The BVerfG has 
confirmed this in various rulings
292
 and strictly speaking abortion and embryo research 
and destruction are still unconstitutional in Germany, even though legislation is now in 
force that provides for a way to bypass the unconstitutionality. These facts illustrate 
clearly how difficult it is to sustain a system of constitutional human dignity protection 
when the protection of human life itself is ever more limited. Here the fundamental flaw 
of the increasing trend in European human dignity discourse is laid bare: when a society 
and its legal system, like in the case of both the European Union and most of its member 
states, no longer accepts the inviolability of human life from the moment of conception 
until natural death, it takes away the only foundation on which human dignity can itself 
remain inviolable or even exist at all. When life itself is not fully respected in all its 
stages and qualities and instead made subject to the individual qualifications and the 
claimed superior rights of others, like in the case of abortion and embryonic stem cell 
research, how is it possible to maintain the inviolability of human dignity that only makes 
sense when each such human life actually receives equal protection? As Böckenförde 
rightly pointed out, there is not so much disagreement as to the inviolability of human 
dignity for born human beings, the problem lies in the fundamental disagreement in 
European society on whether that inviolability also extends indiscriminately to human 
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life before birth. Both Böckenförde and Starck would answer here in line with the 
Christian understanding of human dignity as discussed in detail in this chapter: every 
human being from the moment of conception and regardless of its physical or mental 
state per definition enjoys the same inherent dignity at all times of life and independent of 
other human beings or the state. The most fundamental elements of this human dignity 
are life itself and liberty; Starck paraphrases the BVerfG when he summarizes this in a 
clear definition of the legal principle of human dignity:  
 
―Mit der Menschenwürde ist zu allererst – als Basis – das nackte menschliche Leben 
gemeint; darüber hinaus sind damit die Voraussetzungen für freie und 
selbstverantwortliche Entscheidungen garantiert.―293 
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Chapter 4: Kant’s dignity understanding developed 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Discussing the post-War development of the Kantian notion of human dignity deserves 
discussion in a separate chapter. But, to speak with McCrudden, it would be rash to 
purport to be able to fully get to grips with Kant‟s understanding of human dignity which 
is “notoriously contested territory.”294 Still, there is general agreement in literature that 
the writings of Immanuel Kant have had a decisive impact – and continue to do so - on 
the way we think about human dignity in its European legal context today. Gerhard Luf 
underlines this when he writes: ―Die zeitgenössischen Diskussionen um die Würde des 
Menschen bewegen sich im Wesentlichen innerhalb des ‗vernunftrechtlichen Paradigmas 
der Kantischen Tradition.‘‖295 Elsewhere he says: ―(…) denn es steht wohl außer Streit, 
dass die Philosophie Kants einen wesentlichen, ja für viele den überzeugendsten Beitrag 
zur Bestimmung des Begriffs der Menschenwürde geleistet hat, dem auch heute noch 
Maßgeblichkeit zukommt.―296 Gerd Brudermüller and Kurt Seelmann equally underline 
the overarching importance of Kant for modern human dignity discourse: ―(…) Kant, auf 
den man sich für das moderne Würdeverständnis zumeist stützt (…)‖297 As a more 
practical example, the German constitutional development on human dignity since 1945 
cannot be understood – and thus also the development of European human rights law that 
has been very much influenced by it - without acknowledging the lasting impact of 
Kantian thought
298
. The fact that, as discussed extensively above, the revival of natural 
law thinking along with the Christian philosophical and Catholic magisterial tradition has 
driven human dignity thinking for an important part, does therefore not exclude the equal 
relevance of Kantian thought. It should furthermore be remarked here, as Jacques 
Maritain stresses, that Kant was profoundly influenced by his pietist upbringing and that 
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his doctrine was “dependent on fundamental religious ideas and a religious inspiration he 
received in advance.” 299 To understand Kant‟s ethical theory, Maritain argues, all the 
reference points to traditional Christian thought should also be taken into consideration. 
The influential Catholic philosopher Karol Wojtyla – later Pope John Paul II - was well 
versed in the writings of Kant and clearly influenced by it, although he had some 
profound disagreements with Kantian thought. Closer study of Wojtyla‟s writings, both 
before and after his election to the papacy, reveals this
300
. It is therefore important to 
underline at the beginning of this chapter that the Kantian school of thought on human 
dignity and its post-War development should not be seen - as is often done - necessarily 
always opposing the specifically Christian tradition and the post-War natural law revival 
relating to human dignity
301
. It should rather be seen as a major further development of 
the notion of human dignity – yet at the same time not as a mere continuation or 
replacement of the Christian or Catholic tradition. Luf summarizes this as follows when 
he observes that the Kantian understanding of human dignity ―(…) zwar an bestehende 
Traditionen anknüpft, aber den Begriff doch entscheidend geprägt hat.‖302 Kant‟s human 
dignity theory therefore gives a mixed picture of on the one hand imitating, confirming 
and further developing the Christian tradition on the subject, whilst on other points 
clearly contradicting it. The core of the conflict between the Christian and Kantian 
traditions on human dignity seems to be the focus in Kantian thought (or the 
interpretation thereof) on the degree of the absoluteness of the autonomy of the human 
person and the suggested premise that without it no – or at least a lesser - human dignity 
exists. Kant‟s theory of absolute autonomy leads to the human person being considered 
the final end of the cosmos and an end in itself, whereas the Christian tradition clearly 
sees God as the final end (and beginning) of all that is. The theologian Michael Waldstein 
describes this problem well in comparing the personalistic thought of Kant – which can 
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be seen as one of the defining pillars of his human dignity theory - with that of Karol 
John Paul II: 
 
―Wojtyla‘s understanding of the personalistic norm is indeed rather different from 
Kant‘s. Being an end differs from having an end, being the highest good differs from 
being the beneficiary of the highest good, being God differs from having God as one‘s 
end.‖303 
 
Waldstein criticizes the “quasi divine value” that Kantian thought attributes to the human 
person. He speaks here of an “absolutizing of the autonomous dignity of the person as the 
highest end” leading to a personalism – and thus a human dignity understanding - in 
which the final end is already found in the human person and therefore necessarily 
excludes God
304
. Since it is the final end that determines every aspect of human life, there 
is a fundamental difference between a human dignity coming from that final end being 
God or the final end being the human person
305
. This contradiction seems to be the key 
element of many modern Kant interpretations. A rationalism that exclusively holds the 
human being as the highest good, the final end of the universe, can do no other than to 
consider the human person as fully equal to God – thus God himself. This is something 
fundamentally different from the Christian understanding of human dignity stemming 
from the fact of every human life being equally created in the image and likeness of God 
and thus not itself being God. 
 
If one would merely reduce – as some authors do - the two main sources of post-War 
European human dignity discourse – Christian and Kantian thought - to effectively being 
only the difference between a heteronomous and an autonomous
306
 understanding of 
human dignity, there is much disagreement in literature as to whether these two concepts 
are reconcilable at all. Tiedemann
307
, for example expresses the clear conviction that the 
heteronomous and autonomous concepts of human dignity are diametrically opposed and 
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cannot both and at the same time be the foundation of a single human dignity 
understanding. Heiner Bielefeldt, on the other hand, holds that from a Kantian 
perspective it can be argued there is “no inherent conflict between moral autonomy and 
theocentrism”308, the latter in this context being the heteronomous understanding of 
human dignity. Theo Kobusch is another defender of the latter approach where he 
stresses that the Christian idea of the human being as created in God‟s image and as 
expressed in the early modern natural law tradition, “furnishes the background for Kant‟s 
concept of the dignity of the person” and “although explicitly stated in the Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals, this idea is an often overlooked recourse by Kant to the 
metaphysics of morals being preceding his own philosophy”309. Kobusch sees Kant‟s 
understanding of human dignity not as a new notion developed in modern history, but 
rather as the high point of a tradition started in the Middle Ages. This ―Lehre vom 
moralischen Sein‖ is of great relevance today, he argues310. 
 
4.2. Immanuel Kant on human dignity 
Before entering into a further discussion of the post-War development of Kantian thought 
on human dignity, we will briefly look at the notion of human dignity as Kant himself 
saw it, especially as described in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals
311
, which 
is generally considered as Kant‟s most important work outlining his human dignity 
theory. In total however, Kant discussed „dignity‟ or „human dignity‟ in its various 
contexts in 18 of his published writings, of which the Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals and the Metaphysics of Morals are the most important
312
. It goes beyond the 
scope of this research to discuss all Kant‟s writings that include the word „dignity‟ in 
detail, but we will include some passages from the Metaphysics of Morals as well. We 
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will then concentrate on how Kant‟s theory was developed by some post-War Kantian 
scholars. 
 
Human dignity for Kant means that the human being, he also speaks of the „person‟ - 
„man‟ or the „rational being‟ - has an absolute inner worth. Kant understands the human 
person as an intrinsically free being (‗Wesen der Freiheit‘) that is an end in itself. The 
human being is “endowed with inner freedom”313. This inner freedom, Kant goes on to 
say, constitutes the “innate dignity of a human being”314 and is the “only original right 
belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity”315 The human being by virtue of this 
freedom possesses autonomy
316
. Kant‟s most often quoted categorical imperative, his 
paradigm on the absolute inner value of human dignity, is “act so that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means 
only.”317 The dignity of the human person, Kant then says, finds its basis in its autonomy, 
since “as an end in himself, he is destined to be a lawgiver in the realm of ends, free from 
all laws of nature and obedient only to those laws which he himself gives.”318 The human 
being has an absolute worth in and of itself “that has no price.”319 The absoluteness is 
rooted in human freedom, which finds its expression in the absolute autonomy of the 
human person. We can therefore legitimately lay claim, Kant says, to respect from every 
other human being – and the state, one should add - as the recognition of the dignity of 
each human being that lies in this absolute inner worth. He calls this “the dignity of 
humanity in every other human being” that raises human beings above all things320. It is a 
duty that this respect be shown to every other human being, Kant stresses. Kobusch and 
Braun
321
 point out that this absolute worth of the human being in Kant‟s understanding 
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can only be grasped when it is fully respected, or held in esteem, (“Achtung”) through 
abiding by Kant‟s own – once again: absolute – “prohibition” of instrumentalising the 
human being (“Totalinstrumentalisierungsverbot”322). The absoluteness itself of this 
worth is best understood when we realize that it cannot be compared with anything. Kant 
says: 
 
―In the realm of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. Whatever has a price can 
be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all 
price and therefore admits to no equivalent, has dignity.‖323 
 
and later on: 
―This esteem lets the worth of such a turn of mind be recognized as dignity and puts it 
infinitely beyond any price; with things of price it cannot in the least be brought into any 
competition or comparison without, as it were, violating its holiness.‖324 
 
This concept of absoluteness that Kant develops can be seen as the reason why Kant‟s 
human dignity theory seems to fit in with the classical Christian understanding of the 
incomparable worth of the human being, and thus its inherent dignity and the need to 
hold it in the highest possible esteem. Kobusch
325
 makes an important contribution to this 
discussion of Kant where he concludes that it was Hegel who – as the generally accepted 
“successor” 326 of Kant in the metaphysics of morals – took Kant‟s concept of the esteem, 
the reverence, of the absoluteness of human dignity deeper by showing that ultimately it 
is the divine love (“die göttliche Liebe”) for the human being that constitutes human 
dignity
327
. This ultimate form of love, one could say, God has reserved exclusively for 
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the human being. For Kobusch
328
, Kant‟s categorical imperative “act so that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never 
as a means only” is itself the largely ignored proof that Kant indeed based his 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals on the Judeo-Christian metaphysical concept 
of the human person that stands in direct relation to the Absolute by it being an end it 
itself. One could add here Kant‟s own commitment to the Absolute where in his 
conclusion to the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals in relation to the use of 
reason to understand (human) nature he speaks of the “supreme cause of the world”, 
which is absolute
329
. Yet, in light of what we discussed earlier it is not entirely clear who 
or what this “absolute” is in Kant‟s understanding. Is it God himself or is it the 
autonomous dignity of the human person which in itself is considered the final end of the 
cosmos? Could it be that Kant referred here to the Absolute merely as the initial provider 
of this autonomy herewith relinquishing its role as final end? 
Kobusch‟ line of reasoning would seem to bring Kant‟s human dignity theory right back 
to the essence of the Christian understanding of the human being created in God‟s image 
and likeness, since the act of the creation of human life is itself an act of divine love. Yet 
although this reasoning indeed might be the underlying concept of Kant‟s dignity theory, 
it still does not take away the question of an interpretation of Kant‟s definition of 
autonomy that can be – and is frequently - derived from this passage that we quoted 
earlier: “For, as an end in himself, he is destined to be a lawgiver in the realm of ends, 
free from all laws of nature and obedient only to those laws which he himself gives.”330 
This definition of autonomy can be interpreted as to deny that with all its dignity, the 
human being can still never be God himself who alone is free from all laws of nature. 
Furthermore, in the Judeo-Christian understanding there cannot exist any law that God 
himself has not either made or tolerated. The reason why we make this observation is 
because it points to a fundamental misunderstanding in human dignity discourse today. 
When human dignity is seen as ultimately being the human being‟s absolute autonomy as 
a final end in itself and without any limit, including a disregard for the laws of nature and 
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the existence of the Absolute, we enter into the realm of the arbitrary that is only led by 
individual preference and desire. When absolute autonomy becomes the sole focal point 
of human dignity theory, the foundation of human dignity is taken away. This foundation 
is the acknowledgement that every human being is created in the image and likeness of 
God, which necessarily means the full equality of each human being towards every other 
human being in the sense it is not itself God
331
. The human being in an absolute 
understanding of autonomy no longer accepts that it is “merely” created in the image and 
likeness of God, because it now itself wants to be God. This in turn leads to the 
individual human person – now considering itself almighty – becoming ever more self-
centered and no longer recognizing that all other human beings are equal in dignity to 
itself. Boundaries in what can and cannot be done in order that all life is actually treated 
equal are as a result disregarded. History is littered with examples of this that show the 
tragic consequences of a distorted understanding of individual autonomy that denies the 
equal worth of every human life. For example, modern day human dignity arguments 
often point to the right to privacy and integrity of the person as the “right to do with my 
body and my life whatever I choose”. This right is interpreted as deriving from the 
absolute autonomy a person has over all aspects of life, also when this involves the lives 
of others (the unborn human being, the embryo) when individual circumstances or desires 
so dictate and one‟s own death (euthanasia and assisted suicide). In this approach life is 
no longer seen as an equal gift to all human beings that is subject to the laws of nature, 
but rather as a “product” that can be obtained or disposed with according to individual 
preferences and circumstances. Kant himself would simply call this instrumentialization, 
which he vehemently opposes. This widespread view of human life can be seen as a 
consequence of an understanding of the notion of human dignity that is entirely focused 
on the unlimited autonomy of the individual human being as the rightful expression of its 
inherent human dignity combined with a moral framework that is almost entirely based 
on empirical principles and not on categorical moral imperatives. In this context Kant 
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also warns against basing moral concepts on purely empirical principles as the latter 
makes it impossible for my maxim to be a universal law
332
. There is no reason to believe 
that Kant intended this development of his dignity theory (he could have hardly foreseen 
it), yet uncritically following his absolute autonomy theory inevitably leads to this 
outcome. This we will be able to see when analyzing the case law of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in Part II of this research. It is thus not enough to point to Kant 
adamantly stressing that every human being is an end in itself and therefore any form of 
instrumentalising the human being or using it arbitrarily should be rejected because part 
of the problem lies in the interpretation of the phrasing “end in itself”333. We are for 
example clearly speaking of instrumentalization in the case of embryonic stem cell 
research and cloning.  
 
Kant then explains the contradiction of reasoned duty with the human person‟s – in itself 
plausible - needs and inclinations:  
 
―Man feels in himself a powerful counterpoise against all commands of duty which 
reason presents to him as so deserving of respect. This counterpoise is his needs and 
inclinations, the complete satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness. 
(…) From this natural dialectic arises, i.e., a propensity to argue against the stern laws 
of duty and their validity, or at least to place their purity and strictness in doubt and, 
where possible, to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations. This is 
equivalent to corrupting them in their very foundations and destroying their dignity – a 
thing which even ordinary practical reason cannot finally call good.‖334 
 
It is a “principle of humanity” that the human being is an end in itself and can therefore 
never be used for the end(s) of other creatures, Kant repeatedly says, whilst this is then 
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also the “supreme limiting condition on the freedom of action of each man.”335 This 
means to be the ultimate limit arising from reason that is set to any subjective end we 
might pursue. The counterpoise Kant describes therefore needs to be dealt with by 
consistently and laboriously applying this principle of humanity. This is where the core of 
Kant‟s human dignity theory lies: autonomy is rooted in the human being as an end in 
itself, yet that autonomy is strictly limited by the autonomy of the other human being that 
can never be used as an end. This means, my autonomy does not have a higher worth as 
the autonomy of the other, and the latter thus needs to be respected. That is my moral 
duty. Then, when Kant says that man is only subject to the laws that “he himself gives”, 
should this be understood in the context of the “golden rule” of the Gospel which says 
“do not do to others what you do not want to be done to you”? In the words of Kant: 
“That is, I ought never to act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim 
should be a universal law.”336 Still the question remains whether the purely rationalistic 
approach that Kant favors in this regard can in effect lead the human being to 
acknowledge and act upon this categorical imperative, or otherwise put
337
: this 
unconditional moral obligation that binds us in any and all circumstances? What Kant 
seems to leave out of his considerations
338
 is the traditional Christian understanding of 
faith illuminating reason, thus the faith helping the human being through grace to actually 
act consistently according to that which reason commands even in the face of the 
powerful counterpoise. It is the dynamic relationship of the human being to its creator as 
the beginning and end of all that is missing in Kant‟s absolute autonomy concept. This 
relationship is defined by grace and obviously has no place in the rationalistic approach 
Kant proposes. It is this point that could be seen as the most important divide between the 
Kantian and the Christian understanding of the human person and human dignity. 
 
We will now focus on how these and other attributes of human dignity that have been 
developed by some authors in the last decades and that are relevant for the understanding 
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of human dignity in the European legal context today. Luf presents an effective formula 
for judging the usefulness of Kantian interpretations in that they look at the key 
relationship between autonomy and freedom. He finds more convincing those 
interpretations ―die versuchen Kants Autonomieprinzip so zu interpretieren, dass in der 
Frage nach dem Begriff der Autonomie der Bezug zu den geschichtlichen 
Realisierungsbedingungen rechtlicher Freiheit und damit die Spannung von Idee und 
Geschichte wachgehalten wird.‖339 It is true, without the bloodshed of the two world 
wars of the 20th century it is hard to imagine how the legal concept of human dignity as 
we take it for granted in contemporary Europe could have developed from the basis of 
being a mostly philosophical concept. Yet we should also not loose sight of the fact that 
ultimately, human dignity is a fundamental notion of human life where the empirical 
analysis should therefore be subject to the principle. 
 
4.3. Kantian thought in post-War Europe: various authors 
For Mario Cattaneo it is a foundational concept of Kant‟s human dignity understanding 
that it is rooted in the divine creative act and the human being‟s direct unbreakable link 
with God, the absolute
340. He therefore also sees it as Kant‟s most important contribution 
to the development of the notion of human dignity that he called upon the state (―die 
Inhaber der öffentlichen Gewalt‖) to see it as its duty to always respect human dignity, 
the absolute notion that it is
341
. The way in which the state should do this, Cattaneo 
explains Kant, is by creating a republican division of powers in which the executive and 
legislative powers are separated
342
. Only this system would ensure the freedom of each 
human being, their equality as citizens and a state where all – including the executive and 
legislative power- are subject to common laws, or put differently: the rule of law. 
Cattaneo notes that for Kant the state has the duty to consider the rights of the human 
being sacred: ―die wahre Politik ist also der Moral und dem Recht der Menschen 
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unterworfen.―343 Yet with this high moral conception of human dignity Kant‟s theory 
presents us with, there is also, as Cattaneo points out, a very disturbing contradiction with 
regard to its application in Kant‟s later work the Metaphysics of Morals344. In Kant‟s 
criminal law theory therein described, the categorical imperative of not treating the 
human being other than an end in itself is disregarded where such things as the death 
penalty and certain forms of harsh corporal punishment are proposed in cases of serious 
crimes. As Cattaneo points out, this contradicts the Christian and humanistic principle 
that the human dignity of every person, also the condemned, should be respected under 
all circumstances. Another example he gives is Kant‟s theory that the child born out of 
wedlock does not deserve the protection of the law because it was born “outside of the 
law”, which is marriage. We specifically note these examples here - provided by Kant 
and rightfully criticized by Cattaneo – because it highlights a problem of Kant‟s human 
dignity theory we already discussed above and that we also see in modern Kantian human 
dignity discourse. Due to the fact that Kant – although not directly denying the 
transcendental quality of the human being – founds his categorical imperative on 
practical reason alone, it can become a completely inflexible concept that disregards the 
fundamental contradiction that exists in each human life between good and evil. This 
contradiction is a human weakness (Christian doctrine would call it original sin) which 
cannot be merely dealt with by a reasoned approach, even when Kant‟s theory of the 
“powerful counterpoise” comes close. Gaylin calls this “The capacity to do evil, while at 
risk of freedom, is a component in defining the good.”345 But the purely rationalistic 
application to which Kant‟s theory invites cannot otherwise than lead to the contradiction 
Cattaneo points out. Human weakness will always lead to situations where a reasoned 
approach alone leads to conflict with itself, for example as discussed above in the case 
where harsh corporal punishment is justified to make good for a criminal deed. Both the 
criminal deed and the excessive corporal punishment that follows it violate human 
dignity. Yet Kant would still propose the latter and thus disregard his own categorical 
imperative. This is so, because Kant‟s human dignity theory and especially his 
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understanding of autonomy based on reason alone lacks compassion, which would be one 
of the aspects provided by what we referred to above as the “illumination” of reason by 
faith and its corresponding virtues. This is then also one of the problems we see with 
modern Kantian human dignity notions as they can be observed today. An exclusively 
rationalistic understanding of autonomy as the foundation of human dignity can actually 
lead to undermining the universality of human dignity itself because it fails to include all 
aspects of human life. Catherine Dupré in her commentary on Kant‟s dignity theory 
within its legal context says this “autonomy based understanding of human dignity 
provides a very simplistic and partial legal picture of the complex reality of human lives 
and experiences.”346 Willard Gaylin347 has an interesting additional proposition to answer 
to this danger by proposing to move beyond the exclusive use of the concept of Kantian 
autonomy in human dignity discourse and to look at what other typical attributes of the 
human being give it its worth, even when its autonomy would be questioned. He points 
out that the human species is the “glory of creation” possessing so many more attributes 
than autonomy alone, like for example the range of our emotions and the freedom from 
instinctual fixation
348
. The point being made here is this: where the Kantian autonomy 
theory is seen by literature as at least a leading notion of human dignity in European 
human rights theory, it alone is not enough to come to the right application of human 
dignity provisions in laws, for example the EU Charter. As Gaylin stressed already 
almost 30 years ago, we need to move beyond autonomy alone and see the human being 
and its dignity in a much broader context
349
. This context not only includes for example 
Gaylin‟s attributes or consideration of Cattaneo‟s critique, but also the whole sphere 
beyond mere human reason, such as the human being‟s transcendence and the 
relationship to its creator. 
Oliver Sensen presents an interesting critique of the commonly held view in Kantian 
literature – as also expressed above – which holds that Kant understood human dignity as 
an absolute inner value of each human being which also constitutes the reason why one 
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should respect other human beings
350
. In his paper Sensen argues that contrary to what is 
generally accepted among Kantian scholars, Kant did in fact not see dignity as an inner 
value at all. Sensen presents the thesis that Kant rather viewed dignity as a sublimity, an 
elevation of the human being above all else. This is something different than the common 
view on Kant‟s dignity theory that speaks of its value in terms of „absolute‟, „inner‟ and 
„unconditional‟351. There is an important distinction to be made, Sensen argues, between 
the value-understanding and the elevation-understanding of human dignity. Sensen 
distinguishes three “paradigms of dignity” that explain this distinction: first, the 
contemporary paradigm seeing human dignity as a “non-relational value property human 
beings possess that generates normative requirements to respect them.” Second, the 
archaic paradigm seeing dignity not as a value of the human being but as an elevation the 
human being can earn or loose. Thirdly, there is the traditional paradigm that holds that 
human beings have an exclusively elevated position in nature because of possessing 
attributes like freedom and especially reason, whereby the duty exists to make good use 
of the latter
352
. Sensen claims that it is not the contemporary paradigm of human dignity 
that Kant represents, but the traditional one. He supports his argument with a detailed 
analysis of all the instances Kant speaks about dignity in his published works and he 
comes to the conclusion that in each case Kant was actually meaning the traditional 
human dignity notion of elevation and duty. In Sensen‟s analysis, the traditional 
paradigm has two stages of elevation that are both referred to as „dignity‟. It concerns the 
stage of the initial dignity that every human being has by virtue of reason and freedom, 
and subsequently the duty (read: the categorical imperative) to make proper use of these 
attributes in order to fully realize one‟s “initial dignity”353. As we see, these dignity 
notions focus on the holder of the dignity, not, as is the case with the contemporary 
paradigm, on the dignity of others. This theory of Sensen offers an interesting addition to 
what Kobusch and Bielefeldt say where they argue that there is no real contradiction 
between Catholic and Kantian human dignity theories. Sensen in this regard specifically 
refers to Christian and Renaissance thought where he sees the basic structure of the 
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traditional paradigm clearly represented
354
. But one has to add here that this basic 
structure is not enough to make Kantian human dignity theory the same as the 
specifically Christian tradition that is represented by Catholic writers and in documents of 
the Catholic Church. For example, Sensen holds that in Kant‟s writings “The absolute 
worth of human beings is secondary to and depends upon a morally good will.”355 As we 
discussed above, the Christian tradition does speak of the duty to act morally and holds 
that this has an influence on one‟s dignity, yet it always holds high that every human 
being has an inalienable human dignity that is a given and which is independent of its 
actions and can never be taken away, not even by oneself. Although one could see a 
parallel here with the two-leveled dignity that Sensen describes as the traditional 
paradigm, it must be clear that it is essentially different from the Christian notion 
whereby the human being‟s basic dignity does have an absolute character through its 
divine link. At the same time however, Sensen‟s analysis does give an explanation to the 
discrepancy Cattaneo observed between Kant‟s categorical imperative and his views on 
the death penalty and corporal punishment that we discussed earlier. When Kant indeed 
makes the dignity of the human being dependent on its morally good will, then it should 
be no surprise Kant proposes harsh and undignified treatment for those refusing to act 
with a morally good will. In this perspective such people would not even be entitled to 
treatment that would respect their human dignity, since they do not adhere to Kant‟s own 
categorical imperative.  
 
4.4. Gerhard Luf 
Gerhard Luf in his analysis of Kant‟s contribution to human dignity theory first observes 
– like Heinefeldt and Kobusch – that the notion of human dignity was obviously not 
invented by Kant but is a further development of the Stoic, Christian, humanistic and 
Enlightenment philosophical traditions. What Kant specifically contributed to human 
dignity theory, Luf says, is ―(…) dass er in aller Radikalität den unbedingten Wert der 
Person, eben ihre Würde, in der Freiheit des Menschen zu verantwortlicher 
Selbstbestimmung fundiert und solcherart ins Zentrum moralphilosophischer Reflexion 
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gedruckt hat.―356 Note the central role Luf gives to “Freiheit”. In Luf‟s explanation of 
Kant‟s human dignity understanding human freedom is the foundation of it all, a fact we 
already discussed in the introduction to this chapter. Where Kant uses the terms „dignity‟, 
„autonomy‟ and ‗Selbstzweckhaftigkeit‘, Luf explains, they are systematically speaking 
interchangeable terms that all express an adequate understanding of the concept of human 
freedom
357
. This notion of human dignity founded in freedom then needs to be adapted 
for its use in the legal tradition, since Kant formulated his human dignity principles 
mostly in a moral-philosophical context that cannot be applied one-on-one as legal 
norms. Here Luf makes a crucial point that is often overlooked in modern human dignity 
discourse. Luf points out that merely transferring concepts of moral autonomy to the law 
could lead to loosing the categorical distinction between morality and legality
358
. Moral 
autonomy as an expression of self-determination should never be enforced by the law, 
Luf warns, since that would mean instrumentalising the freedom-threatening force of law 
to do good. What constitutes the bridge between Kant‟s autonomy as the basis of human 
dignity and the application of human dignity principles in the law is ―die Anerkennung 
und den Schutz der vitalen Voraussetzungen sittlichen Subjektsseinkönnens, also jener 
Bedingungen, die für die Garantie der körperlichen bzw. Seelischen Integrität von 
Menschen maßgeblich und notwendig sind.―359 So it is indeed possible, Luf concludes, to 
apply Kant‟s principles in a legal context as long as the law guarantees the integrity of the 
whole human being necessary for it to be able to make free moral choices. Not doing so 
would mean that the law itself violates the human dignity it is meant to uphold because it 
takes away the freedom to act in a self-determining way. Not allowing this freedom of 
self-determination to all human beings would mean that certain human beings end up 
completely at the mercy of the interests of other human beings or the specific objectives 
of a given society. This would mean the instrumentalisation of human beings and their 
individuality as a means, which denies their personhood
360
. Luf cites an impressive piece 
of case law by the BVerfG to highlight his point that in the end, Kant‟s formula of self-
purpose can be applied as a criterion to evaluate laws and legal procedures: 
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―Der Satz ‗der Mensch muss immer Zweck an sich selbst bleiben‘ gilt uneingeschränkt 
für alle Rechtsgebiete; denn die unverlierbare Würde des Menschen als Person besteht 
gerade darin, dass er als selbstverantwortliche Persönlichkeit anerkannt bleibt.―361 
 
Luf herewith presents convincing evidence of what we noted earlier, namely that the 
German post-War legal tradition cannot be understood without acknowledging the 
influence of Kant and his notion of human dignity.  
An up-to-date and better informed Kant-interpretation, Luf says, should be able to bring 
forth a clearer framework in which these complex questions can be answered. Part of this 
framework Luf already provides himself. First, he cautions against using human dignity 
either as only a very restricted principle to deal with the most barbarous of crimes and 
thus severely limiting its scope, or to degrade the principle into an ‗Allerweltsformel‘ that 
can be used for whichever interest one would like to forward
362
. Second, Luf echoes 
Christian Starck and others in underlining the vital importance of avoiding the tendency – 
that is also widely present amongst modern adherents to Kant‟s theory – to do away with 
the metaphysical dimension of human dignity for the sake of finding a basic common 
denominator of ethical principles. One could add here that the metaphysical dimension of 
human dignity was certainly not disputed by Kant. When rejecting the metaphysical 
dimension, Luf rightly points out, we merely end up with wholly unreflected „new‟ 
metaphysical premises
363
. Kant himself would surely agree where he for example puts it 
quite strongly in his Metaphysics of Morals: ”But his thought must always go back to the 
elements of metaphysics, without which no certitude or purity can be expected in the 
doctrine of virtue, nor indeed any moving force.”364 Kant underlines how any moral 
principle can only be rooted in this metaphysical dimension “that is inherent in every 
human being because of his rational predisposition (…)”365 A moral principle can never 
be based upon any feeling, he says. This latter assertion by Kant highlights a tendency 
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that can also be clearly seen in the current debate on human dignity and its 
implementation. The application of human dignity as the ―Allerweltsformel‖ Luf speaks 
of is often inspired by presumed moral principles that lack a reasoned basis because they 
are almost exclusively rooted in feelings, opinions and preferences. One of many 
examples relevant here is the main argument used to justify euthanasia: the suffering of 
the person concerned has become “undignified” and his or her right to the protection of 
human dignity justifies death on demand
366
. No matter how horrendous the suffering of a 
person in such a situation can be, this argument completely lacks the metaphysical 
dimension of human life and is merely based on how this person feels about its suffering 
and what he or she prefers to do about it. Suffering is an unavoidable reality of human 
life, yet this reality cannot be understood when the metaphysical dimension is excluded. 
Euthanasia is of course subject of much debate and controversy, which goes beyond the 
scope of this research to discuss. Yet it is interesting to conclude the discussion of this 
example by once again letting Kant himself speak on the matter. On “willfully killing 
oneself” he says it is a violation of “one‟s duty to other people (…), as one‟s abandoning 
the post assigned him in the world without having been called away from it.”367 Once 
again, this quote of Kant highlights his adherence to the metaphysical dimension of the 
human being, which clearly lacks proper attention in the current euthanasia debate, as 
well as in most other debates on questions of life and death in (bio) medicine and science. 
 
4.5. Kurt Seelmann and Joachim Hruschka 
Kurt Seelman
368
 gives a further useful analysis of the development of the post-War 
Kantian human dignity understanding. He outlines how in his view there is a – possibly 
deliberate - misunderstanding in Kantian literature as to the basis of Kant‟s human 
dignity notion. Seelmann argues that where literature on the subject is mostly in 
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agreement that the second paradigm of Kant‟s categorical imperative, namely that the 
human being is an end in itself, forms the basis for human dignity, a close reading of the 
relevant texts shows it is in fact the thrid paradigm, namely that the human being is 
capable of self-legislation, that forms the basis. This observation is relevant because 
deciding what the basis is of Kant‟s human dignity understanding sets the stage for the 
actual scope of protection either human dignity notion in a legal context gives. The 
second paradigm-based concept considers human dignity as a given of every human 
being regardless of its mental or physical state or stage of development and thus has the 
widest possible application. The third paradigm-based concept, in Seelmann‟s opinion, 
would require the actual capability to self-legislate, which would automatically exclude 
certain groups of human beings
369
. Although Seelmann tries to develop an argument that 
would enable the broad application of human dignity that stems from the second 
paradigm to also apply to the third paradigm, he finally comes to the conclusion himself 
that this is not possible. This leads Seelmann to concede that it is therefore preferable that 
either the “misunderstanding” remains in place for practical considerations, or that we 
deliberately limit the Kantian human dignity notion to its basis in the second paradigm of 
the categorical imperative
370
. Seelmann‟s observation points to a problem we observed 
earlier with an interpretation of Kantian thought or other schools of thought where it 
comes to an often applied notion of human autonomy that gives prime importance to the 
mental and physical capability to „live‟ its autonomy and human dignity. This limits 
human dignity to those that can use reason expressively and therefore denies the inherent 
quality of human dignity in every other human being because it applies this autonomy as 
an argument to deny the equal dignity of somebody unable to express it. In its extreme, 
such a line of thought leads to the radical utilitarian observations the well-know 
philosopher Peter Singer makes on the value of human life, where even young children 
are denied equal dignity and the right to life because they are dependent. Once again we 
quote Luf where he underlines that the actual capability to use reason is not relevant in 
Kant‟s human dignity understanding but only the fact of belonging to the human species:  
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―Denn der Begriff der Würde ist wie jener der Freiheit ein praktischer Vernunftbegriff, 
der alle empirischen Entwicklungsstadien des Menschen überschreitet und in seiner 
apriorischen Dignität daher nicht vom tatsächlichen Vorhandensein oder Nicht-
Vorhandensein spezifischer Fähigkeiten abhängig gemacht werden darf.―371 
 
In this perspective Kant‟s theory presents us with, Luf goes on to say, dignity belongs by 
principle to the each and every human being. Joachim Hruschka puts it even stronger 
where he says that full human dignity according to Kant belongs to every human being 
from conception onwards. He writes “every human being is a person and thus an end in 
itself” and “‟the conceived‟ is also „a person‟”372 Hruschka therefore rightly sees human 
embryos and fetuses as fully equal to born human beings, and he supports his argument 
with Kant‟s own words that it is “in practical respects a completely correct and also 
necessary idea to see the act of conception as an act through which we have placed a 
person…in the world.”373 Hruschka goes on to warn that the death of the notion of human 
dignity is immanent where this fundamental principle is not respected and where the 
human being sees itself only as a rational natural being (what Kant calls the Homo 
Phaenomenon) rather than also an intellectual being (Homo Noumenon). Such merely 
rational natural being therefore has – in Kantian terms - a price because it has relative 
value only. The human being becomes a good, a thing and thus it is substitutable. 
Consequentialism and utilitarianism are the result, Hruschka argues, of which the theories 
of Peter Singer are the most extreme example
374
. Hruschka then makes an important point 
that underlines the importance that we have discussed already of the radical approach to 
human dignity being equally applicable to each and every human being from conception 
onwards. If we do not apply this as the minimal guarantee – that even Kant seems to 
propose – we quickly drift towards a human dignity system in which the application of 
this notion depends on qualifications to human life where one human being decides over 
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another. Since this can only be an empirically-based exercise, it is per definition prone to 
arbitrariness and therefore inevitably leads to the undermining and eventual death – as 
Hruschka warns – of the notion of human dignity itself. The current mainstream 
understanding of human dignity in Europe is in fact already very much advancing 
towards this arbitrariness. We will discuss this in greater detail in the following chapters. 
Neither Kant‟s human dignity theory nor the Christian understanding of human dignity 
justifies this unfortunate development. 
 
4.6. Heiner Bielefeldt 
We already discussed Heiner Bielefeldt briefly above, but his various contributions to 
post-War Kantian literature and human dignity discourse deserve further discussion. 
In his analysis of the notion of human dignity within the Kantian tradition Bielefeldt 
gives a frank analysis of what human rights in reality are. Human rights, he says, are the 
expression of the “ambivalence of modernity”375. On the one hand they are an answer to 
the experience of gross injustices in modern history, whilst on the other hand they reflect 
the relatively recent (post-War) development of an ethos of universal freedom into 
political discourse and operational legal norms. This has amongst others led to new 
interpretations of the notion of human dignity and Bielefeldt sees Kant as the best 
orientation-help to come to a universal understanding of this idea. Human dignity, 
Bielefeldt also reiterates, is a “given” of human life which cannot be ignored, even if one 
would want to
376
. It finds its origin in the human being as capable of and destined to 
morality
377
. This is what Kant calls autonomy. According to Bielefeldt the 
“revolutionary” consequence of this theory is that Kant does away with any form of 
materializing or categorizing human dignity and makes it an absolute which does not 
recognize any degrees of application
378
: ―Die Unverrechenbarkeit der Würde impliziert 
die strikte Gliechheit der Menschenwürde – wie immer auch gesellschaftliches Ansehen 
und Stellung der Menschen differieren mögen.‖ Kant clearly sees dignity and honor as 
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completely different concepts
379
. For Kant, it is understandable through reason ―dass die 
Menschenwürde etwas völlig anderes sein muss als ein materialer Wert neben anderen 
Werten. Die Würde des Menschen kann nicht durch das Gesamt einer objektiven 
‘Wertordnung‘ mediatisiert werden, sondern findet ihren Grund in der sittlichen 
Autonomie des Menschen als der Bedingung der Möglichkeit materialer Werte 
überhaupt.―380 What Bielefeldt says here is quite essential to giving human dignity the 
right place in the ordering of society. According to this Kantian principle, human dignity 
is not a mere value that can be compared, let alone ranked, with other values. It is a 
foundational “stand-alone” principle necessary to even be able to speak about the values 
of a society. This also means that this principle cannot be changed without undermining 
the value-system as a whole based on it. But in order for this understanding not to remain 
an abstract notion difficult to implement, it needs to find a form in the legal system able 
to specify the principle as an operative norm
381
. For Kant, the two basic and equal 
premises in such a legal system would need to be liberty (freedom) and equality. They are 
intrinsically connected, Bielefeldt underscores, and also a given of the human being
382
. 
Liberty and equality constitute the basis for the one and same dignity of every human 
being as well as for the legal system that protects it
383
. Kant‟s theory of moral autonomy 
and the modern equality movement inspired by it, Bielefeldt argues, is not – as some 
argue - an effort to level the social structure of society, but rather brings to fruition the 
true greatness of the human being, its moral autonomy and therefore its dignity: ―Sie ist 
denkbar nur als die eine und gleiche Würde eines jeden: als eine Würde jenseits aller 
gesellschaftlichen ‗Würdigkeiten‘‖384. Human dignity is inseparably both the normative 
limit as well as the foundational principle of the rule of law, which is why the state has 
the duty to protect it. Limit and foundation belong together, Bielefeldt says, because the 
protection of human dignity by law is only possible when the rule of law limits itself to 
that which regulates the external aspects of human interaction, whilst not interfering with 
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the equal freedom of the human being in choosing its individual relations
385
. This is what 
Bielefeldt calls the necessary differentiation between law and moral when dealing with 
human dignity, whereby moral autonomy is inalienable:  
 
―Nur die Indirektheit, in der das Freiheitsrecht auf die Würde des Menschen als sittlich 
autonomes Subjekt verweist, verleiht der Rechtsordnung ihre symbolische Qualität als 
institutionelle Verkörperung des Respekts der Menschen voreinander, dessen letzter 
Geltungsgrund, die sittliche Autonomie, jeden direkten Zugriff entzogen blieben muss.―386 
 
Bielefeldt clearly rejects religious principles as decisive for the interpretation and 
application of human dignity in modern pluralistic society, pointing out that even the 
drafters of the German Basic Law voted to describe human dignity in strictly secular 
terms
387
. This point of departure, Bielefeldt argues, should also be leading for 
international legal instruments including human dignity provisions, such as the EU 
Charter. He forwards – in line with the Kantian tradition – a model of human dignity 
discourse that is founded on rational arguments and practical ethics such as human beings 
recognizing and assuming responsibility („Verantwortung‘)388. Bielefeldt here proposes 
to understand the notion of human dignity as a purely “secular concept”389. He however 
cautions that the qualification as a secular concept does not mean that religious thought is 
not relevant for human dignity at all, only that the latter‟s existence is independent from 
it
390
. In this regard Bielefeldt seems to contradict what various other writers discussed in 
this research, such as for example Spaemann, have argued about the notion of human 
dignity in which the Christian understanding of the human person is considered as 
decisive for its application. Here we see highlighted what Maritain and John Paul II 
already pointed out as the fundamental difference between Kantian and traditional 
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Christian thought on the human person, namely the nature of its finality
391
. The latter 
tradition has the autonomous self as its finality, while the former tradition considers this 
to be God. Bielefeldt is right though in underlining that the existence of the attribute of 
human dignity itself is independent from any given religion, religious interpretation or 
understanding of the order of finality. Human dignity is a given of human life and in spite 
of various understandings as to its origins and purpose it will always remain the same. 
The challenge for mankind is to continue unlocking the mystery of its deepest meaning. 
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Chapter 5: The Christian and the Kantian basis 
 
 
5.1. The ―Four Accounts Approach‖ of Lebech 
In concluding and summarizing this part of our research on the philosophical roots of the 
legal concept and the legal principle of human dignity in post-War Europe, Mette Lebech 
provides for a useful ordering of the different human dignity theories that influence the 
current understanding of the notion
392. In her “Four Accounts Approach” Lebech 
distinguishes between the cosmo-centric, the Christo-centric, the logo-centric and the 
polis-centered approach to human dignity. Human dignity as we know it today, Lebech 
argues, cannot be properly understood without taking all these four approaches into 
consideration
393
. The basis for Lebech‟s approach is furthermore that a distinction needs 
to be made between the principle of human dignity and the idea of human dignity (not to 
be confused with the distinction we make between the legal principle and the legal 
concept of human dignity): 
 
―The principle of human dignity, as a universal affirmation that human beings have the 
highest value, does not itself have a history, because a universal statement is meant to 
have limits neither in space nor in time. But the idea of human dignity does have a history 
in so far as it has been thought to rely on various things and consequently been 
accounted for in various ways.‖394 
 
Lebech goes on to say she distinguishes four stages in the development of the idea of 
human dignity, whereby each stage developed in its own historical context and can be 
seen as a source of the idea of human dignity as it is ultimately expressed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These four accounts coexist in the current 
discourse on human dignity: at times they overlap and at other times they conflict with 
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each other, yet neither one suffices alone to understand human dignity in today‟s 
context
395
. 
The cosmo-centric framework
396
, to which Aristotle and Cicero are the main contributors, 
sees human beings as having a fundamental value because they have dominion, both 
moral and physical. Their human nature allows them to dominate their passions and other 
people and the animal kingdom. The Christo-centric framework, based on the Bible and 
to which Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastics contributed importantly, sees human 
beings as having fundamental value because they are made in the image and likeness of 
God – imago Dei – and therefore are a reflection of God the creator who is the originator 
of all being and value. The resulting relationship with God is of equal importance for this 
fundamental value of the human being. The logo-centric framework, mostly inspired by 
Kant, sees human beings to have dignity because of reason and autonomy and their 
capability to understand the consequences of their actions. The polis-centric framework, 
according to Lebech much inspired by Mary Wollstonecraft, sees human dignity as based 
on experience and recognition within society and therefore a forgeable concept that 
includes no absolute value and thus easily leads to utilitarian approaches to human 
dignity. It is therefore the trickiest of the four frameworks, as it is easily applied as a tool 
of political influence rather than a principled idea. This Lebech recognizes indirectly 
when she explains the polis-centric framework as a result of the social development of 
the common people that only started during the Enlightenment: “The idea of human 
dignity was the linguistic tool by which they themselves gained self-esteem and political 
influence (…)”397. It is this framework we find to present the biggest challenge to human 
dignity understanding in the current European legal setting, as it is – unlike the other 
three approaches – not grounded in a clearly identifiable attribute of the human being but 
rather based on the current opinion of society and mostly empirically oriented. This can 
hardly be a sustainable basis for a viable notion of human dignity. 
Lebech concludes: “Human dignity as the fundamental value of human beings is common 
to the frameworks treated, yet each understands it to rely upon, or to be conditioned by, 
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different features of human reality.”398 Adherents to each of the four theories would agree 
that human dignity pertains to the individual human being as a whole, and not only 
merely to one of its different attributes as here described. Yet there is clear disagreement 
about the source of the universality of this principle. Already Jacques Maritain, whom we 
discussed at length above, saw this problem when co-drafting the Universal Declaration 
and therefore settled for a “practical assertion”399 of a list of human rights based on a 
notion of human dignity that was held to be universal without there being an agreement 
on its philosophical or theological origins. As the jurist Frans Alting von Geusau rightly 
points out, following the Second Word War, such practical agreement on these universal 
norms was only possible because of the specific historical context within which the 
Western world found itself at that time
400
. The Universal Declaration could be passed 
firstly because of the awareness of the gross violation of these fundamental rights by 
Nazi-Germany and Stalin‟s regime, and secondly due to the common understanding in 
the West at the time that the protection of dignity and rights against state-sponsored 
violation called for international supervision. This historical experience and its political 
and legal consequences therefore beg the question whether Lebech‟s four approaches 
should not be extended to include what we would call a conscience-centred approach. As 
we will discuss in greater detail in Part II, it was the revolt of conscience following 
Hitler‟s and Stalin‟s atrocities that led to the inclusion of the notion of human dignity into 
a system of international human rights law and especially European law. The polis-
centred approach covers this partly through its inclusion of experience but insufficiently 
addresses the reality of conscience as a defining element of the notion of human dignity. 
Where the polis-centred approach puts too much emphasis on opinion and power, a 
conscience-centric approach would add the element of the voice of the human soul; 
throughout history it has always spoken out in the face of extreme suffering and 
persecution. 
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In her final analysis, Lebech concludes with one thought that is central to understanding 
human dignity, yet at the same time mostly very difficult to appreciate outside of the 
Christian context
401
. She says: 
 
―We call the pure appreciation of the individuality of the other self, love. Love sees 
potential everywhere, even where great effort is needed to bring it to fulfillment. It also 
bears disappointment and understands, where only rudiments of meaning seem to exist. It 
advocates the rights of the weak, the young and the old, and it protects them against 
abuses by stronger parties and interests. Against this background it is not so strange that 
it is only in love that we adequately identify the other, and therefore not so strange either 
that we should have to rely on it in practice in order to give content to the idea of human 
dignity. What we say when we claim that the principle of human dignity is the basis of the 
international world order, is that this world order should be a civilisation of respect and 
love.‖402 
 
What makes the Lebech approach so useful for understanding today‟s human dignity 
principle and its application in the legal sphere is that it recognizes that the legal concept 
or legal principle of human dignity can only be applied when the notion (idea) of human 
dignity is recognized as containing various components that are to be regarded jointly. 
Where human dignity is inalienable and thus unchangeable, understanding it, as history 
shows, is a process of humanity that goes through various stages of development. This 
process is ongoing. 
 
5.2. Summary: Overlapping and contradicting positions 
We have analyzed in detail what are the most important post-War philosophical sources 
of the legal concept of human dignity in general and the legal principle of human dignity 
as it is now codified into EU law through the EU Charter. The two main schools of 
thought on human dignity have been discussed: the Christian, mostly Catholic, tradition 
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which revolves around the imago Dei concept and the intrinsic, absolute and equal value 
of every human life from the moment of conception, and the Kantian tradition and its 
further European development with its specific emphasis on the absolute autonomy of the 
human being and it being an end in itself. From a jurist‟s point of view, McCrudden puts 
the two main elements of Kantian human dignity theory as follows: individuals should be 
treated as ends in themselves and not means to an end, and dignity is defined by treating 
individuals as autonomous beings able to choose their own destiny.
403
 Following 
Lebech‟s approach where she distinguishes the four frameworks within which the notion 
of human dignity developed, the Christian and Kantian traditions would fall within the 
Christo-centric and logo-centric approaches. Although we agree with Lebech that it is 
necessary to take all these approaches to human dignity into consideration for better 
understanding, the Christian and Kantian concepts are certainly the most important for 
understanding human dignity in its European legal context, along with the historical 
dimension to be discussed in the next chapters
404
. By way of concluding our 
philosophical discussion on the notion of human dignity we will now briefly outline the 
overlapping and contradicting positions in the Christian and Kantian approaches. 
 
The most important difference between the Christian and Kantian human dignity 
understanding is how its ultimate source is perceived. In the Christian tradition this 
source has consistently been the imago Dei principle, found in the Book of Genesis, 
telling us that the human being is created in the “image and likeness of God”. The 
extensive literature on the Christian notion of human dignity cannot be understood 
without starting from this fundamental Biblical premise. The Kantian tradition, on the 
other hand, whilst not specifically denying the imago Dei, tells us that human dignity 
finds its true origin in the fact that the human being is a free being with the capacity to 
reason and therefore possesses absolute autonomy. As the philosopher Jürgen Habermas 
rightly points out, Kant does not really define human dignity as such, but rather integrates 
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it into his key concept of autonomy. Habermas says: ―Interessanterweise erhält bei Kant 
die menschliche Würde keinen systematischen Stellenwert; die ganze Begründungslast 
trägt die moralphilosophische Erklärung der Autonomie.―405 The consequence of these 
two different fundamental approaches to human dignity is that one – the Christian 
concept – is clearly transcendental whilst the other – the Kantian concept – is not, at least 
not visibly so. In the Kantian tradition the relationship between the creator and the 
created does not enjoy the same primary importance as it does in the Christian tradition. 
Where the human being‟s relationship with God the creator cannot be omitted to 
understand the Christian human dignity tradition, following the Kantian school this 
would be possible, some would argue even necessary, as we can conclude by the fact that 
the Kantian human dignity theory is so widely accepted, by Christians and non-Christians 
alike. Where in the Christian tradition the creator is at the forefront of human dignity, 
Kant has given it a background position. It is this aspect that is also much prevalent in 
modern human dignity thinking in Europe: autonomy is clearly recognized as the 
fundamental if not the only relevant aspect of human dignity, yet the relationship of a 
human being to God is mostly left in the sphere of “the private religious opinion” and is 
therefore not seen as necessarily relevant within the framework of the public affirmation 
of human dignity. In other words, it is the difference between human dignity as a purely 
rational principle of human life and human dignity as a broad principle of what it means 
to be human, including its physical, social, intellectual and spiritual dimensions. Where 
the Christian tradition focuses on the oneness of the person in all its facets and a finality 
that exists beyond itself, the Kantian position is mostly concerned with its absolute 
autonomy, leaving transcendence in the background and seeing the human being as a 
fully independent end it itself. Maritain, in his earlier quoted critique on Kant, expresses 
it as follows: “But it is not only in the name of pure disinterestedness of ethical 
motivation, it is also and above all in the name of the autonomy of the will that for Kant 
the absolute ultimate end must be eliminated from the constitutive structure of ethics and 
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from the proper domain of the moral life. God plays no role in this domain. (..)”406 
Maritain therefore concludes that the dignity of the person in Kant‟s ethical theory can 
“only obey itself” because the only legislator is the Practical Reason.407 
 
Where the two schools of thought overlap on the notion of human dignity is that the 
Kantian school took the Christian tradition and so to say selected the gift of reason – the 
latter which, as we have discussed extensively, is obviously much recognized and 
discussed throughout the Christian tradition - as that attribute of the human being to be 
given the highest place and to be further developed. Out of this development then grew 
the theory of the primacy of autonomy. The two traditions overlap where they see that 
reason is one of the key attributes that distinguishes the human being from all other living 
creatures and therefore makes it so unique within the order of nature. Yet the two 
traditions diverge again when it comes to the consequences this has for formulating the 
dignity of the human being: where reason resulting in autonomy is considered as one of 
the defining aspects of human life in the Christian tradition, it is not seen as standing on 
its own and disconnected from God. It is part of being an image of God to possess reason, 
yet it can therefore also not be seen as separate from him. The human being‟s relationship 
to God is seen as all-defining for human dignity. Most of the post-War Kantian school 
however develops in a direction that raises reason and autonomy to a level of 
independence increasingly – and at times completely - leaving out the transcendental 
dimension which in Christian thought is the essence of human dignity itself. As Karl 
Rahner said, it is the personal relationship of God and Man that is the defining aspect of 
human dignity. In the Kantian tradition the defining aspect is understood to be the lived 
autonomy of the human being ruled, in the words of Maritain, by the law of Pure 
Practical reason. 
 
Further positions that overlap are the equal dignity of all human beings defended by both 
traditions as well as moral consciousness being the necessary compass in guiding human 
action to be in accordance with human dignity. Equally important is the overlapping 
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position on the pre-positive nature of human dignity: it is not something the human being 
created for itself or is able to dispense with, both traditions agree, but it is a defining and 
natural given element of human life. Jürgen Habermas describes this in other words 
where he says that ――Menschenwürde― [ist] keine Attrappe (ist), hinter der sich eine 
Vielfalt verschiedener Phänomene verbirgt, sondern die moralische ―Quelle―, aus der 
sich die Gehalte beliebiger Grundrechte speisen.―408  
 
In his extensively researched study on human dignity and human rights law, McCrudden 
is able to identify a consensus on the existence of three core elements of human dignity 
amongst those who use the notion of human dignity within its historical and legal 
context. The first is the recognition of the intrinsic worth of every human being. The 
logical second element is that this intrinsic worth should be accepted and respected by 
others, whilst the third element is the requirement for the state, in recognizing this 
intrinsic worth, to exist for the sake of the individual human being, and not the other way 
around. McCrudden calls these the ontological, the relational and the limited-state claims 
together constituting the “minimum core”409. This minimum core, however, is merely a 
common notion of human dignity, without there being a philosophical or political 
consensus on its implications
410
. The notion of human dignity goes through continued 
and renewed stages of philosophical and historical development. The understanding of 
human dignity as we know it in Europe today is thus far from perfect and still 
incomplete.  
 
We will now turn to a (legal) historical discussion of the notion of human dignity to gain 
a better understanding of its implications through the individual experiences of men and 
women. Once again Jürgen Habermas, makes this point forcefully: 
 
“Menschenrechte sind immer erst aus dem Widerstand gegen Willkür, Unterdrückung 
und Erniedrigung entstanden. Heute kann niemand einen dieser ehrwürdigen Artikel – 
                                                 
408
 Ibid. Jürgen Habermas, Das utopische Gefälle. Das Konzept der Menschenwürde und die realistische 
Utopie der Menschenrechte, pp. 44-45 
409
 See: Ibid. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, p. 679 
410
 Cf. Ibid. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, pp. 679-
680 
 139 
beispielsweise den Satz ―Niemand darf der Folter oder grausamer Strafe unterworfen 
werden― – in den Mund nehmen, ohne das Echo zu hören, das darin nachhallt: den 
Aufschrei unzähliger gepeinigter und hingemordeter menschlicher Kreaturen.“411 
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PART II: 
HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN 
ARTICLE 1 EU CHARTER: VIOLATION, CODIFICATION AND CASE LAW 
 
Chapter 1: Historical context - the revolt of conscience 
 
 
1.1. Introduction: the revolt of conscience 
The relevance of history for current law is well summarized by the Dutch legal scholar 
Hirsch Ballin who says: “Europe‟s legal history has been written not just in the ink of the 
pens of great scholars, but also in blood and tears.”412 Human dignity as a legal principle 
in the EU Charter today cannot be understood without specifically taking into 
consideration the rise and fall of three excessively violent regimes. These regimes were 
responsible for the biggest bloodshed in human history which had far-reaching 
consequences for countless individual men and women and for Europe as a whole. The 
historian Norman Davies chillingly summarizes how deep Europe actually sank:  
 
―There are shades of barbarism in twentieth-century Europe which would once have 
amazed the most barbarous of barbarians. At a time when the instruments of constructive 
change had outstripped anything previously known, Europeans acquiesced in a string of 
conflicts which destroyed more human beings than all convulsions put together. The two 
World Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, in particular, were destructive beyond measure, 
and they spread right across the globe. (...) Future historians therefore must surely look 
back on the three decades between August 1914 and May 1945 as the era when Europe 
took leave of its senses. The totalitarian horrors of communism and fascism, when added 
to the horrors of total war, created an unequalled sum of death, misery and degradation. 
When choosing the symbols which might best represent the human experience of those 
years, one can hardly choose anything other than the agents of twentieth-century death: 
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the tank, the bomber and the gas canister: the trenches, the tombs of unknown soldiers, 
the death camps and the mass graves.‖413 
 
Communism, Nazism and ethnic Nationalism were all three ideologies born on the 
European continent sharing an unprecedented organized disregard for human dignity. 
The bitter irony is that Nazism and Communism saw each other as arch-enemies and 
often justified their horrendous deeds by pointing to the danger posed by the other. Hitler 
already in his early days proclaimed the Jews and “their Marxist helpers” the cause of all 
evil and urged the need for their removal from German and European society, whilst even 
in post-War Eastern Europe most of the Soviet-led propaganda was still geared towards 
convincing the population that communist totalitarian rule was only defending Europe 
from fascism (in this case Nazism was actually meant) and was therefore necessary
414
. 
Yet it was almost as if Nazism, Communism and Nationalism competed for the doubtful 
distinction of most barbaric regime. The three regimes became experts in the large-scale 
and well-organized killing of innocent civilians by the state, all under the guise of a better 
future for their own “great nation” or “the workers”. Statistical data illustrates this point 
well: the Nazi organized Holocaust alone, also called The Shoa, led to the death of up to 
6 million Jews from 15 different European countries, the total number of civilians killed 
during World War II however being estimated at over 27 million; victims of the Soviet 
Gulag number 22 million between 1914 and 1945. The 1939-1940 deportation of 
civilians from Eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Romania led to an estimated 2 
million deaths. The list goes on.
415
 Timothy Snyder, in his much acclaimed work on the 
combined destruction caused by Hitler and Stalin between 1933 and 1945, points out that 
Nazism and Stalinism (the latter as an extreme form of Communism) had much in 
common, not only in ideology
416
 but even more in what he calls the “Bloodlands”417. 
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“Bloodlands” refers to the geographical area in the middle of Europe extending from 
central Poland to western Russia through Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States. Here the 
Nazi and Soviet regimes between 1933 and 1945 committed most of their atrocities 
killing fourteen million people: “mass violence of a sort never before seen in history was 
visited upon this region.”418 Snyder calls the killing that took place in the Bloodlands the 
central event of European history.
419
 These staggering facts are therefore the key to 
understanding the post-War European unification process and the rapid introduction of 
human rights legislation and human dignity language. Even though the number of deaths 
pertaining to the Balkan wars of the 1992-1999 period is much smaller, the utter cruelty 
and disdain for human dignity applied by the people involved bears close resemblance to 
the Nazi and Stalinist regimes. If the actors in the Balkan wars would have had the 
chance to continue, it is likely the number of deaths would have been much higher. 
Therefore an analysis of this more recent conflict is equally important to the 
understanding of human dignity discourse in Europe today. 
 
Closer analysis of what brought these regimes to perform their murderous acts reveals a 
pattern of consistent disregard for the equal dignity of every human being as the root of 
their ideologies, whereby certain “races”, “nationalities” or “class enemies” were 
suddenly degraded to virtual statelessness and therefore rightlessness. They were 
dehumanized. Regimes centrally decided upon the life and death of groups and 
individuals often using fear and age-old prejudices as a justification. Where Hitler 
decided the Jews or the handicapped were in need of extinction because of their “danger” 
or “burden” to society, Stalin equally sent millions of innocent people to their deaths 
because they were regarded as being “dangerous bourgeois elements” or “counter-
revolutionary”. Indeed, the historian Norman Davies puts it well when he says that the 
first half of the 20
th
 century is “the era when Europe took leave of its senses.‖420 Yet, in 
spite of this and many other like-minded observations and the grandly proclaimed treaties 
and laws that followed after 1945 enshrining human dignity and protecting human rights, 
Europe once more fell into the abyss of genocide when all thought the respect for human 
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dignity had been firmly established on the European continent. In full view of the 
international media and armed UN peacekeepers, the likes of Milosevic and Mladic 
simply repeated the methods of Hitler and Stalin, only selecting different scapegoats to 
dehumanize. The Balkan wars at the end of the 20
th
 century therefore painfully show us 
the fragility of the notion of human dignity as a guiding principle of governance and civil 
society. 
 
The Jewish political theorist Hannah Arendt, in her influential work on ―The Origins of 
Totalitarianism‖, investigates this problem of the grandly proclaimed respect for human 
dignity and human rights failing to have any effect at all exactly at those events in 
modern history when it was most needed. She traces back the problem to the end of the 
18
th
 century when – as a result of the Enlightenment - Man himself became the only 
source of the inalienable dignity and rights of Man, thus also requiring a human structure 
such as the political community to be able to effectively guarantee these rights. Since 
however many Europeans in the 1918-1939 inter-war period as well as during and after 
the First and Second World Wars became minorities, stateless, refugees or were 
proclaimed undesired, they found themselves deprived of anybody caring about their 
„inalienable rights‟. No law protected them.421 Helis paraphrases Arendt‟s point well 
where he says: “The political empowered simply cannot relate to the disempowered as 
equal members of humanity.”422 By way of illustrating the problem Arendt observes that 
these people would only be recognized by the law when they would commit a criminal 
offense. Only by becoming an offender of the law will the stateless or the refugee be 
noticed by it and gain protection from it like everybody else.
423
 Hitler first deprived the 
Jews of all their rights and legal status in Germany and waited for no other country to 
“claim” them before he sent them to the extermination camps424. This was a carefully 
planned process of which Arendt concludes: “The point is that a condition of complete 
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rightlessness was created before the right to live was challenged.”425 Following Hannah 
Arendt‟s reasoning, it was not so much the loss of specific human rights themselves that 
led to the mass murder of innocent civilians in 20
th
 century Europe, but rather “the loss of 
a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever (..). Man, it turns out, 
can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his 
human dignity. Only the loss of polity itself expels him from humanity.”426 Indeed, as we 
will see with our analysis of Nazism, Communism and ethnic Nationalism, each of these 
regimes first deprived people of their “belonging to” and then went on to exterminate 
them when they were left literally „homeless‟, with nobody caring about them. The Jews 
under Hitler, the Tatars under Stalin and the Bosnians under Karadzic all suffered this 
fate. The Srebrenica massacre of up to 8000 Muslim boys and men is the most recent 
illustration of this point. 
 
Of course historical explanations for the notion of human dignity reach much further 
back into history, yet it was the combined human destruction in Europe caused by 
Communism (1917-1989, especially in the extreme form of Stalinism until 1953) and 
Nazism (1933-1945) that led to a revolt of conscience, which can be considered as the 
main thrust leading to the inclusion of the human dignity notion into the European legal 
framework. The 1992-1999 ethnic Nationalism that led to the Balkan wars was a stark 
reminder that the ghosts of mass killings on European soil had not been cast away by any 
of the international human rights treaties of the post-World War II era. It is therefore 
important to include an analysis of the methods of these three ideologies and their 
consequences in order to better understand the fragile notion of human dignity in the 
history of Europe and what is the deeper meaning of this widely used but little 
understood concept. In our brief historical discussion we will, through the use of concrete 
examples as reported by historical scholars, focus on analyzing the attitude primarily 
responsible for all human dignity violations throughout history: the deliberate 
dehumanization of individual human beings. Tim Snyder underlines the importance of 
not letting the sheer numbers of Europe‟s bloodletting lead to anonymity of the victims. 
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Every human being is irreducible, he reminds us again and again in “Bloodlands” through 
the personal stories of individual victims: “Each record of death suggests, but cannot 
supply, a unique life. We must be able not only to reckon the number of deaths but to 
reckon with each victim as an individual.”427 Human dignity cannot be understood 
otherwise. 
 
1.2. Nazism 
First of all a distinction needs to be made between Nazism and Fascism. The Nazi 
ideology was a German invention and originated with Hitler‟s National-Socialist 
Democratic Party (NSDAP) which came into existence in the same year that the First 
World War ended. The Fascist ideology is rooted in Italy and has Mussolini as its main 
author. Fascism had adherents and like-minded political movements in various European 
countries, whilst Nazism was mainly concentrated in Germany and Austria and later 
forcibly exported to some of the German-occupied countries. An important example of 
the difference between these two ideologies is the aspect of racism. Mussolini, although 
an ally of Hitler, did not adhere to the Nazi theory of the superiority of the Aryan race 
and related racist theories about the Jews. The confusion between these two terms finds 
its origin in Soviet propaganda which was introduced under Stalin in the 1930-ties and 
continued until 1989, whereby anything that was anti-communist (which was obviously 
not only Nazism) was labeled as fascist. In this research we will not discuss Fascism but 
focus on Nazism and the persecution of the Jews and other minority groups. Nazism was 
by far the more destructive of the two ideologies and studying it gives a deep insight into 
the motivations for human dignity violations in general. 
 
The historian Martin Gilbert starts his analysis of the Nazi-perpetrated Holocaust with a 
pointed summary of how this organized disregard of human dignity worked in practice: 
“the strong helping the strong to attack the weak; this was to become a hallmark of Nazi 
action”428. He describes another attitude that was equally a hallmark of Nazi 
effectiveness, as described by a survivor who says the Holocaust “depended most of all 
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(…) upon the indifference of bystanders in every land”429. Indifference and right defined 
by might are thus the key elements contributing to the organized extinction of up to six 
million Jews and millions of other civilians between 1933 and 1945. Where the Jews 
were the largest persecuted group under Nazi rule, they were certainly not the only 
victims. Political opponents, the handicapped and infirm, Gypsies and Slavs also ended 
up in the gas chambers, the execution sites and the forced-labor camps, to name but some 
of the persecuted groups. Analyzing human dignity violations past and present, like for 
example slavery, the Rwandan genocide and the mass murder of Muslim men and boys in 
Srebrenica, shows that indeed the root of the problem lies in widespread indifference and 
unchecked political power leading to the dehumanization of “the other”, mostly a 
minority or a weaker group. Human dignity, history teaches us, cannot therefore be a 
principle depending on the state. It has to be a principle that protects us from the state. As 
National Socialism has shown, the state or the political entity throughout history has 
often been either unwilling or incapable to protect human dignity. Human dignity has to 
be a notion universally recognized as finding its meaning in human nature itself, 
independent of the structures it is part of. The decisive – be it far too late - response of 
post-War Europe, the United States and Canada to the Nazi atrocities showed that indeed 
the human being is capable to understand vividly where human dignity is violated, 
without there being a need or even the possibility for the state to define it. Jacques 
Maritain noted this, as already quoted above, immediately after the War: 
 
―Be it finally noted that when it comes to the application of basic requirements of justice 
in cases where positive law‘s provisions are lacking to a certain extend, a recourse to the 
principles of Natural Law is unavoidable, thus creating a precedent and new judicial 
rules. That is what happened, in a remarkable manner, with the epoch-making Nazi war 
crimes trials in Nuremberg.‖430 
 
So it was the clearly visible violation of human dignity that enabled post-War Europe to 
prosecute the perpetrators, without there being the need of a functioning justice system at 
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the time to base the Nuremberg convictions on. Conscience revolted at the sight of the 
abuse, and it has done so repeatedly in history, albeit mostly after a long period of 
ignoring the evil. In this chapter we will analyze through a number of concrete historical 
examples how the “dehumanization of the other” unfolded in the thinking and acting of 
those violating human dignity on such a massive scale, or turning a blind eye. 
 
It should be noted first of all, and we should be constantly reminded of this in our often 
uncritical democracy-loving Western world, that the successful rise of Nazism in 
Germany is a convincing example of the fact that democracy is not always a guarantee 
for the rule of law and for the protection of human dignity. On 30 January 1933, Hitler 
came to power by democratic means, namely through the popular vote and subsequent 
political negotiations which led to German president Von Hindenburg inviting Hitler to 
become Chancellor, following existing constitutional procedures
431
. Once Hitler had 
taken possession of his new powers he then rapidly established a totalitarian regime 
through intimidation and the silent consent or indifference of the majority of Germans, 
including the elected parliament. One of Hitler‟s first legislative acts was to abolish the 
fundamental rights catalogue of the German constitution on 28 February 1933. He did 
this with an emergency decree entitled ―Zum Schutz von Volk und Staat.‖ and enacted by 
German president Von Hindenburg himself.
432
 Hitler was not a new face in German 
politics appearing out of the blue. His anti-Jewish and publicly known race theories could 
be dated as far back as the end of the First World War. Hitler‟s NSDAP party (National 
Socialist German Workers Party), founded in 1919, already on 25 February 1920 
proclaimed its distinctly anti-Semitic and racist intentions in its party manifesto, the 
―Grundsätzliches Program‖433. The manifesto held: “None but members of the Nation 
may be citizens of the State. None but those of German blood, whatever their creed, may 
be members of the Nation. No Jew, therefore, may be a member of the Nation.”434 The 
anti-Jewish rhetoric was also to be found explained in detail in Hitler‟s published work 
                                                 
431
 See, amongst many others, Martin Gilbert: History of the Twentieth Century, Harper Collins Publishers, 
2001, p. 215 
432
 See: Fragen an die deutsche Geschichte – Ideen, Kräfte, Entscheidungen Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart, 
Deutscher Bundestag Bonn 1986, p. 296 
433
 Grundsätzliches Programm der nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-Partei, München 24 Februar 
1930, in: Ibid. Fragen an die deutsche Geschichte, p. 292 
434
 Ibid. Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, p. 23 
 149 
―Mein Kampf‖, in which he lamented the fact that up to 15.000 Jews had not been killed 
by poison gas at the beginning of the First World War
435
. The rhetoric of Hitler was soon 
backed up by the creation of the ―Sturmabteilung‖, better known as the Brownshirts or 
SA, supposedly to guard party meetings but mostly used to rough up and intimidate 
political opponents and Jews. The first Jewish victims of the Nazis were eight people 
killed by the SA in Berlin on January 1
st
, 1930
436
, three full years before Hitler came to 
power. His rise to power followed a period in which the NSDAP and its paramilitary arm 
(SA) had already repeatedly attacked and boycotted Jews throughout Germany. The 
following event, one of many that took place in the months directly after Hitler‟s rise to 
power, is a cruel example of how Nazi ideology from the beginning of its rule 
deliberately dehumanized those it persecuted. It speaks of the arbitrary arrests taking 
place in March 1933: 
 
―One of these Jews was a baker‘s apprentice, Siegbert Kindermann. Before Hitler‘s 
coming to power, Kindermann, a member of the Bar Kochba Jewish Sports Society, had 
been attacked by Nazi thugs. His attackers had been brought to court, and convicted. 
Now the thugs took their revenge. On March 18 Kindermann was taken to a Stormtroop 
[SA] barracks in Berlin and beaten to death. His body was then thrown out of a window 
into the street. Those who found his body discovered that a large swastika had been cut 
into his chest.‖437 
 
Jews were quickly and openly degraded in all areas of civic life and excluded from all 
layers of civil responsibility, whether in government, law, healthcare, education or 
commerce. German society was presented with the image of the Jew as being the cause of 
all evil and the urgent need to ban anything Jewish from German soil, including the Jews 
themselves. In the developing rhetoric they were reduced from being a person to being a 
category for government-sponsored discrimination and eventually liquidation. On March 
23, 1933 Hitler presented his Enabling Law (“Gleichschaltungsgesetz”) in the Reichstag 
(parliament), a draconian piece of legislation that basically gave the government 
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unlimited power to pass any „law‟ it wanted and which abolished all remaining 
constitutional limitations to Hitler‟s power438. Once again, this law was passed with a 
sufficient parliamentary majority
439
. It was to be the last of parliamentary democracy in 
Germany until after the war: Hitler used the Enabling Law to firmly establish his 
dictatorship and quiet any political opposition, whilst centralizing all power in his own 
person. He used the Gleichschaltungsgesetz to forthwith formally exclude Jews from 
society and to do away with all political opponents, referred to as ―Staatsfeinde‖ 
(enemies of the state) and meticulously defined by the Sicherheitspolizei (secret police) 
as follows: 
 
―Kommunismus, Marxismus, Judentum, politisierende Kirchen, Freimaurerei, politisch 
Unzufriedene (Meckerer), Nationale Opposition, Reaktion, Schwarze Front, 
Wirtschaftssaboteure, Gewohnheitsverbrecher, auch Abtreiber und Homosexuelle, Hoch- 
und Landesverräter.‖440 
 
By arbitrarily singling out a large group of Germans to be excluded from the protection 
of the law, in as far as the rule of law still existed, the Nazi regime openly dehumanized 
these people and left them to the whims of the Nazi apparatus. The result was bloody: 
fierce persecution of these groups ensued, leading to organized murder and large-scale 
detention in the newly erected concentration camps and later also extermination camps. 
Any semblance of a democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens had herewith 
officially come to an end.  
 
It is a bitter irony that parliamentary democracy in Germany was abolished by parliament 
itself, another example of how democracy does not guarantee the rule of law. This 
observation is vital to understanding and assessing the legal landscape in Germany after 
March 1933. The question many scholars have debated since, and which goes beyond the 
scope of this research to discuss in detail, is whether any of the “laws” or decrees passed 
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by the Nazi regime between 1933 and 1945 can be considered as valid laws at all? When 
we follow Augustine‟s rule that “un unjust law is not a law”, it is not difficult to conclude 
the status of most Nazi legislation. Yet many, if not most, of those having played active 
military or civil roles in the Third Reich defend(ed) their actions by referring to the law 
of the land at the time and their required obedience to it. For our discussion of the 
historical development of the notion of human dignity in Europe, this ambiguous position 
is relevant to note. It is an example, as we discussed above, of what Martin Gilbert calls 
“the strong helping the strong to attack the weak” and the “indifference of bystanders in 
every land”441. Even if “the strong” were often well-meaning people, their indifference or 
fear allowed injustices and human dignity violation to become the order of the day. The 
rejection of the dignity of every human being in Nazi-Germany was initially brought 
about by democratic means, be it at times accompanied by intimidation. Its ensuing 
policies were subsequently enacted or silently tolerated by the majority of ordinary 
people. 
 
The Nuremberg “laws” of 15 September 1935 then formalized what the Nazis had been 
openly propagating since 1920. The Nuremberg Laws “elevated random discrimination 
into a system” as Gilbert puts it, and were signed by Hitler personally442. Jews were now 
officially defined as not being of German blood and forbidden from marriage and sexual 
relations with Germans. They were reduced to “lesser humans”, or denied the status of 
human being entirely. The world reacted with disgust as articles appeared in important 
newspapers such as the New York‟ Herald Tribune (today the New York Times) and the 
London‟ Times443, yet nothing substantial was undertaken to stop Hitler, both inside and 
outside of Germany. But the gravity of the situation in Germany was apparently well 
known by the major powers at the time. Once again Gilbert quotes a chilling report by a 
witness of the time. A senior British government employee writes down his experiences 
after his return from Berlin where he met with German officials:  
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―I knew that the Jewish situation was bad, I had not realized as I now do that the fate of 
German Jews is a tragedy, for which cold, intelligent planning by those in authority takes 
rank with that of those who are out of sympathy with the Bolshevik regime, in Russia; or 
with the elimination of Armenians from the Turkish Empire. The Jew is to be eliminated 
and the state has no regard for the manner of his elimination.‖444 
 
Note the explicit comparison made here with the Russian Gulag and the Armenian 
genocide of 1915-1917, the latter of which led to the organized killing of around 1 
million Armenians at the hands of the Ottoman Empire. It is a clear proof that the 
massive violation of human dignity by the Nazis was already a fact widely known outside 
of Germany as early as 1935. Already at that time the common pattern of rejecting the 
humanity of certain groups of society as a prelude to their destruction, now taken up 
enthusiastically by the Nazis, was noted by what would later be the Allied Powers. Their 
detailed knowledge of the atrocities kept growing. A January 6, 1942 official note of the 
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (himself not being unacquainted with the 
atrocities of his own regime) describes in harrowing detail what happened to the Jews in 
German-occupied Kiev in the period June-December 1941, as reported by eyewitnesses:  
 
―A large number of Jews, including women and children of all ages, was gathered in the 
Jewish cemetery of Kiev. Before they were shot, all were stripped naked and beaten. The 
first persons selected for shooting were forced to lie face down at the bottom of a ditch 
and were shot with automatic rifles. Then the Germans threw a little earth over them. The 
next group of people awaiting execution was forced to lie on top of them, and shot, and 
so on.‖445 
 
Yet little was done in practical terms to stop Hitler until the Allied forces achieved 
militarily superiority over the Germans. As Anthony Eeden, the British Foreign Secretary 
noted in the summer of 1944, “the speedy victory of the Allied nations” was the only 
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hope to stop the mass killings
446
. The same British man who as an immigration officer at 
the British consulate in Berlin had already reported - mostly ignored by his superiors - on 
Nazi atrocities in 1938-1939, now saw the full reality of the massacres when British 
troops entered concentration camps in April 1945. He writes: “Now the people here really 
and finally believe that the stories of 1938-9 were not exaggerated.”447 
 
Nazi ideology rejecting the idea of the equal dignity of every human being was not only 
disseminated through the propaganda of Goebbels, it also entered mainstream education 
and the academic world in an effort to give it broader support. Gilbert reports the 
successful 1936 doctoral thesis defense of a student in the German state of Saxony who 
held that the worth of an individual to the community “is measured by his or her racial 
personality. Only a racially valuable person has a right to exist in the community. A 
racially inferior or harmful individual must be eliminated.”448 Forced sterilization and 
castration, as well as euthanasia of certain groups of “racially inferior” (Jews), “racially 
harmful” (sexual offenders) or “unproductive” (invalids) people was openly promoted 
and increasingly performed by the Nazi regime and its helpers, culminating in the state-
ordered euthanasia of large groups of people.  It therefore did not remain a mere 
academic theory. The “academic” thesis promoted was more a theory following the 
already existing and growing practice. One of the most well-known Germans openly 
rejecting this abhorrent practice of euthanasia in Nazi Germany was Bishop Clemens 
August von Galen. He repeatedly and publicly complained to the German authorities and 
dedicated a number of sermons preached in the various churches of his Münster Diocese 
to these atrocities. He was one of the few examples of public figures voicing the revolt of 
their consciences against the state-sponsored rejection of the equal worth of every human 
being. In one of his famous sermons Von Galen, also called “the Lion of Münster”, said: 
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―Wenn man den Grundsatz aufstellt und anwendet, dass man den ‚unproduktiven‘ 
Mitmenschen töten darf, dann wehe uns allen, wenn wir alt und altersschwach werden! 
Wenn man die unproduktiven Mitmenschen töten darf, dann wehe den Invaliden, die im 
Produktionsprozess ihre Kraft, ihre gesunden Knochen eingesetzt, geopfert und 
eingebüßt haben! Wenn man die unproduktiven Mitmenschen gewaltsam beseitigen darf, 
dann wehe unseren braven Soldaten, die als schwer Kriegsverletzte, als Krüppel, als 
Invaliden in die Heimat zurückkehren! Wenn einmal zugegeben wird, dass Menschen das 
Recht haben, ‚unproduktive‘ Mitmenschen zu töten – (…). Dann ist keiner von uns seines 
Lebens mehr sicher. Irgendeine Kommission kann ihn auf die Liste der ‚Unproduktiven‘ 
setzen, die nach ihrem Urteil ‚lebensunwert‘ geworden sind.―449 
 
State-condoned anti-Jewish activity started also rapidly spreading throughout other parts 
of Europe after 1933, especially in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine 
where – partly inspired by Nazi pressure and propaganda – age-old sentiments of anti-
Semitism were reawakened with zeal and with death and destruction as a result. A 
familiar pattern repeated itself: Jews were portrayed as lesser human beings, or as 
resembling animals, and the perpetrators used this as their justification for ignoring their 
intrinsic dignity. But probably nowhere else outside Germany were the Jews so suddenly 
and systematically persecuted and excluded from civil life as in Austria after the 
―Anschluss‖ of 1938. When Austria became an official part of the Third Reich in March 
1938, Jews, communists and other political opponents immediately became targets of 
fierce persecution by Nazis and parts of the population. Martin Gilbert reports in detail 
how from one day to the other, Austrian Jews were completely excluded from public life 
and mistreated on a massive scale: 
 
―Overnight, the Jews of Vienna, one sixth of the city‘s population, were deprived of all 
civil rights: the right to own property, large or small, the right to be employed or to give 
employment, the right to exercise their profession, any profession, the right to enter 
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restaurants or cáfes, public baths or public parks. Instead they experienced physical 
assault: the looting of shops, the breaking of heads, the tormenting of passers-by.‖450 
 
In the meantime, whilst all this was unfolding before the world in full view, a much more 
sinister and over the years carefully planned and hidden campaign was gaining 
momentum. The ―Endlösung‖451 as the Nazis called it, the “Final Solution”, was aimed 
at for good eliminating all estimated 11 million Jews in Europe. The official policy was 
decided on 20 January 1942 in the German town of Wannsee near Berlin, for the most 
part prepared by Adolf Eichmann, head of the „Jewish Section‟ of the SS452. During the 
meeting, attended by a carefully selected group of senior military, security and civil 
representatives of Hitler‟s government, the Jews were not talked about as human beings 
but as ―Untermenschen‖ and in the most businesslike of terms condemned to total 
extinction. Here we see that the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 were not only the formal 
continuation of an already existing policy of anti-Jewish aggression, but also the formal 
establishment of the ideological basis of what was already under way and still to come: 
the firing squads at mass graves, the extermination camps with their gas chambers, the 
torture prisons and the euthanasia centers. Once again, what was considered a “law”, 
constituted the starting point of unspeakable atrocities against humanity. By the time the 
Wannsee-Konferenz convened to decide on its meticulously planned campaign to deport 
and exterminate the Jews from all over Europe, more than 40.000 Jews and Gypsies had 
already been gassed by way of experiment in the Chelmno extermination camp in the 
preceding 44 days
453
. The full operation of the death camps Auschwitz-Birkenau, Belzek, 
Chelmno, Majdanek, Sobibor and Treblinka was the direct result of the Wannsee 
meeting. Its stated goal was to indeed eliminate all 11 million Jews from Europe
454
, yet 
the organized mass killing had already been under way for quite some time. Together 
with the many concentration camps throughout Europe, the countless executions, the 
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forced labor and the organized starvation
455
, as well as the ghettos
456
, all for which the 
Nazis were responsible, up to 6 million Jews alone were killed.
457
 Snyder reports that by 
December 1941, before the Wannsee Konferenz, Himmler‟s SS and police had already 
killed up to 1 million Jews in the German-occupied part of the Soviet Union. The “Final 
Solution” was therefore once again only the inevitable formalization of existing Nazi 
policy
458
. Gilbert quotes a widely disseminated speech Hitler gave at the Sports Palace in 
Berlin only 10 days after the Wannsee meeting and which was recorded word for word 
by the Allied Powers‟ information service. The speech in clear terms publicly confirmed 
the ―Endlösung‖ policy and described the Jews as “universal enemies”: 
 
―(..) the war will not end as the Jews imagine it will, namely with the uprooting of the 
Aryans, but the result of this war will be the complete annihilation of the Jew. (..) And the 
hour will come when the most evil universal enemy of all time will be finished, at least for 
a thousand years.‖459 
 
With this perverse idea the Holocaust took its final ugly turn whilst the Nazi machine run 
by German efficiency rolled out a well-planned scheme that foresaw the deportation of 
Jews, Gypsies and other ―Staatsfeinde‖ from all over Europe to the death camps in the 
East and the many concentration camps wherever the German writ was upheld. Adolf 
Eichmann is reported on his last visit to the death camp of Theresienstadt in 1944 to have 
said: “I shall gladly jump into the pit, knowing that in the same pit there are five million 
enemies of the state.”460 Even countries not occupied by the Germans, like for example 
Bulgaria, were pressured and often forcibly obliged to deport Jews to the death camps. 
Local Nazi leaders were given lists and quotas of Jews that needed to be put on transport. 
No effort was spared. Gilbert reports that on 20 January 1943 Himmler, the head of the 
                                                 
455
 Timothy Snyder points out that the Nazis killed as many people by mass executions and starvation as 
they did through the six extermination camps. A distinction also needs to be made between concentration 
camps, where people had to work and had a chance to survive, and extermination camps where people were 
sent straight the gas chambers, such as Treblinka. See: Ibid. Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands, pp. 380-383 
456
 Alone in 1941, the number of deaths by starvation in the Jewish ghetto of Warsaw had reached the 
staggering number of 50.000. See. Ibid. Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, p. 294 
457
 See: Ibid. Fragen an die deutsche Geschichte, p. 317 
458
 See: Ibid. Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands, p. 218 
459
 See: Ibid. Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, p. 285 
460
 See: Ibid. Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, p. 792 
 157 
SS, sent the German transport minister a special letter imploring the latter to urgently 
send more trains for the deportation of the Jews
461
. As a result, four hundred thousand 
Hungarian Jews alone were gassed in Birkenau in the summer of 1944
462
. The 
persecution and the killing of Jews in and outside of the camps continued on a large scale 
and with great dedication right until the end of the war in Europe in May 1945
463
, even as 
the Allied armies swept into Germany and the occupied territories
464
. One of the last 
trains of Jews deported from Vienna reached the concentration camp of Theresienstadt on 
April 15, 1945; two days after the Red Army had entered Vienna
465
. It was typical for the 
efficiency and dedication with which the Nazis pursued their ―Endlösung‖. Right until 
the end they were convinced that Jews and other “opponents” were either not human, or 
“lesser humans” and should thus be deprived of their lives. The following harrowing 
account of a Holocaust survivor, Chaim Hirszman, written up by his wife, sums up in 
conclusion what the institutionalized dehumanization of other human beings ultimately 
leads to - the unthinkable: 
 
―When a transport with children up to three years old arrived [,] ‗The workers were told 
to dig one big hole into which the children were thrown and buried alive. My husband 
recollected this with horror. He couldn‘t forget how the earth had been rising until the 
children suffocated‘.―466 
 
1.3. Communism 
Echoing Norman Davies as quoted above, the French historian Stéphane Courtois 
observes: “The fact remains that our century has outdone its predecessors in its 
bloodthirstiness.”467 Together with Timothy Snyder, Courtois is one of few well-known 
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historians willing to explicitly compare Nazism and Communism as evil regimes of the 
same league
468
. He underlines this point by starting his investigation into the crimes and 
genocides of Communism with listing a rough estimate of the deaths caused by 
Communism throughout the 20th century: approximating 100 million, mostly civilians. 
The Soviet Union and Europe with 21 million and China with 65 million are responsible 
for the large majority of deaths
469
. The Communist regimes, Coutois notes, “in order to 
consolidate their grip on power, turned mass crime into a full-blown system of 
government.”470 Indeed here the comparison with Nazism is justified: also the Nazis 
promoted mass murder to a system of centralized government, allowing them to deport 
and kill countless millions of perceived opponents, also most of them civilians. In both 
systems, the dehumanization of the persecuted constituted the justification of the killings. 
Courtois puts it bitterly: “Thus in the name of an ideological belief system were tens of 
millions of innocent victims systematically butchered, unless of course it is a crime to be 
middle-class, of noble birth, a kulak, a Ukrainian, or even a worker or a member of the 
Communist Party.”471 This was the extent of the Soviet agenda of intolerance, especially 
under Lenin and Stalin. Whole groups of people were from one day to the other, like the 
Nazis did it, identified as lacking the quality of human beings. At the whim of the 
totalitarian leaders it was decided whether people‟s humanity would be respected or not. 
Where people or groups were considered to be an “enemy of the state” or an “anti-Soviet 
element”, they simply needed to be eliminated. The following quote from a 1917 speech 
by Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet KGB (secret police), shows how the 
Communist regime from the earliest stages of its development rejected justice in the 
name of revolution:  
 
“(..) we must make use of determined comrades – solid, hard men without pity – who are 
ready to sacrifice everything for the sake of the revolution. Do not imagine, comrades, 
that I am simply looking for a revolutionary form of justice. We have no concern about 
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justice at this hour! (…) What I am proposing, what I am demanding, is the creation of a 
mechanism that, in a truly revolutionary and suitably Bolshevik fashion, will filter out the 
counterrevolutionaries once and for all!”472 
 
It would be the beginning of a first massive wave of arbitrary arrests, tortures and 
executions directed against anybody that stood in the way of the new Communist 
dictatorship. It is a familiar pattern in history and would repeat itself, as we discussed 
above, in 1933 when Hitler rose to power in Germany. Terror in the Communist system 
was even a formally accepted method of governance that needed to be enshrined in the 
Criminal Code, as Lenin himself wrote in 1922 to his Commissar of Justice, Kursky: 
 
―(…) the basic concept, I hope, is clear, notwithstanding all the shortcomings of the 
rough draft: openly to set forth a statute which is both principled and politically truthful 
(…) to supply the motivation for the essence and the justification of terror, its necessity, 
its limits. The court must not exclude terror (…), it is necessary to formulate it as broadly 
as possible, for only revolutionary righteousness and a revolutionary conscience will 
provide the conditions for applying it more or less broadly in practice.‖473 
 
Already in the 1920‟s, the Communists were constructing a large network of 
concentration camps to lock up and kill opponents by means of forced labor, malnutrition 
or execution, something the Nazis would start repeating a decade later. Deportation of 
large numbers of innocent civilians and “political opponents” by cattle trains was not a 
German invention. The Soviets did it long before them. Solzhenitsyn vividly describes 
how the red cattle or coal cars were prepared, not by cleaning or with bunk beds, 
ventilation or hygiene for the prisoners, but rather with guard platforms and the barring of 
windows to ensure maximum security and minimal comfort
474
. Here the prisoners had to 
endure for up to 24 hours, or more. The Soviet concentration camp system, known as 
“The Gulag”, already contained over 925.000 prisoners as of January 1935, performing 
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forced labor under extreme conditions of climate and undernourishment and leading to a 
camp mortality rate of up to 10%. By 1941 the total Gulag population had doubled to 
1.930.000 prisoners
475
. Only a very small percentage of these almost two million people 
were actual criminals; most were labeled “class enemies” or considered to be a threat to 
the Communist system in other ways. Fair trials were nonexistent. By the beginning of 
the Second World War, the NKVD (later the KGB), in the territories the Soviets occupied 
as a result of the 1939 Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact
476
, initiated a series of campaigns of 
“cleansing”, executions and deportations on a scale that matched those of the Nazis in 
other areas of Europe. Alone in the 1940-1941 period, 381.000 Polish civilians were 
forcibly deported eastwards into the Soviet Union, many of them not surviving the 
ordeal. The NKVD did not even provide food for the deportation transport, whilst the 
journey could take up to twelve weeks
477
. The scale of the deportation of whole ethnic 
groups within the Soviet Union during the Second World War is unparalleled in 
European history. For example, by 1942, up to 1.209.430 ethnic Germans, most of them 
descendants of Germans invited to come and live in Russia in the 18
th
 Century by 
Catherine the Great, were deported to Kazakhstan and Siberia. The ethnically German 
population of the Soviet Union, according to a 1939 census, was 1.427.000
478
. This was 
followed in 1943 and 1944 by the massive deportation of Chechens, Ingush, Crimean 
Tatars, Karachai, Balkars and Kalmyks under the pretext of these peoples having 
“collaborated with the Nazis”. Alone in 1944, 521.247 Chechens and Ingush were 
deported to far-flung eastern regions, most of them women, children and old people 
labeled as “potentially dangerous elements”.479 The Soviets were no less cruel with the 
civilian population coming under their control elsewhere at the end of the war: Norman 
Davies reports how Nazi concentration camps, like for example Buchenwald, were 
merely turned into oppression centers for a newly defined group of “state enemies”480. 
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Millions of civilian refugees who had fled the fighting in the East adamantly refused to 
return to their homelands when these were under Soviet control, being keenly aware of 
the atrocities taking place there at the hands of the new rulers. But the forcible expulsion 
requested by Stalin and followed through by the Western Allies went on. The latter were 
well informed of the communist barbarities towards returning civilians, yet it took 
hundreds of thousands of deaths of forcibly returned exiles for the Western Allies to stop 
this practice
481
. Simultaneously, at least 9 million German civilians were forcibly 
expelled from their lands and homes in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Former Nazi camps 
were used by the Soviets as collection centers for the expelled. Maltreatment and 
persecution led to tens of thousands of more deaths
482
. The litany of barbarism, 
specifically against the defenseless civilian population of many countries, goes on 
throughout the reign of Stalin and beyond. By the beginning of the 1950‟s, over 5,5 
million people were administered as prisoners or “specially displaced people” by the 
Gulag concentration camp system
483
, excluding the many millions of others forcibly 
expelled from their homes and deported to Siberia and other inhabitable regions of the 
Soviet Union. The following original wording from Soviet deportation and execution 
orders under Stalin‟s reign shows how large groups of innocent civilians, whole ethnic 
populations, were deprived of the protection of their humanity and dignity by a few 
words of utter arbitrariness
484
: 
 
- “potentially hostile to the Soviet system” 
- “members of the families of socially alien elements, bandits and nationalists” 
- “all individuals refusing to comply with the minimum number of work days in the 
kolkhozy and living like parasites” 
 
Official charges were even standardized. Solzhenitsyn
485
 lists a further collection of 
“charges” used in politically motivated persecution whereby it is hard not to laugh – yet 
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hundreds of thousands of people were sent to concentration camps with these 
fabrications: 
 
- A negative attitude towards the collective-farm structure 
- A negative attitude toward the Stalinist constitution 
- A negative attitude toward whatever was the immediate, particular measure being 
carried out by the Party 
- Sympathy for Trotsky 
 
It was this perverse arbitrariness that the Stalinist regime used to strip ordinary civilians 
of the protection of their dignity as human beings. Such charges were used widely and 
implemented blindly by many other human beings. The arbitrariness knew no limits. A 
striking example is the case of Irina Tuchinskaya who was sentenced to 25 years behind 
bars on terrorism charges after being arrested whilst exiting her church following a 
religious service. The official charge was “prayed in the church for the death of 
Stalin.”486 
 
It is for good reason that this period of Stalin‟s reign was called “The Great Terror”. The 
totalitarian system would use all means at its disposal to make its grip on power firmer, 
even leading to approaches that contradicted its own avowed principles of anti-fascism 
and feeding the Soviet people. Two examples stand out here as specifically noteworthy: 
the orchestrated revival of anti-Semitism in the post-War Soviet Union as of 1946, and 
deliberately ignoring the failures of the forced collectivization leading to massive death 
by starvation. Starting in 1946 and continuing until Stalin‟s death in 1953 anti-Semitism 
of the same sort produced by the Nazis led to the large-scale exclusion of Jews from all 
positions of authority, the arts and the media in especially Moscow and Leningrad. This 
happened mostly under the pretext of having engaged in “counterrevolutionary 
activities
487
.  It included arrests, executions and sending Jews to the Gulag. At the same 
time the 1946-1947 famine in the provinces of Kursk, Tambov, Voronezh, Orel and 
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Rostov led to death by starvation of at least 500.000 people. Due to the draconic 
obligatory “collection targets” imposed on farmers, combined with an already failing 
agricultural forced collectivization system and massive drought, shortage quickly became 
famine. The famine was completely ignored by the authorities
488
. It bore close 
resemblance to the Great Famine of 1921 and 1922 during which at least 5 million Soviet 
citizens died, although this famine had a strong element of institutionalized starvation of 
the restive peasantry
489. This is illustrated by Lenin‟s openly expressed view of famine as 
a political tool for social change. At the time Lenin praised famine as an instrument that 
could and should be used “to strike a mortal blow against the enemy”, which he 
considered then to be the Orthodox Church. He also held that starvation was an effective 
tool to bring about socialism and “numerous positive results”.490 Stalin would more than 
once use starvation as a method of carefully planned mass murder, for example during 
the 1932-1933 collectivization campaign which led to millions of peasant deaths in 
Soviet Ukraine alone
491. Snyder reports: “no matter what peasants did, “they went on 
dying, dying, dying.” The death was slow, humiliating (..). To die of starvation with some 
sort of dignity was beyond the reach of almost anyone.”492 
 
The calculated destruction of dignified human life becomes strikingly clear when one 
further studies Solzhenitsyn. In “The Gulag Archipelago” he masterfully analyses how 
this was done, how the camps were “calculated and intended to corrupt”493. Under the 
title “Our Muzzled Freedom” Solzhenitsyn lists the 10 ways in which the whole country 
was infected by the “loathsomeness of the state” 494, its methods and attitudes as they 
permeated throughout Soviet society
495
: 
1. Constant Fear. “Peace of mind is something our citizens have never known.”496 
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2. Servitude. The meticulously bureaucratic system making it practically impossible 
to escape the system, thus making even the smallest dissent hazardous. 
3. Secrecy and Mistrust. Openhearted cordiality and hospitality, a former hallmark 
of the Russian people, became a threat to one‟s freedom and thus disappeared. 
4. Universal Ignorance. Hiding things from each other and not trusting each other 
helped implement a totalitarian system of absolute secrecy and thus control. 
5. Squealing. The organized informing on others and the involvement of so many 
people in this system that “in every group of people, in every office, in every 
apartment, either there would be an informer or else the people there would be 
afraid there was.”497 
6. Betrayal as a Form of Existence. Because of the constant fear people where 
exposed to over many years a “human being became a vassal of fear” which led 
many to the pragmatic conclusion that “the least dangerous form of existence was 
constant betrayal”. This betrayal mostly consisted of turning away quietly from 
the doomed people around oneself: “You acted as if you had not noticed”498. 
7. Corruption. The many years of fear and betrayal led to a widespread corruption of 
the inner life of human beings, of which large-scale denunciations were the 
clearest example. 
8. The Lie as a Form of Existence. “The permanent lie becomes the only safe form 
of existence, in the same way as betrayal. Every wag of the tongue can be 
overheard by someone, every facial expression observed by someone. Therefore 
every word, if it does not have to be a direct lie, is nonetheless obliged not to 
contradict the general, common lie.”499 
9. Cruelty. In a society where “class cruelty” was promoted, pity and mercy were 
ridiculed and one had to constantly protect oneself against the state machine, there 
was little place left for kindheartedness. The cruel regime only became crueler to 
sustain itself. 
10. Slave Psychology. A people subjected to a state that treats them as slaves. 
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These 10 points show how the regime was systematically trying to dismantle the 
principles and social behavior required to guarantee the respect and protection of the 
dignity of each human being, not only by the state, but also by its ordinary citizens 
amongst themselves. Hannah Arendt explains how a system of “mass atomization” 
through repeated purges destroyed all social and family ties employing fears of  “guilt by 
association” to create a society of isolated individuals500. Snyder, in paraphrasing Hannah 
Arendt, speaks here of the “alienation of all from all”.501 It is striking to see how this list 
can be applied word-for-word to other totalitarian systems as well, beginning with the 
Nazis. The stark difference between Nazism and Communism is however that the Nazis 
reserved their disregard for human beings to certain groups of its citizens and those of 
occupied countries, whilst the Soviet Communists, especially under Stalin, subjected the 
entire population to this system, leading to a far greater death toll. All this shows how the 
Communist and Stalinist ideology serves itself from a worldview that utterly despises the 
individual human being. It bases itself on a purely materialistic philosophy where the end 
of a so-called collective “workers paradise” justifies all the means, even if this leads to 
the targeted and large-scale destruction of human life. It is an all too familiar pattern in 
modern European history. What these examples of unspeakable injustice and human 
suffering at the hands of Communist ideology also show is that the institutionalized 
rejection of the humanity and therefore the dignity of whole groups of people as well as 
individuals were indeed made possible by unlimited power and indifference coupled with 
blind obedience. Once again, it is Solzhenitsyn who brings this to the point where he 
describes his personal experience with “The Bluecaps”, the men of the Soviet State 
Security apparatus performing their interrogations and torture in the Gulag and other 
prisons:  
 
―They understood that the cases were fabricated, yet they kept on working year after 
year. How could they? (…) they forced themselves not to think (and this in itself means 
the ruin of a human being), and simply accepted that this was the way it had to be and 
that the person who gave them their orders was always right…  
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But didn‘t the Nazis, too, it comes to mind, argue the same way?‖502 
 
Solzhenitsyn here shows us the common roots of the Nazi and Communist ideologies. In 
a footnote to this observation, he notes that “there is no way of sidestepping this 
comparison: both the years and the methods coincide too closely.” Where they coincide, 
one could summarize, is in the decision of the regime‟s followers and accommodators 
“not to think” which is “the ruin of a human being”, as Solzhenitsyn rightly puts it. Here 
we come to the core of the lesson the history of 20
th
 century Europe teaches us: the 
violation of human dignity was and is made possible by those that decide not to think, not 
to use human reason, to be blind to the injustices that happen in front of their eyes. They 
therefore allow indifference and irrational emotions to lead to the dehumanization of 
others – whether individuals or groups. It is the classical recipe for all forms of genocide, 
mass killing and persecution in general and – as history shows us – the beginning of the 
end of such regimes. Communism fell precisely because it so consistently disregarded 
human dignity. The Polish Solidarnosc movement, which stood at the basis of the fall of 
the Iron Curtain in 1989, was inspired by an open and peaceful revolt of conscience of 
millions of Polish citizens against the disregard of their human dignity and their 
subsequent exploitation by the Communist authorities. It was, as the leader of this 
movement and later president of Poland, Lech Walesa, put it in 1984
503
 a “communion of 
the people who do not wish to participate in a lie.” Jósef Tischner, one of the other 
leading figures of Solidarnosc, explains how this peaceful revolt of conscience works in 
practice. The final outcome of this struggle was the end of Communism in Europe:  
 
―One who condones moral oppression tightens a noose over his or her own humanity. To 
rebel against moral exploitation is a basic duty of conscience. Obviously, it is also 
crucial that the means of carrying on this rebellion not be contrary to conscience.  
A mutiny of conscience against the moral exploitation of work brings to the forefront the 
question of human dignity. (…) Human dignity does not imply pride and empty ambition. 
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One who thinks so does not understand human beings. Since treachery has occurred, 
fidelity must follow. Since humiliation has been inflicted, respect must ensue. Since there 
was degradation, equality must come. Dialogue is possible only when there is a common 
grammar. Ethics are the grammar of relationships between people, and their principle, 
human dignity. 
It is for this reason that our present defiance is not an ordinary mutiny. Rather, it is a 
voice – great and piercing – calling the people to fidelity.‖504 
 
1.4. Ethnic Nationalism 
With the euphoric scenes of 1989 still vividly present on the minds of Europeans and the 
continent looking with new hope to the future, persecution, concentration camps and 
massacres happened all over again before the dust of the fallen Berlin Wall had even 
settled. As conflict broke out once again on the Balkan in 1991, lasting till 1999, and 
despite the lessons Europeans fighting for human dignity thought to have learned from 
modern history, only two years after the demise of Europe‟s murderous Communist 
ideology mass graves were once again being created. This Balkan war cost over 200.000 
– mostly civilian – lives whilst an estimated 60.000 Bosnian women alone were raped, let 
alone the 2 million refugees the conflict caused. The same old pattern was 
enthusiastically repeated: the state-sponsored and publicly promoted rejection of the 
humanity of whole groups of people. Those now rejected were the same human beings 
one had lived with peacefully as family members, neighbors, friends and colleagues since 
after the end of World War II. This time an ideology reemerged that had been thought 
dead at least since the end of World War II: nationalism inspired by ethnic rivalries. 
Communism was defeated, yet as a direct consequence of the moral desert and power 
vacuum this system had left behind, now ex-communist leaders in the disintegrating 
Yugoslavia quickly seized the opportunity to step into the void they had themselves 
created. Power-addicted as they were, former communist leaders turned “democrats” 
overnight. Helped by a willing media they deliberately revived and invigorated 
nationalistic sentiments and myths to stay in power through the classic method of “divide 
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and rule”505. Mass hysteria was the result. Suddenly, and quite unexpectedly506, Europe 
was presented with the horror of “ethnic cleansing” – a euphemism in practice mostly 
meaning outright genocide
507
. This was something the majority of Europeans had thought 
was merely part of long passed Balkan history. The hope of 1989 was as quickly gone as 
it had come. As Michael Ignatieff puts it in 1994: “When the Berlin Wall came down, 
when Václav Havel stood on the balcony in Prague‟s Wenceslas Square and crowds 
cheered the collapse of the Communist regimes across Europe, I thought, like many 
people, that we were about to witness a new era of liberal democracy. (…) We soon 
found out how wrong we were. For what succeeded the last age of empire is a new age of 
violence.”508 Large scale ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina started immediately at 
the onset of the Bosnian war in April 1992 when a majority of Bosnians had voted for 
independence. But as early as 1991 both Serbs and Croats had already partaken in 
targeted campaigns of ethnic cleansing
509
. Even though the new independent Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina received almost instant recognition from the main Western powers, 
its Serb citizens rejected the new nationhood, supported by their Serbian brethren on the 
other side of the border in Serbia proper. In January 1992 they had already declared their 
own ―Republika Srpska‖. Bosnian Serb forces supported by the Serbian government and 
military quickly started a campaign to drive countless Bosnian Muslims (also referred to 
as “Bosniaks”) out of their homes whilst looting and destroying their villages. Hundreds 
of villages were soon flattened and in the spring and summer of 1992 an average of 200 
homes were destroyed each day
510
. The campaign included thousands of random killings 
of civilians even before the massacre of Srebrenica took place three years later. By 
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August 1992 the death toll had already reached 35.000
511
. Once again the Western 
powers were looking on and proved incapable or unwilling to stop a new chapter of 
massive human dignity violation on European soil. This was due mostly, as Glenny 
points out, to ignorance or other preoccupations
512
. The fall in July 1995 of the United 
Nations Safe Area
513
 of Srebrenica to Bosnian Serb forces and the subsequent largest-
scale massacre of civilians since World War II – under the eyes of the Western powers - 
was the climax of the orgy of violence. It constituted a clear case of genocide that finally 
forced the West to act decisively
514
. The Carnegie report leaves no doubt that the 
international community knew perfectly well what was happening from the moment 
Srebrenica fell to the Bosnian Serb forces. Speaking of the days – 11 and 12 July 1995 - 
Srebrenica was overrun it reports in 1996: “(…) in front of Dutch peacekeepers and the 
world‟s television cameras, the troops commanded by General Ratko Mladic selected out 
the men and older boys. The evidence indicated that they were taken away and 
slaughtered.”515  The genocide of Srebrenica alone left well over 8000 Bosnian men and 
boys dead
516
. When reading the once again harrowing accounts by survivors of the 
Srebrenica massacre, the parallels to the Nazi and Communist barbarism become 
immediately clear: the familiar pattern of well-organized executions planned with 
precision, soldiers “just following orders” and civilians – who were once peaceful 
neighbors - turning a blind eye or sometimes cooperating outright. Solzhenitsyn‟s 
concept of those involved deciding “not to think” is once again omnipresent. This time 
soldiers of the Bosnian Serb army decided that Bosniak men, women and children should 
be denied their humanity. Apart from the mass killings, rape, torture and looting also took 
place on a large scale. The following testimony by a survivor, Ramiza Gurdic, shows the 
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same total disregard for human life we discussed above and revives memories of the 
worst Nazi crimes: 
 
―At one time, I saw how a young boy of about ten was killed by Serbs in Dutch uniform. 
This happened in front of my own eyes. The mother sat on the ground and her young son 
sat beside her. The young boy was placed on his mother‘s lap. The young boy was killed. 
His head was cut off. The body remained on the lap of the mother. The Serbian soldier 
placed the head of the young boy on his knife and showed it to everyone. (…) I saw how a 
pregnant woman was slaughtered. There were Serbs who stabbed her in the stomach, cut 
her open and took two small children out of her stomach and then beat them to death on 
the ground. I saw this with my own eyes."
517
 
 
But even as the Dayton peace accords that were signed on 21 November 1995 by the 
presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina ended the military conflicts 
between and within these now independent countries of the former Yugoslavia, the 
genocide and ethnic cleansing had still not come to an end. It required yet another Balkan 
conflict to be halted. The bitter irony is, as Glenny describes, that the Dayton Agreement 
hailed a new constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina that “included the most advanced 
provisions for the protection of human rights anywhere in the world.”518 The 1996-1999 
Kosovo conflict can however be qualified as nothing less then deliberately in full 
contempt of the letter and spirit of the Dayton peace agreement and its constitution 
supposedly ending the Balkan war in 1995. The ink had hardly dried when Serb troops 
and paramilitaries as well as Kosovo Albanian fighters were once again committing 
atrocities amongst civilians. The conflict got fully out of control with the 27 April 1998 
entering into Kosovo of Serbian units of what was left of the Yugoslav army. A new 
round of ethnic cleansing and mass murder had begun in earnest, including the 
destruction of countless villages throughout Kosovo. It would take the March-June 1999 
war between NATO and Serbia, with the relentless bombing campaign by NATO 
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airpower, to finally stop the killing and destruction. This allowed the over 1 million 
Kosovo refugees to return to their looted and burnt-down homes and villages. Martin 
Gilbert describes what NATO troops encountered upon entering Kosovo after the 
withdrawal of Serb troops: “Within twenty-four hours of entering Kosovo, British and 
German troops found mass graves of victims of „ethnic cleansing‟ at five villages. (…) 
Within a week a further fifty mass murder sites had been located.”519 Although Europe 
responded faster to the massacres of the 1992-1995 and the 1996-1999 conflicts than it 
did during the Second World War, it only did so after intense – and mostly failed – 
diplomacy. It was above all the massive pressure and diplomatic and military 
involvement of the United States that ended the bloodshed. The bitter irony is how once 
again the United States was needed to come to the rescue of Europe‟s grandly proclaimed 
human dignity and human rights principles. A positive outcome of the Balkan conflicts 
however was the creation in 1993 – during the war - of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, which has so far indicted 161 
persons from all parts of the former Yugoslavia, of which Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan 
Karadjic and Ratko Mladic are the most well-known accused. Proceedings for 35 of the 
indicted are ongoing, whilst cases for 126 accused have been concluded
520
. The ICTY has 
since served as an international model to administer justice in the aftermath of other 
conflicts where the states involved are either unwilling or incapable to do so themselves. 
It goes beyond the scope of this research to make an in-depth study of the Balkan wars of 
the latter part of the twentieth century (the start of the twentieth century, as well as the 
middle of the century also saw bloody ethnic-nationalistic conflict on the Balkans). 
Instead, we will again analyze, as we did with Nazism and Communism, what thinking – 
if any – lay behind the politics of ethnic Nationalism and what methods or attitudes were 
used to deny the humanity of men and women not belonging to one‟s own “group”. 
Although sadly the patterns are all too familiar, it is still useful to expose them here from 
a different angle giving us a better understanding of why Europe, despite its worthy post-
War human dignity policies, once again became the scene of a human slaughterhouse. 
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Why were the principles of human dignity so easily forgotten? Drakulic
521
 describes in 
vivid and shocking detail how war crimes were committed by all groups in the Balkan 
conflicts, military or civilian; Croats, Serbs and Muslims. Whilst not all participated in 
the killings, many did in the looting. Drakulic for example tells the story of the Gospic 
massacre where in October 1991, shortly after an unsuccessful attempt by Serb forces to 
capture this Croatian town, some 120 Serb civilians having lived peacefully in Gospic for 
generations, were taken from their homes at night and immediately executed and secretly 
buried outside the town. The perpetrators were not only the Croatian civil and military 
leaders of the town, but also a group of ordinary civilians
522
. The motivation of the killing 
was that these civilians did not deserve for their humanity to be respected because “they 
had the wrong blood”, as Drakulic bitterly puts the commonly held view at the time 
amongst local Croats
523
.  The main reason for committing these atrocities, Ignatieff puts 
it pointedly, was the politically motivated “narcissism of minor difference”524 brought to 
a murderous zeal by creating a climate of fear. This climate was created by targeted use 
of nationalistic sentiments and manipulation of the media leading to mass hysteria. The 
infamous 1987 speech of Slobodan Milosevic on the Kosovo Polje, promising the 
Kosovo Serbs that they would never be run over again by the Turks (read: Muslims) as 
had occurred in 1389, was a deliberate political move to create fear and a pretext for 
persecution and violence. Fear of the “other” nationalities or ethnic groups was slowly 
but persistently introduced and led the way to dehumanizing them. In other words: ethnic 
nationalism was created on the assumption that since Yugoslavia had fallen apart, who 
else then your fellow ethnic or national group would protect you against all the others? 
This in spite of the fact that these others were until recently family, friends, colleagues 
and neighbors. Who else would protect you from the international “conspiracies” against 
your small and defenseless nation? The Carnegie report echoes Ignatieff‟s observation 
where it notes in its analysis of the Republika Srpska: “Everyone in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina must live according to Karadzic‟s conception of that country, where cultural 
distinctions are elevated to differences in species, and “cats and dogs” (Karadzic phrase) 
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are no longer expected to cohabit.”525 It is history repeating itself. Did not Hitler and the 
Nazis refer to the Jews as dogs? Did the Nazi ideology not qualify the Jewish people as 
“an inferior race”, another species? Did not Stalin deny the humanity of whole ethnic 
populations by forced deportation and mass executions, simply because they were 
deemed “a threat to the Communist state”? The level of disregard for human dignity 
people like Mladic and Karadzic displayed was therefore quite the same as Hitler‟s and 
Stalin‟s views – and fear was used to promote these views to become more generally 
accepted. Numbers do not matter when it comes to the primary consideration of any 
given action, and this consideration was the same for all these men. But the crimes and 
the motivations of these men are obvious. Yet it is even more revealing to study the 
thinking and methods of the “ordinary” people that did most of the killings or stood idly 
by. Without them dictators and war criminals cannot fulfill their aims
526
. Draculic brings 
this to the point in her analysis of the Balkan war criminals where she says: “Only if we 
understand that most perpetrators are people like us can we see that we too might one day 
be in danger of succumbing to the same kind of pressure.”527 This understanding of 
human nature, of its potentially destructive sides, is essential to understanding the true 
meaning of human dignity. Draculic rightly points out that we need to move away from 
the concept that war criminals are only monsters with which we have nothing in 
common. Doing so blinds us for the fact that most of the perpetrators are simple, ordinary 
citizens. In order to come closer to grasping the meaning of human dignity, we need to 
ask: What led them to do this? What led them to decide that “it has been „proved‟ that our 
enemies are no longer human beings” and therefore “we are no longer obliged to treat 
them as such.”528 Following Draculic‟ minute research on the individuals standing 
accused before the ICTY in The Hague, three main patterns can be distinguished that lead 
to such behavior: fear, the moral slippery slope and conviction. The motivations of war 
criminals are often a mixture of these three. We will briefly discuss these three patterns, 
aided by examples of war criminals convicted by the ICTY. 
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First of all, as most writers on the Balkan wars underline, fear was and is the major 
motivating factor for human dignity violations by ordinary civilians. We already 
discussed the fear of the other nationality and its exploitation by politicians and the 
media. This led to a step by step exclusion of whole groups from society with rape, 
looting and killings as a consequence directly accommodated by this process. The deputy 
Bosnian-Serb leader under Karadzic, Biljana Plavsic – also convicted by the ICTY for 
war crimes – describes this fear as a “blinding fear” leading to an obsessive determination 
to not ever become victims again: “In this obsession not to become victims ever again, 
we allowed ourselves to become perpetrators.”529 One can speak here of a “general fear” 
of society caused by a perceived threat from “alien” elements in this particular society, 
leading to the notion that these threats need to be removed, if necessary by force. The 
subsequent dehumanization of those that posed a “threat” was the logical consequence of 
a well-orchestrated propaganda of fear. But there was another sort of fear as well, what 
one could call the „individual fear‟ caused by (perceived) pressure or threats from within 
one‟s own „group‟. One could call this extreme peer pressure. An clear example is where 
Draculic describes
530
 the ICTY case of Drazen Erdemovic, a young Serbian-Croatian 
soldier in the Bosnian Serb army who participated in the Srebrenica massacre in July 
1995. The ICTY acknowledged that Drazen had acted under “extreme duress” after 
hearing his own and witnesses‟ statements on how he repeatedly protested before his 
commanding officer against the order to execute the unarmed civilians kneeling in front 
of his firing squad. He ultimately obeyed the order when threatened to be executed 
himself along with the civilians. He caved in after receiving this direct threat to his life 
whilst thinking of his young wife and child he felt could not be left alone. The Court 
obviously did not accept this in any way as a justification for the 70 people he alone 
executed that day, but took this into consideration as sentence was passed. The ICTY 
hereby noted that throughout the whole war this was the only time Drazen had killed. 
Drazen is a typical example of an ordinary citizen that nobody around him could imagine 
would ever do such a thing, yet circumstances - above all fear - let him to a situation 
where everything he believed in was thrown overboard, leading to great bloodshed. Even 
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reason did not have a chance in this situation. Draculic describes how during the shooting 
Drazen took apart an older Muslim man who pleaded with him to stop the killing and 
asked him how he could do this. The soldier, even giving the man a cigarette, answered 
with a weak “I don‟t know” and continued the executions when the threat to his own life 
was repeated. This example highlights how the human will to survive, to preserve one‟s 
own dignity, can – inspired by genuine fear - easily lead to the conscious or unconscious 
decision that in order to avert this threat, the other‟s life and dignity – the weaker human 
being over whom one can exert power - should be sacrificed. This pattern of peer 
pressure and fear is also what led a far larger number of ordinary people to participate in 
the “lesser” crimes of the Balkan wars, such as the expulsion of “other” families from 
their houses and the looting and burning that followed. 
 
Secondly, it is equally the “moral slippery slope” that leads to large scale human dignity 
violations. It is a process of ceding ground to injustice by small steps that in themselves 
seem harmless. The case of General Radislav Krstic
531
 shows how such a “policy of 
small steps”, of everyday decisions and concessions, of a collaboration on a much smaller 
scale, brought men like Krstic into situations where they “had either to obey or disobey 
the orders of men like Ratko Mladic”, Draculic observes. As commander of the armed 
forces of Republika Srpska he was sentenced to 46 years imprisonment by the ICTY for 
his direct role in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995. Krstic, however, was not a man with a 
record of violence or criminality; neither did he display any interest in nationalistic 
policies. In fact, he was a quiet career soldier who joined the Yugoslav National Army 
mostly because of the economic advantages this brought him at the time of Communism: 
an apartment, an income and a pension. He was not an especially good or courageous 
soldier; he just happened to be promoted by the circumstances of war and went on to 
serve directly under Ratko Mladic. Krstic was “an opportunist who went with the tide”532, 
which led him into a situation where he could no longer disobey the orders of General 
Ratko Mladic without endangering his own life. In the final analysis, which once again is 
given by Draculic, we see that the threat to human life and dignity is so much closer to 
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home where she says; “Krstic wanted to portray himself as a bystander, but in war there 
are no bystanders.” It is exactly this “policy of small steps”, followed by a policy of 
compartmentalizing human dignity where the ultimate danger comes from. It is in 
gradually only acknowledging human dignity protection for certain „groups‟ that history 
has shown lays the threat to upholding the inviolable dignity of every human being.  
 
Thirdly, the case of Goran Jelisic
533
 shows how the Balkan conflict also brought forward 
men and women acting from a strong conviction that the “others” or “dogs” needed to be 
eliminated. The Balkan wars equally produced sufficient willing executioners. These 
were men and women who enjoyed torturing, raping and killing at random. They acted in 
the belief that they were doing the right thing because the others were “lower” beings or 
“animals” and they themselves had the power to decide over their lives. Jelisic randomly 
killed over a hundred prisoners at the Luka prison camp in Bosnia alone. But Jelisic was 
also an ordinary citizen with no criminal record to speak of, other than petty crime. He 
was even known by his family and friends as somebody who “would never hurt a fly”, 
always helping others, whether Muslim, Croat or Serb. What then, turned this young man 
into a war criminal who killed with relish believing he was doing the right thing? 
Draculic - describing the ICTY Foca case that deals with the systematic rape of Muslim 
women
534
 - provides us with an explanation that is hard to swallow, but entirely correct: 
 
―(...) the war itself turned ordinary men – a driver, a waiter and a salesman, as were the 
three accused – into criminals because of opportunism, fear and, not least, conviction. 
Hundreds of thousands had to have been convinced that they were right in what they 
were doing. Otherwise such vast numbers of rapes and murders simply cannot be 
explained – and this is even more frightening.‖535 
 
Human dignity, 20
th
 century history of Europe shows us through the atrocities of Nazism, 
Communism and Nationalism, is not something that is only violated by the infamous 
totalitarian regimes and dictators such as Hitler, Stalin and Milosevic. It suffers its real 
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setbacks at the hands of ordinary citizens who in one way or the other accommodate the 
horrors. Judge Florence Mumba of the ICTY summarized this point well when she read 
out the verdict in the Foca case on 22 February 2001: 
 
―The three accused are not ordinary soldiers, whose morals were merely loosened by the 
hardships of war. These are men with no known criminal past. However, they thrived in 
the dark atmosphere of the dehumanization of those believed to be enemies, when one 
would not even ask, in the words of Eleanor Roosevelt, ‗Where, after all, do universal 
human rights begin? In small places, close to home.‘ Political leaders and war generals 
are powerless if the ordinary people refuse to carry out criminal activities in the course 
of war. Lawless opportunists should expect no mercy, no matter how low their position in 
the chain of command may be.‖536    
 
Draculic rightly asks the question where all this leaves us if we realize the perpetrators 
were ordinary people “just like you and me”. They were people that through 
circumstances made the wrong moral decisions – their behavior thus had less to do with 
character but more with circumstances. We should not yield to the temptation, Snyder 
says, to simply dismiss the perpetrators as inhuman, thereby abandoning the search for 
understanding how these atrocities could happen
537
. That is why, when looking at ways to 
better protect human dignity, we should really first and foremost look at how ordinary 
people react to extraordinary situations
538
. In Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia in the years 
leading up to the war and during the war itself, most citizens gradually – almost without 
noticing – adjusted to a society that was being led by a combination of state propaganda, 
opportunism, fear and indifference leading to a behavior the consequences of which 
people were not really aware of
539
. A “normality of hatred” set in, as Draculic puts it. 
This institutionalized hatred, which is not much different from the anti-Semitism in 
Germany under Hitler, made the step to active or passive participation in the 
dehumanization of other human beings a small one. The amount of normal law-abiding 
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citizens collaborating with the injustices as a result grew naturally. This is a tendency of 
human nature that is all too familiar as we have observed through the many examples 
presented in this research. It is still no justification for the barbarous acts. Draculic 
reminds us: “But turning your head away or remaining silent in the face of injustice and 
crime means collaborating with a politics whose programme is death and destruction. 
And whether it is willing or unwilling collaboration doesn‟t really matter, because the 
result is the same.”540 
 
The Second World War brings together in a bitter way the three most murderous 
ideologies of the twentieth century. Their convergence on Balkan lands between 1940 
and 1945 confirms what we have already stated above, namely that Nazism, Communism 
and ethnic Nationalism were basically the same in their intent and methods. The different 
(official) labels matter little in the reality of what they caused. Yugoslavia during World 
War II was the scene of atrocities beyond imagination where the fascist Croatian Ustache, 
the nationalist Serb Chetniks, the Tito-led communist partisans and an unusually 
bloodthirsty German Wehrmacht all partook in indiscriminate killings of civilians and 
other human dignity violations, whilst also fiercely combating each other. It is telling 
how each of these groups – with their different ideological backgrounds yet many 
similarities - was equally involved in human dignity violations of the worst kind. There is 
for example the massacre of Kragujevac in October 1941. Here a retaliatory round of 
executions by the Germans in response to the killing of 10 of its Wehrmacht soldiers in 
an earlier attack by Chetnik and partisan fighters left 2,324 men – mostly civilians - dead. 
Of these men, 144 were secondary school students from the ages of twelve onwards
541
.  
Not much later, in December 1941, the Chetniks themselves massacred between 2000 
and 3000 Muslim men, women and children in the Bosnian town of Foca by way of 
reprisal because of the latter‟s perceived „collaboration‟ with Tito‟s partisans542. The 
Ustache was no less genocidal; they were amongst others responsible for the creation and 
running of the Jasenovac concentration camp, where the Croatians actively cooperated 
with the Nazis as to the extermination of the Jews. The Ustache especially targeted ethnic 
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Serbs who were tortured and killed in Jasenovac on a massive scale
543
. The bloody 
history of the Balkans with its most recent violent eruptions between 1991 and 1999 
confirms that indeed the program of death and destruction was really the same for all 
three ideologies of the twentieth century described in this research. Here, as Frans Alting 
von Geusau puts it, “Humiliation of fellow human beings is the instrument of choice to 
gradually destroy the human spirit and human dignity.”544 
 
1.5. Response to the violations 
The intense human tragedies of the 20
th
 century led to various (international) responses, 
the effects of which can be felt clearly today, especially in our political and legal systems. 
The Nuremberg Trials, the European Court of Human Rights and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the development of the European Union 
and the Council of Europe are all a direct result of these conflicts and the massive human 
dignity violations they caused. The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 
1998 was also inspired by the bloodletting of the 20
th
 century. It is the symbolic value 
and political relevance of the Nuremberg (1945) and The Hague - ICTY (1993) tribunals 
and the precedent they set in international law that is especially relevant for the 
development of the human dignity notion in its legal context. Neither in the charter 
establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal
545
, nor in the statute erecting the ICTY
546
 do we find 
specific mention made of the legal concept or principle of human dignity. Also a 
definition of what constitutes its violation is not to be found. Other than in international 
human rights law, human dignity as a separate legal concept or principle does not play a 
prominent role in international criminal law. The latter discipline focuses mainly on 
prosecuting clearly defined internationally recognized “elements of crimes”: genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ICC has also added the category “crimes of 
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827), last amended on 7 July 2009 (UNSC 1877) 
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aggression” to the list. Obviously each of these crimes would constitute a violation of 
human dignity, yet the detailed catalogues of crimes the statutes of the international 
criminal tribunals provide only tell us what is punishable, without in any way referring to 
human dignity. This can still give us a useful insight into what would generally be 
considered a human dignity violation today, but not why this is so in order that also 
undefined crimes could fall within the scope of its protection. In this respect we have not 
advanced much further since the end of World War II. This reminds us of what Jacques 
Maritain observed in relation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the authors 
of which specifically agreed on a catalogue of human dignity violations without being 
able to agree on the philosophical and legal underpinnings of human dignity and human 
rights itself. Like the Declaration, the legal documents establishing the various 
international criminal tribunals in post-War Europe have therefore all reverted to merely 
defining what crimes these institutions may prosecute. Although this is certainly a major 
step forward from a historical and legal perspective, the process still lacks a discussion 
and agreement on the core principles that are needed to come to a legal system – at least 
in Europe - that is indeed able to guarantee the inviolability of the human dignity of every 
human being.  
We will not discuss the tribunals and international criminal law in detail but rather point 
out some of their distinctive historical and legal elements, as well as political 
consequences relevant for a better understanding of human dignity as a legal principle in 
Europe today. 
 
The creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945 and the ICTY in 1993 indeed constitute 
two decisive stages in the development of international criminal law and were a direct 
response to the massive violations of human dignity and human rights brought forth by 
the Nazi regime and the war that accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia as of 
1992. One interesting aspect of the evolving role of international (criminal) law can be 
observed in the timing of the founding of these tribunals. Both tribunals were founded 
through the United Nations Organization (UN), however with the important difference 
that the Nuremberg Tribunal was founded directly after the end of the war on 8 August 
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1945
547
, whilst the Hague Tribunal (ICTY) was founded during the 1992-1995 war, 
already in May 1993
548
. The ICTY furthermore also handed down its first indictment on 
7 November 1994 whilst the war was still going on. These details of timing indicate that 
since the end of World War II the influence and weight of the principles of international 
law have increased, as well as the willingness of political leaders to enforce them. One 
can also observe this trend on other continents, where both in Africa (Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone) and Asia (Cambodia) post-conflict tribunals were created that are modeled on the 
Nuremberg and ICTY tribunals. It can thus be marked as an indirect positive 
development in the protection of human dignity and human rights that at least the 
response to the violation of these and other principles of international law in national 
jurisdictions has become more efficient and more forceful. It is no small achievement, as 
we already noted above, that all of the individuals indicted by the ICTY have either been 
prosecuted or are currently undergoing prosecution at the Tribunal. It is a major step 
forward in the development of international human rights law that the centuries-long 
impregnable concept of the unaccountable sovereign state - so long having kept the 
crimes of totalitarian regimes hidden from international scrutiny - has now been seriously 
breached in many – yet certainly not all – countries. This in itself is a serious advance for 
the cause of human dignity protection, as it exposes ever more violations and helps to 
forward the slow process of finding ways to come to a broader application of the notion 
of inviolable human dignity. The creation in 1998 of the ICC with seat in The Hague
549
 
has been a further step in breaking through the system of mutually recognized impunity. 
The latest examples of this process are telling: the indictment and issuing of arrest 
warrants by the ICC for Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in 2009 and Libyan leader 
Muhammar Gadaffi in 2011, both whilst they were still in office.  
 
As we discussed above, international criminal law is relevant for the development of the 
legal concept and legal principle of human dignity insofar as it offers an “introvert 
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definition” of what constitutes human dignity. This is achieved by interpreting it as 
defining what violates human dignity instead of what constitutes human dignity. For 
example, article 5 of the statute of the ICTY reads
550
: 
 
―Crimes against humanity 
 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the 
following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in 
character, and directed against any civilian population:  
(a) murder;  
(b) extermination;  
(c) enslavement;  
(d) deportation;  
(e) imprisonment;  
(f) torture;  
(g) rape;  
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;  
(i) other inhumane acts.‖ 
 
A more limited wording can be found in Principle VI (c) of the ―Principles of 
International Law‖ applied by the Nuremberg Tribunal551: 
 
―Crimes against humanity: 
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against 
any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when 
such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection 
with any crime against peace or any war crime.‖ 
                                                 
550
 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as amended on 7 July 
2009 by UNSC Resolution 1877, see: 
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 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the 
Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal as published by the United Nations in 2005. See: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_1_1950.pdf (retrieved 11-9-2011) 
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These provisions are limited in application and scope to situations of armed conflict and 
do not apply to the broader field of law and governance in general (other than is the case 
with the jurisdiction of the ICC). However, this shows how the European understanding 
of crimes that need to be prosecuted, regardless of real or imagined national sovereignty, 
created a political climate that made it possible for human dignity evolving into the legal 
principle to be found today in the EU Charter. Such crimes are self-evidently in violation 
of human dignity. As Lynn Hunt observes:”The process had and has an undeniable 
circularity to it: you know the meaning of human rights because you feel distressed when 
they are violated. The truths of human rights might be paradoxical in this sense, but they 
are nonetheless still self-evident.”552 
 
As a final point concluding the discussion of Europe‟s 20th century organized bloodshed, 
there is one striking fact that cannot be overlooked and needs brief discussion here. 
Although it is true that the way in which the different World War II perpetrators have 
dealt with their past is quite varied, it can be said that the main aggressor, Germany, went 
to great lengths to do so correctly, of course much under the influence of the victors of 
that war and the Nuremberg trials. This process of coming to terms with the past is still 
ongoing. As to the most recent Balkan wars, the matter lies more complicated, yet here it 
can be noted that, especially under pressure from the EU and the ICTY, the Bosnians, the 
Serbs and the Croats are little by little starting to deal with their own crimes during the 
conflict. This is an ongoing process too, even if it is very slow and often marred by 
political deadlock and the unwillingness of many in these countries to accept their part of 
the guilt. Very much still needs to be done here, but some important first steps have been 
made, given the fact that none of the war crimes‟ suspects indicted by the ICTY is now 
unaccounted for
553
. None of this however can be said of the main force of Communism in 
twentieth century Europe, the former Soviet Union. It should be noted that no tribunal of 
any kind or even a “truth commission” was set up to investigate the crimes of 
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 All war crimes suspects indicted by the ICTY are either in custody (awaiting trial or serving out their 
sentence), acquitted because of lack of evidence or have died. In the end the governments of the countries 
involved – Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia - all cooperated with the ICTY 
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Communism in the former Soviet Union. It is equally bitter to note that both the 
Nuremberg tribunal and the ICTY were created with the explicit (UN Security Council) 
support of the Soviet Union in the former case and the Russian Federation in the latter 
case. But it seems the Russian political leadership does not measure the country‟s own 
past in the same way as it does that of others. Apart from former Russian president 
Vladimir Putin‟s infamous remark that the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest 
geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century, we have so far not seen any serious effort in 
Russia or other former Soviet republics to deal with the human tragedies caused by 
decades of a Communist totalitarian regime. Despite the above described human dignity 
violations that lead to the death of tens of millions of civilians throughout seven decades 
of Communist rule, there has not even been a national court or other institution seriously 
and methodically investigating the full extend of the crimes of Communism and who was 
responsible for it. Even countries like Rwanda and South Africa, both the scene of much 
bloodshed in the latter part of the twentieth century, established their own national legal 
mechanisms to deal with their troubled past. Of course these mechanisms are not perfect 
but at least they start a process of information and reconciliation that can help a country 
to diminish the risk of renewed large-scale human dignity violations. Such a process 
contributes to a better, if still imperfect, understanding of the notion of human dignity as 
the founding principle of civil society and the rule of law. It is therefore a cause for great 
concern that Europe‟s largest country, Russia, seems not to be interested in evaluating its 
own human rights record and past violations. This in turn has led to the continuation – be 
it on a much smaller scale – of the serious violation of human dignity in Russia and many 
other former Soviet republics until today. The current official Russian attitude towards its 
Communist, and especially Stalinist, past will prove to be a serious obstacle for lasting 
stability and peace in Europe and Asia Minor since the central role of human dignity 
protection is paramount to achieving this. Is this current attitude in the former Soviet 
Union merely a form of organized forgetting, as was commonly practiced in communist 
times, or does a deeper reason explain this? Echoing what Draculic said about the former 
Yugoslavia, the historian Timothy Snyder sheds some light on this attitude:  
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“Ideology, when stripped by time or partisanship of its political and economic 
connection, becomes a moralizing form of explanation of mass killing, one that 
comfortably separates the people who explain from the people who kill. It is convenient 
to see the perpetrator just as someone who holds the wrong idea and is therefore 
different for that reason.”554  
 
The conclusion we may draw from the study of Europe‟s bloody 20th century is one that 
may be repulsive or even unacceptable to us: the massive human dignity violations at the 
hands of Nazis, Communists and Nationalists were not simply perpetrated by inhuman 
monsters. They were performed mostly by ordinary human beings to whom the mass 
killings actually made sense.
555
 Human dignity and its violations, history has shown us, 
lies exclusively in the hands of ordinary human beings – you and me. 
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 Ibid. Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands, p. 399 
555
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Draculic in “They Would Never Hurt a Fly” as quoted above 
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Chapter 2: Legal-historical context – from concept to principle 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Collective shock and fear of Europeans in the final years and the years following the end 
of World War II led to a powerful movement inspired by the “never again” mantra which 
in turn provided the final push for national and European human dignity legislation. It 
seemed all were in agreement – all at least realized - that human dignity had been grossly 
violated and should from now on be legally protected on a supranational level, preferably 
enhanced with effective enforcement instruments. Still today we accept the “never again” 
argument as the main explanation of the protection of human dignity having such a 
prominent role in the European legal system, whether on the national or the supranational 
level. But the historically self-evident legal prominence of human dignity has in modern 
times also highlighted the increasing need to specifically protect more recent victims of 
human dignity violations, especially the most vulnerable members of modern society. 
These are, amongst others, the elderly, the handicapped, the (unborn) children, the poor, 
and the immigrants. Without a consistent application of the legal concept and legal 
principle of human dignity, their position becomes ever more precarious. The European 
legal system would undermine itself and the democracies that underpin it when these 
most vulnerable of people do not receive the full protection of the law. This means that 
each of them is equally able to invoke his or her inherent dignity and right to life, 
integrity and liberty as any other citizen. A 2010 ground-breaking cover article in the 
influential international newspaper The Economist illustrates this point in a chilling 
way
556
. The magazine describes under the title “Gendercide” how at least a 100 million 
baby girls –both unborn and born- have been killed in the past decades through the 
Chinese forced one-child policy combined with the cultural preference for having boys. 
Both abortion and the killing of just-born baby girls is common practice in China (and 
India as well). The main reason: baby girls are killed because the government mostly 
only allows one child and couples prefer in that case to have a son. Both the one-child 
policy and the killing of children because they are female is a flagrant violation of human 
dignity and the right to life. European governments have done little to stop this gross 
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injustice. But it was exactly the unspeakable crimes committed against those that could 
not – for reasons outside of their control - invoke their inherent dignity and rights which 
led to the post-War process of enshrining human dignity as a “central organizing 
principle in the idea of human rights (...).”557 This notion is inspired by different 
philosophical roots and national constitutional traditions, and leading to varying judicial 
interpretations. 
 
2.2. Chronology of post-War European human dignity legislation 
The drafting of the EU Charter and the predominance of human dignity in this document 
is strongly linked to the constitutional development in the EU member states. Gradually 
the human dignity notion was included as a fundamental principle of governance, 
especially after World War II. As we will see in this chapter, the EU Charter is the logical 
answer to a constitutional tradition which established itself in EU member states and 
beyond, as well as the pivotal role played by the Universal Declaration and the European 
Convention. It cannot be said however that the notion of human dignity had not entered 
European constitutions before World War II at all. Weimar Germany
558
, Ireland
559
, 
Portugal
560
 and Finland
561
 all included the concept of human dignity in their constitutions 
before 1939, albeit mostly as a secondary legal concept or a limited legal principle. But it 
was as a direct response to World War II that the legal protection of human dignity 
became an international - especially European - aim and also a more broadly codified 
primary concept of law in the national constitutions of European countries. An example 
to illustrate this shift in the weight of human dignity wording in constitutional documents 
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is the Weimar Constitution of 1919. The pre-War constitution of the Weimar Republic 
only mentions human dignity in relation to economic activity in article 151: 
 
―Die Ordnung des Wirtschaftslebens muß den Grundsätzen der Gerechtigkeit mit dem 
Ziele der Gewährleistung eines menschenwürdigen Daseins für alle entsprechen―.  
 
The incorporation of human dignity protection as a general principle of constitutional law 
happened in Germany only after 1945. The Grundgesetz holds in article 1.1.:  
 
”Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist 
Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.“ 562 
 
Its inclusion in the Grundgesetz (1949) has subsequently been very influential for the 
further development of the legal concept and the legal principle of human dignity 
throughout Europe, along with the Universal Declaration, which preceded and inspired it. 
Because of the large amount of case law the BVerfG has developed interpreting and 
applying article 1.1. of the Basic Law, the German conception of human dignity and 
human rights in general is of leading importance today, as one can see by comparing 
article 1 EU Charter with article 1.1. of the Basic Law. The wording in both articles is 
very similar, making clear that the latter inspired the former
563
.  
 
The utter destruction and desolation caused by World War II also gave the world a rare 
moment of unity and resolve on an international level. The urgency of legislating on 
human dignity was understood by its massive violation. The newly created United 
Nations Organization (UN), the successor of the failed League of Nations, was able to 
relatively quickly draft and officially proclaim a universal human rights catalogue 
including human dignity provisions. This was preceded by the founding Charter of the 
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United Nations of 1945 also introducing the notion of human dignity
564
. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations on December 10
th
, 1948
565
. Although eight countries, including the 
Soviet Union, abstained from the General Assembly vote, all other UN member states at 
the time voted for the document. The proclamation was accompanied by the bold and 
apparently effective appeal to member countries to publicize widely the Universal 
Declaration and “to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded 
principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the 
political status of countries or territories”566. Until that time there had been no other 
international legal document in which human dignity was so firmly established. The 
Declaration therefore has been a source of inspiration for many subsequent human rights 
documents that formally enshrined the concept of human dignity, for example the 1966 
UN “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (ICCPR). The Helsinki Final 
Act of 1975
567
 contains an explicit reference to the obligation the signatories take upon 
themselves to respect human dignity. It was at the time a mere political statement and not 
an international treaty, yet it had historically proven far-reaching consequences for the 
later demise of the Iron Curtain. The emerging human rights movements in Eastern- and 
Central Europe used the document to challenge their totalitarian regimes with their own 
words. The Helsinki Final Act reads in §VII, second paragraph: 
 
―They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, 
social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.‖ 
Other post-War European constitutions have included the legal concept or legal principle 
of human dignity as well, for example Italy
568
, Spain
569
 and Portugal. But also Belgium, 
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Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, Slovakia, Slovenia and more recently the Baltic 
States have all included human dignity wording in their constitutions
570
. The 1946 and 
1958 constitutions of the French 4
th
 and 5
th
 Republics include no direct referral to human 
dignity and neither does the 1789 French Bill of Rights that forms an integral part of 
these constitutions through incorporation in the preamble
571
. However, the preamble of 
the 1946 Constitution carried all the content of a human dignity provision, which was 
then incorporated in the 1958 Constitution by referral: 
 
Constitution of the 4th Republic, 27 October 1946:  
―Au lendemain de la victoire remportée par les peuples libres sur les régimes qui ont 
tenté d'asservir et de dégrader la personne humaine, le peuple français proclame à 
nouveau que tout être humain, sans distinction de race, de religion ni de croyance, 
possède des droits inaliénables et sacrés. Il réaffirme solennellement les droits et libertés 
de l'homme et du citoyen consacrés par la Déclaration des droits de 1789 et les principes 
fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République. ― 
 
Constitution of the 5th Republic, 4 October 1958:  
―Le peuple français proclame solennellement son attachement aux Droits de l'homme et 
aux principes de la souveraineté nationale tels qu'ils ont été définis par la Déclaration de 
1789, confirmée et complétée par le préambule de la Constitution de 1946, ainsi qu'aux 
droits et devoirs définis dans la Charte de l'environnement de 2004.― 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 and 119 speak of respecting human rights. English translation from: Ibid.  International Constitutional 
Law (ICL) project of the University of Bern 
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The United Kingdom (UK) applies the Common Law system and has no single written 
constitutional document. What passes as the „constitution‟ of the UK consists of a 
collection of statutes, court judgments and treaties. British legal scholars debate whether 
or not this can be called an actual constitution. In any case, human dignity wording seems 
to have no prominent place in the UK legal tradition, only indirectly through the 1998 
Human Rights Act which basically incorporates the Convention into the legal system and 
abolishes the death penalty
572
.  
 
The 1997 Constitution of Poland
573
 leans heavily on the notion of human dignity, which 
is not surprising due to its tragic history under Nazism and Communism and the 
subsequent influence of the Solidarnosz movement as well as Pope John Paul II on the 
country. Human dignity was one of the main messages of the pontificate of this Polish 
Pope. He had a decisive influence on the country and its return to democracy and the rule 
of law. The preamble of the Polish Constitution reads: 
 
―We call upon all those who will apply this Constitution for the good of the Third 
Republic to do so paying respect to the inherent dignity of the person, his or her right to 
freedom, the obligation of solidarity with others, and respect for these principles as the 
unshakeable foundation of the Republic of Poland.‖ 
and article 30: 
―The inherent and inalienable dignity of the person shall constitute a source of freedoms 
and rights of persons and citizens. It shall be inviolable. The respect and protection 
thereof shall be the obligation of public authorities.‖ 
 
The 1999 constitution of Switzerland includes a human dignity provision in article 7 as 
the first provision under the heading “basic rights” providing that “Human dignity is to be 
respected and protected.” The most recent example of a European constitution including 
human dignity wording is the much debated Fundamental Law of Hungary which entered 
into force on 1 January 2012. Apart from mentioning human dignity as a founding 
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principle in the third paragraph of the preamble, it also introduces the legal principle of 
human dignity in the constitution itself. Article II reads: 
 
―Human dignity shall be inviolable. Every human being shall have the right to life and 
human dignity; embryonic and foetal life shall be subject to protection from the moment 
of conception.‖574 
 
Another essential European development relevant for the development of human dignity 
in its legal context was the founding of the Council of Europe in 1949 and the subsequent 
signing of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Convention) in Rome on 4 November 1950
575
. The creation of the Council of 
Europe was a direct answer to the deep trauma and dangers of post-War Europe in which 
human dignity had once again come under threat, most notably because of the increasing 
menace posed by the Soviet Union and the rise of communist totalitarian regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The signing of the Convention followed the successful 
Hague Congress of May 1948 and the European Movement that helped strengthen the 
political will to erect the Council of Europe. As we will discuss in greater detail later, the 
Convention does not stipulate directly the protection of human dignity. Only by 
mentioning the Universal Declaration in the preamble of the Convention did human 
dignity become a relevant legal concept for application of the Convention.  
 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) – revised by the Lisbon Reform Treaty – speaks 
about “respect for human dignity” in articles 2 and 21, in both cases however not as an 
operational legal principle but as a mere „consideration‟ whereby it is stated that the 
Union is founded on a certain set of values, amongst them human dignity. Article 2 TEU, 
General Provisions, holds that:  
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―The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities.(..)‖;  
article 21 TEU, External Action:  
―The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of 
equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law.‖ 
 
We finally come to the EU Charter itself, entered into force on 1 December 2009. It 
should once again be noted how obvious is the influence of the German post-War 
constitutional development on the drafting of the EU Charter. The text of article 1 clearly 
derives from article 1.1. of the Grundgesetz. It is also no coincidence that Roman Herzog, 
former president of the Federal Republic of Germany and former president of the 
BVerfG, presided over the convention that drafted the EU Charter. 
 
In legal-historical terms, the actual process that led from the term human dignity being 
introduced into the European legal system(s) to the moment it became a legal principle 
through the EU Charter constitutes five main milestones. Each of these milestones was 
the result of a political process that had started during the Second World War and 
continues until today with the scope and meaning of human dignity protection still being 
debated. Without these milestones, it is difficult to imagine how article 1 Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union would have existed today as the legal 
principle of human dignity it is. We will now discuss each of these stages in more detail 
from a legal-historical perspective in order to gain more insight into the motivations 
behind each of these documents. Whilst we will focus on five key international legal 
documents on human dignity, they are certainly not the only ones of importance in this 
regard. We will therefore also briefly discuss additional treaties signed by members of the 
UN, the Council of Europe and the EU that are relevant for human dignity legislation. 
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The central question here will also be: what definition and scope – if any – did the 
drafters of the following documents have in mind for human dignity protection? 
 
2.3. 1945 – Charter of the United Nations 
The second paragraph of the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations reads: 
―to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person…‖ Articles 1.3 and 55c of the UN Charter reaffirm this call for human rights 
protection and include the provision that these rights should be applied “without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.  
 
This document is of such importance for the development of the legal concept and 
principle of human dignity in Europe because, being the founding charter of the United 
Nations, it set the tone for future discussions and documents on the subject of human 
dignity and human rights within the perspective of international law. Within that 
perspective of international law, the Charter of the United Nations also has a special 
status, an extraordinary legal position. The UN Charter can be characterized as a sort of 
„constitution‟ for the world community of nations, whereby the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) indeed characterizes charters in general as „constitutions‟ and therefore 
treats the UN Charter as if it were a constitution
576
. Additionally, the UN itself has also 
been attributed a special legal status by the ICJ where it is regarded as an „objective 
international (legal) personality‟ allowing it to operate globally fulfilling its main 
objective of maintaining peace and security
577
. These legal attributes give special weight 
to what is being said in the UN Charter; also where it concerns the place and meaning the 
document gives to human dignity.  
The UN itself was a direct response to the horrors of war and a renewed effort after the 
failed post-World War I League of Nations to bring about an international organization 
that could be a promoter of peace and human rights. Interestingly, the political and 
drafting process leading up to the signing of the UN Charter in June 1945 did not 
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prominently feature human rights. As Glendon describes
578
, it was the pressure applied 
by NGO‟s and delegates of smaller (especially Latin American) countries at the drafting 
conference in San Francisco as well as emerging horror reports of Nazi atrocities that 
finally led the United States to push for human dignity and human rights wording to be 
included in the UN Charter. The Soviet Union, Great Britain and China still remained 
very skeptical of such language, as the US government itself had been until briefly before 
the San Francisco conference. Glendon in this respect notes dryly:  “On the eve of the 
San Francisco conference one thing was clear: The Great Powers were not going to take 
the initiative in making human rights a centerpiece of their postwar arrangements. It was 
not in their interest to do so.”579 Before his sudden death in April 1945, US president 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt had been the only Allied leader to push for human rights 
language in the upcoming UN Charter. Surprisingly, one would find today, there was still 
at that time broad consensus amongst international lawyers that the treatment by a 
sovereign state of its citizens was exclusively a matter of the nation‟s internal affairs and 
only in very exceptional cases warranted international intervention
580
. It has to be said 
though that this was at a time during the final stages of World War II where the full scale 
of the Nazi crimes was not yet widely known. As we have observed throughout this 
research, opinions started shifting dramatically as the details of the death camps and gas 
chambers became more widely known. Now it would be political foolishness not to 
support international human rights mechanisms as the Allied Powers realized in June 
1945. The Nuremberg Principles (regulating the administration of justice by the 
Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal) only dealt with human dignity violations in wartime 
and without using this specific term. It was therefore ultimately seen as opportune to also 
agree on such principles for peacetime. The UN Charter provided this, but it had been a 
close call – the omission of generic human rights in the charter of the UN predecessor, 
the League of Nations, had almost been repeated. This would certainly have been a major 
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setback for the development of the concept of human dignity as a guiding principle of 
international law
581
. 
 
2.4. 1948 – Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Much has already been written and discussed about the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Declaration), also called the “International Bill of Human Rights”582, adopted and 
proclaimed by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948. We will focus here on 
pointing out some of the relevant legal-historical background with regard to the inclusion 
of human dignity language in the document. The Declaration, Glendon points out, brings 
together two distinct rights traditions: the Anglo-American liberal tradition focused on 
the rights of the individual and the Continental tradition focused on the dignity of every 
human being
583
. It was the earlier proclaimed “American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man” (also called the “Pan-American Declaration”) adopted in 
Bogota on May 2, 1948, that seems to have been the inspiration for including the legal 
concept of human dignity in the 10 December 1948 Universal Declaration. 
The drafting process of the Declaration was a political minefield and accompanied by 
many disagreements, as the drafting committee, presided over by Eleanor Roosevelt – 
widow of former US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt – tried to come up with a 
document that would be acceptable for all United Nations‟ member states. They 
obviously represented many different religions, cultures and traditions. One should also 
not forget that the committee – called the “Human Rights Commission” - was doing its 
work against the backdrop of rising tensions between the Soviet Union and Western 
powers, especially the United States, over the spread of Communism and its influence in 
Europe and beyond. Although the pressure on the committee to produce a legally binding 
international bill of rights was enormous, especially the opposition from the Great 
Powers resulted in the document becoming a declaration only. But even with this being 
the case, nobody could have predicted how much influence this „mere declaration‟ would 
have on international and national human rights discourse. Thomas Buergenthal writes: 
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―The great irony here is that the Universal Declaration was drafted in hortatory 
language designed to emphasize its non-binding character because many member states 
of the United Nations did not want a binding legal document. Their governments no 
doubt believed that ‗mere words‘ could do no harm, provided they did not impose legal 
obligations. How wrong they were! It is precisely the Declaration‘s language – at once 
eloquent, expansive and simple – that allowed it to express universal truths in words 
human beings all over the world could understand and wanted to hear. No formal legal 
instrument could have achieved that result and had quite the same inspirational impact 
on the human rights movement.‖584 
 
The irony of history continues as the Declaration became the foundation on which most 
subsequently agreed legally binding international human rights documents and national 
constitutions are directly or indirectly based. It clearly set the standard for human rights 
internationally
585
. The Declaration provides “the basic building blocks of the normative 
edifice on which the contemporary code of human rights rests.”586 All UN treaties dealing 
with human rights, as well as the various European human rights documents, can in 
essence be traced back to the Declaration. Countless official documents were inspired by 
or based on the Declaration, which also includes independence declarations and charters 
of international organizations
587
. Notable examples of human rights treaties in this regard 
are the European Convention (1950), the International Covenant for Civil and Political 
Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966). Each of these documents specifically incorporated the Declaration and its human 
dignity language and therefore affirmed these provisions as having the status of at least 
customary law
588
. Finally it is worth noting that by 2002 at least 146 national 
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constitutions drafted since 1948 included fundamental rights language which can be 
traced back to the Declaration
589
. Most of the human rights treaties inspired by the 
Declaration follow its emphasis on the primacy of human dignity. The relevance of the 
Declaration for understanding the current legal concept and principle of human dignity in 
European law is therefore not to be underestimated. This becomes even clearer when 
observing the prominent place human dignity has in the Declaration: 
 
The preamble states in its first paragraph: 
―Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world‖ 
and in the fifth paragraph: 
―Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person (..)‖ 
 
The preamble of the Declaration “reflects in a few words the fundamental dialogue of the 
World War II years” and observes that “the barbarous acts that had outraged the 
conscience of mankind were caused by disregard and contempt for human rights (...)”590, 
which this Declaration now seeks to forestall for the future of mankind.  
 
Article 1 of the Declaration affirms: 
―All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.‖ 
 
In effect through article 1 the Declaration formalized the notion of human dignity as 
being the foundation of human rights as such, therefore turning it from a mere 
philosophical notion into a legal concept
591
. This major development in international law 
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was however not easily achieved as Glendon describes in her detailed account of the 
drafting process. Rather, article 1 as it appears today was preceded by intense debate 
within the committee and countless proposed amendments later in the drafting process 
from around the world that amongst others argued that dignity could not be a right and 
should therefore not be included in the Declaration. Let us not forget that because of the 
highly pluralistic nature of the United Nations it was practically impossible to come to a 
common understanding on matters of human nature and destiny. Michael Novak 
expresses this point well: “Although consciences on all sides had been shocked by the 
bloodshed, the newly discovered death camps (...), no one way of thinking about moral 
issues commanded consensus.”592 Human dignity as a term or legal concept does not 
even appear in the 1947 first official draft of the Declaration, but only in the 1948 re-draft 
by the UN committee
593
. Article 1 received much attention towards the end of the 
drafting process, apparently under the influence of the large Latin American delegation. 
During the 88
th
 through the 179
th
 meetings of the Third Committee of the UN General 
Assembly (September-December 1948) and representing the final round of discussions 
involving all 58 member states at the time, 6 entire sessions were devoted to article 1, not 
counting the general discussions where it was intensely debated as well
594
. Much of the 
discussion was whether article 1, and thus human dignity, should be seen as a right or a 
statement of fact. This was relevant for answering the question of where in the 
Declaration the proposed text of article 1 belonged. It was argued for example by the 
Dutch representative De Beaufort that if it were a statement of fact it belonged in the 
preamble as the function of the latter was “to furnish a basis upon which the whole 
structure of the declaration could be erected. It was, consequently, the logical place for 
the insertion of fundamental principles which would justify the existence of that 
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international instrument.”595 In the end, it seems that the Third Committee concluded that 
article 1 is the “foundation and cornerstone of the entire declaration” with a “normative 
status” rather than a statement of fact596. With regard to human dignity as a legal concept, 
the Declaration also explicitly refers to it in the first paragraph of the preamble, thus 
making it obvious that it indeed is its fundamental guiding principle. There is no doubt 
that the drafters of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union followed 
the Declaration in this regard, where human dignity features various times, also in the 
preamble. 
 
Two of the other key members of the drafting committee, René Cassin and Charles 
Malik, assisted Roosevelt in overcoming the opposition against the inclusion of „dignity‟ 
by stating that in the structure of the Declaration article 1 was meant to refer to the fact 
that every human being is worthy of respect and to underline what is the basic foundation 
for human rights
597
. The Declaration in its whole, as Glendon puts it unequivocally, is 
“an integrated document that rests on a concept of the dignity of the human person within 
the human family.”598 The preamble makes this very clear by proclaiming that freedom, 
justice and peace in the world depend on the recognition of the human being‟s inherent 
dignity
599
. However, René Cassin, widely credited as the main author of the final draft of 
the Declaration
600
, had no illusions about the lack of a common definition of what would 
exactly constitute this human dignity. He says: “The dignity of man has been reaffirmed 
by philosophers, sociologists, and statesmen regardless of religious beliefs, and has been 
detached from religious credos or cults. What is incontestable is the permanence of the 
idea through the centuries and despite the most profound divergences of interpretation of 
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the doctrine.”601 Yet, taking into consideration the decisive role Cassin played in 
preparing the final text of the Declaration as we know it today, the core aspect of human 
dignity we have discussed at length in Part I, namely that human dignity exists because 
the human being is created in the image and likeness of God, does after all appear as a 
foundational principle of the Declaration where Cassin says:  
 
―First of all, if any relationship between the Universal Declaration and more generally 
the place of the rights of man in the modern world on the one hand, and the Decalogue as 
the first formulation of man's basic duties on the other hand does exist, this relation is not 
a formal one. Nevertheless, its reality is evident and must be traced back to the earliest 
periods of ancient history, when man, standing erect, mastering fire, and enjoying the 
benefits of written language, became aware of his innate dignity.‖602 
 
In spite of the fact that article 1 of the Declaration speaks about human beings as “born 
free and equal in dignity‖, it is proven by the available documents of the drafting process 
that the word “born” was not meant to limit human dignity to the actually born human 
being as such as opposed to unborn human beings. In the context of current “human 
rights” arguments in favor of abortion it is important to underline that the drafters of the 
Declaration never had the intention to exclude the pre-born life from protection. This 
becomes clear when looking at the discussion about the use of the word “men” instead of 
“men and women” in an earlier stage of the drafting process, where it was finally agreed 
that all human beings were referred to in article 1 of the Declaration
603
. Later the term 
“men” was then replaced by “human beings”, which indeed does more justice to the 
necessary broad understanding of its scope, not only from the perspective of respecting 
the two sexes, but also for it to be inclusive of all human life regardless of its state of 
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development. The wording “are born”, as Lindholm604 explains well, was generally 
interpreted by the drafters as pointing towards the specific human character of freedom 
and equal dignity as such, not as to who amongst humans could claim these attributes. 
The unique character of freedom and dignity is their being of a pre-positive nature, as we 
discussed above. This means that they are given each human being independent of the 
state. Article 1, therefore is the “thin, but crucially important normative basis, on which 
representatives of several cultures could reach agreement.”605 
 
2.5. 1949 – Grundgesetz (German Basic Law) 
Considering the vast amount of literature that is available on the principle of human 
dignity in the German Basic Law on the one hand, and the increasing tendency of 
rejecting its distinctly (but not exclusively) Christian roots on the other hand, we will 
focus primarily on the important relationship of the preamble‟s reference to „God and 
Man‟ with the human dignity understanding of the „constitution fathers‟. The latter forms 
the basis of article 1.1. of the Basic Law and its intended application. In the specific 
context of the EU Charter that the Basic Law is being discussed here, there is a need to 
pay special attention to this relationship in order to better understand the prerequisites for 
applying article 1 EU Charter and related articles truly indiscriminately.  
 
From a legal-historical perspective, the Grundgesetz was first of all influenced by the 
constitution of the 1918-1933 Weimar Republic. The constitutions of the German states 
of Bayern (1946), Hessen (1946) and Bremen (1947) were then further building stones 
for the human dignity clause in the Basic Law. Each of these state constitutions explicitly 
included human dignity provisions
606
 The UN Charter (1945) and especially the 
Universal Declaration (1948) also had an important impact on the drafting process of the 
Grundgesetz
607
. The aim with the Basic Law was to radically reshape the German State 
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and establish a full parliamentary democracy within a federal system
608
. But before it 
came to the 23 September 1949 signing and proclamation of the Basic Law by the new 
political leaders of Germany and after the approval of the document by Western military 
governors, a period of major disagreements leading to intense negotiations almost 
derailed the whole project. When on 1 July 1948 the Western military governors formally 
asked the prime ministers of the German states to convene a constitutional assembly, 
their first reaction was to refuse. German leaders felt there was not enough of a prospect 
for Germany to regain its full territory and sovereignty. They could not agree to a 
permanently divided Germany. Amongst disagreements between Germany‟s political 
parties and states it would also require much pressure from the Western powers to reach a 
compromise whereby not a “constitution” would be drafted, but rather a “basic law”. This 
would however have the same function as a constitution until Germany would once again 
be an integral sovereign state on 3 October 1990 when Germany was reunified
 609
. But in 
spite of this formal confirmation of the Grundgesetz actually being a constitution taking 
place only in 1990, the document soon after 1949 became the de-facto constitution and 
was adhered to by state and citizens as if it were a full constitution.  
 
Together with the Universal Declaration the 1949 German Basic Law is the document 
that has most influenced the EU Charter. This especially counts for the development of 
the legal concept of human dignity into a legal principle. Both the EU Charter and the 
Grundgesetz speak about the protection of human dignity in the first article, whereby the 
wording of the EU Charter is clearly inspired by, if not derived from, the Grundgesetz
610
. 
The Basic Law was the first post-War constitution in Europe that made human dignity 
not only an operational legal term, but also the leading principle for all state activity. It 
set a constitutional limit to state power. Given Germany‟s Nazi past, it was no surprise 
that its new rulers wanted to write a constitution that would create a constitutional system 
clearly distancing itself from the regime that preceded it. The text of its preamble and 
article 1 leave no doubt as to where the framers of the Grundgesetz were coming from: 
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―Präambel 
Im Bewusstsein seiner Verantwortung vor Gott und den Menschen. 
 (..) 
I. Die Grundrechte 
Artikel 1 
(1) Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist 
Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt. 
(2) Das Deutsche Volk bekennt sich darum zu unverletzlichen und unveräußerlichen 
Menschenrechten als Grundlage jeder menschlichen Gemeinschaft, des Friedens 
und der Gerechtigkeit in der Welt. 
(3) Die nachfolgenden Grundrechte binden Gesetzgebung, vollziehende Gewalt und 
Rechtsprechung als unmittelbar geltendes Recht.― 
 
The Basic Law through its preamble and specific reference to God and Man clearly does 
away with the extreme legal positivist approach and the totalitarian system of the Third 
Reich. The Grundgesetz instead puts a transcendental and humane principle in place by 
subjecting all activity of the state to ―Verantwortung für Gott und den Menschen‖ and 
the resulting high legal standard of human dignity. The drafters wanted to create a new 
and more humane order
611
. Human dignity, as the authors of the Basic Law understood it, 
derives from the unique relationship of the human being to its creator – the 
Gottesebenbildlichkeit.  There is no doubt that the majority of German post-War 
politicians having drafted the Grundgesetz was guided by the Christian understanding of 
the human person as standing in a personal relation to God its creator
612
, without however 
in any way imposing Christianity or turning Germany into a Christian state
613
.  
To better understand this profound development in German constitutional law we will 
look at the text proposals presented as a result of the two main phases in which the 
drafting of the Grundgestez took place – the Herrenchiemsee Verfassungskonvent of 
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August 1948 followed by the Parlamentarischer Rat of 1948-1949. The two references 
we discuss here – God and human dignity – were indeed much debated and led to a final 
text that is very different from the original draft. The Herrenchiemsee draft did not 
include a reference to God in the preamble at all. Human dignity was formulated in a 
more limited way as pertaining only to the ―menschliche Persönlichkeit‖ – the human 
personality rather than the much broader application we see in the Grundgestez today 
where it refers to ―des Menschen‖ – the human being as such614. In general one can 
observe that the wording authored by the Parlamentarischer Rat was more unambiguous 
and stronger
615
. In Christian Starck‟s commentary on the Grundgesetz616 we find a useful 
explanation why the reference to God was included, whereby his analysis seems to be 
generally accepted in literature on the subject
617
. It reflects, Starck points out, the general 
agreement amongst the drafters of the Parlamentarischer Rat that a constitution should 
be created once and far all banning totalitarian systems of government on German soil. 
But this was only possible when the Basic Law would explicitly set the limits of the state: 
―Der Staat soll begrenzt sein und soll nicht über alles verfügen dürfen. Imperium semper 
limitatum est (..)‖618 The reference to „God and Man‟ in the Basic Law is an expression 
of ―die Summe des bisherigen Wissens über die Grenzen menschlicher Fähigkeit.‖619 The 
reference to God merely acknowledges the limits of human capability and thus the limits 
of the state and its imperfection. The reference to the human being, on the other hand, 
highlights the state‟s acknowledgement that the state is created for Man, not Man for the 
state
620
. Starck rightly sees this reference to God and Man as the basis for human dignity 
protection itself: the state‟s objective should always be to conduct its activity in full 
respect of the human being and its dignity. This can only be achieved when the state 
recognizes its own limits, especially where it concerns the human being. The drafters of 
the most recent Swiss constitution
621
 re-introduced the reference to God and its prominent 
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placing for this exact same reason: ―In der Anrufung Gottes liege ‗ein Bekenntnis zur 
Relativität aller staatlichen Macht‘ (...)‖622. The essence of understanding human dignity 
in its legal context lies here: only when the state recognizes and accepts her absolute 
limits in relation to the individual human being, which includes not being able to control 
or change its exclusive attribute, can the dignity of the human being truly be protected. 
The commentary on the new Swiss constitution puts it well where it says about the 
Gottesbezug:  
 
―Es kommt darin die ganze Ambivalenz staatlicher Macht zum Ausdruck. Der Staat hat 
keine letzte Verfügungsgewalt über die ihm unterstellten Menschen, was ein Bekenntnis 
zu Humanität und Menschenwürde bedeutet. In der Berufung auf eine höhere Instanz 
erinnert die Verfassung selbst daran, dass das durch sie geschaffene Staatswesen 
unvollkommenes Menschenwerk ist.―623 
 
The reference to God, Ehrenzeller paraphrases Böckenforde
624
, expresses a fundamental 
agreement that the law of the state and its dealings are rooted in a common set of 
principles that cannot be created by the liberal democratic state itself but that pre-date the 
state. It acknowledges that ―sich Mensch und Staat nicht auf sich selbst gründen 
wollen‖625. This seems to be the core message the authors of the Grundgesetz wanted to 
relay in the preamble and article 1: human relations cannot function and the state cannot 
exist without recognizing the pre-positive human order that should be their foundation. 
The reference to God, Man and human dignity points to this foundation on which the Bas 
Law is built. The content and scope of the legal principle of human dignity therefore is 
not to be found primarily in the exact phrasing of human dignity in the Grundgesetz or 
even in case law dealing with it. Rather it should be found in the process of human 
history that led to it being codified through invoking a set of common principles. In 
drafting article 1.1 of the Basic law, the Parlamentarischer Rat indeed responded directly 
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to the Nazi atrocities by reintroducing the traditional – mostly Christian - concept of 
“Man before the state”626. Starck points out: 
 
―Wie sich aus dem Vorangehenden ergibt, steht der Begriff der Menschenwürde in Art. 1 
Abs. 1 in der Kontinuität der philosophischen Überlieferung (..) und ist zugleich 
unmittelbare Reaktion auf die Zeit der nationalsozialistischen Diktatur.―627 
 
The opinions in literature on this subject are however divided as to how much the 
Christian tradition did actually influence the current legal principle and understanding of 
human dignity in German constitutional law. Starck
628
 and Dreier
629
 for example, in their 
respective commentaries on the Grundgesetz, give a fundamentally different appraisal of 
the Christian roots of the human dignity principle and with it highlight an ongoing 
controversy on the importance of Christian thinking. Dreier, although recognizing the 
relevance of the Christian tradition in general, points to the combination of Antiquity, 
Enlightenment and Humanism (thus skipping the Middle Ages) as the main sources of 
today‟s human dignity concept. Starck, on the other hand, whilst explicitly recognizing 
the influence of the Enlightenment and Humanism, still sees the Christian tradition as a 
whole (including the Middle Ages) as the main source and unbroken conduit of human 
dignity norms throughout Western history. The notion of human dignity, he says, ―hat 
ihren Keim im christlichen Menschenbild und ist in einem komplizierten 
Säkularisierungsprozess philosophisch ausgearbeitet und rechtlich gesichert worden―630. 
The reason why the Christian tradition is of such importance to the legal-historical 
analysis of article 1.1. Grundgesetz is because it considers the inviolability and equal 
application of human dignity absolute. In the various traditions that played and currently 
play their part in interpreting the human dignity principle in the Grundgesetz, only the 
Christian tradition acknowledges the inviolability of human dignity and its equal 
application to all human beings from conception to death, under all circumstances, within 
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any human condition and without exception. In Böckenförde‟s critique631 of the revised 
2003 Maunz/Dürig Grundgesetz commentary on article 1.1. (authored by Matthias 
Herdegen) it is well illustrated how the inviolability of human dignity is undermined 
when it is disconnected from its roots in Christian tradition. What results is, as 
Böckenförde puts it: ―Die Menschenwürde als rechtlicher Begriff wird ganz auf sich 
gestellt, abgelöst (und abgeschnitten) von der Verknüpfung mit dem vorgelagerten 
geistig-ethischen Inhalt, der dem Parlamentarischer Rat präsent (...) war.‖ The basis and 
content of the human dignity principle is herewith replaced by a system of interpretation 
through case law and mere circumstances. There is no doubt that this will lead to a 
serious limitation to the scope of human dignity protection through the law, whereby 
once again the weak will be ruled by the strong. Böckenförde rightly points to far-
reaching consequences of Herdegen‟s commentary on the scope of protection of the 
human dignity principle where the latter says: ―Der kategorische Würdeschutz kommt 
allen Menschen als Person zu. Im Sinne der gebotenen Gesamtbetrachtung sind Art und 
Maß des Würdeschutzes für Differenzierungen durchaus offen, die den konkreten 
Umständen Rechnung tragen.‖632 The word “categorical” in this quote refers to the 
Kantian human dignity paradigm that in Herdegen‟s interpretation would exclude the 
much broader Christian understanding. The actual scope of article 1.1. Grundgesetz is 
then further limited by making its application dependent on “differentiations” and 
“concrete circumstances”. Any trace of the true inviolability of human dignity is herewith 
erased as the principle becomes a mere instrument of circumstance and current 
interpretation. The core norm, the unchangeable principle, is done away with and 
replaced with what one could call an „empirical principle‟, meaning that the applicability 
of human dignity protection is decided in view of variable circumstances rather than an 
absolute truth about the human being.  
 
The relevance and even suitability of the Christian tradition for current human dignity 
interpretation is not only disputed in academic discourse. In today‟s highly secularized 
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society in general many outright reject Christian anthropology as being a primary – or 
even a relevant - source for understanding the notion of human dignity. Since religion is 
relegated to the “private sphere”, any reference to Christian or other religious thinking is 
increasingly considered inappropriate, especially where it regards the understanding of 
human dignity and human rights. Instead it is pointed out, as we discussed above, that 
Antiquity, Enlightenment and Humanism are its real and truly relevant foundations
633
. 
What these writers seem to overlook however is the fact that Enlightenment and 
Humanism, as well as the process of codifying human dignity in the Grundgesetz, cannot 
be forcibly disconnected from the Christian tradition because these movements grew out 
of it and developed along with it – and often within it634. As a matter of historical fact 
both movements were born out of or at least developed within a society that at that time 
was still deeply Christian and religious, even when increasingly anti-clerical (for example 
the French revolution). This society remained firmly rooted in the essentially Christian 
understanding (“Menschenbild”) of Man as a unique, free and intelligent being. Other 
than is often suggested, rather than being able to throw the whole of Christian tradition 
overboard and re-inventing the basic understanding of human life as such, the 
Enlightenment was amongst others an effort to take away the exclusive moral authority 
from the Church in this regard and transfer it to the people and the civil and state 
institutions they created. Church and State were separated and religion was privatized but 
not extinguished. Yet in spite of the fact that this led to an ever more visible exclusion of 
God from public life, it were still individual Christians formed by their tradition that 
shaped the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment built on the Christian tradition. Kant was a 
Christian who did not reject his faith whilst developing his rationalistic approach to 
human dignity and autonomy. Humanism – finding its first roots in Antiquity - was a 
movement equally developed in and by a distinctly Christian European culture. Many 
Catholic scholars for example shaped the renaissance humanism. The great humanist 
Erasmus was himself a deeply religious man firmly rooted in his Christian faith. It is 
mostly modern humanism that has shown a desire to ignore its essential Christian 
foundations. It goes beyond the scope of this research to discuss in-depth this correlation 
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between the Christian tradition and Enlightenment and Humanism, yet the point needs to 
be made here is that Christian thought, in its various forms, has continued to shape our 
understanding of the human being and thus its dignity and was not simply replaced or 
overwritten by Enlightenment and Humanism. It developed together with these traditions 
and thus remains crucially relevant for our understanding of human dignity today. An 
argument put forward by Horst Dreier
635
 echoes this general skeptical view of 
Christianity that exists in Europe today: this argument rejects the relevance of the 
Christian tradition for human dignity interpretation or waters it down, pointing for 
example to slavery and colonialism as being condoned by Catholics and Protestants alike. 
Such line of reasoning however ignores the fact that the Christian moral and intellectual 
tradition itself and its development with regard to human dignity is rooted in the much 
older Jewish tradition leading us back to the Book of Genesis written in approximately 
1300 B.C. and much inspired by the philosophers of the antiquity. Both these sources 
were explicitly incorporated in Christian teaching from the beginning. The unfortunate 
fact that the Christian churches and many Christians themselves took such a long time to 
acknowledge the full meaning and extend of the concept of human dignity and 
fundamental rights does not therefore make the Christian tradition itself less relevant for 
understanding human dignity today
636
. Once again, all this is not to say that Christianity 
is the exclusively relevant tradition for explaining article 1.1. Grundgesetz. Indeed 
Antiquity, the Enlightenment and Humanism have all played an important part in its 
conception, yet this cannot be detached from the Judeo-Christian tradition as the “all-
encompassing” driving force. It incorporated and unfolded the Greek and Roman 
traditions and was the springboard for the Enlightenment and Humanist movements. 
There is also sufficient evidence that the Christian philosophical-theological tradition 
played a key role in the deliberations of the Parlamentarischer Rat, which alone is 
enough reason to take this tradition into account when applying the human dignity 
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principle today
637
. The preamble itself proves this point where it states the German 
people‟s responsibility towards God, rather than towards Zeus, Erasmus or Kant. A very 
clear understanding of the deep roots of the Grundgesetz and the specific role Christian 
thought and other traditions played in it was presented by Pope Benedict XVI during his 
speech to the German Bundestag (lower house of parliament) in September 2011
638
: 
 
―Im Gegensatz zu anderen großen Religionen hat das Christentum dem Staat und der 
Gesellschaft nie ein Offenbarungsrecht, nie eine Rechtsordnung aus Offenbarung 
vorgegeben. Es hat stattdessen auf Natur und Vernunft als die wahren Rechtsquellen 
verwiesen – auf den Zusammenklang von objektiver und subjektiver Vernunft, der freilich 
das Gegründet sein beider Sphären in der schöpferischen Vernunft Gottes voraussetzt. 
Die christlichen Theologen haben sich damit einer philosophischen und juristischen 
Bewegung angeschlossen, die sich seit dem 2. Jahrhundert v. Chr. gebildet hatte. In der 
ersten Hälfte des 2. vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts kam es zu einer Begegnung zwischen 
dem von stoischen Philosophen entwickelten sozialen Naturrecht und verantwortlichen 
Lehrern des römischen Rechts. In dieser Berührung ist die abendländische Rechtskultur 
geboren worden, die für die Rechtskultur der Menschheit von entscheidender Bedeutung 
war und ist. Von dieser vorchristlichen Verbindung von Recht und Philosophie geht der 
Weg über das christliche Mittelalter in die Rechtsentfaltung der Aufklärungszeit bis hin 
zur Erklärung der Menschenrechte und bis zu unserem deutschen Grundgesetz, mit dem 
sich unser Volk 1949 zu den „unverletzlichen und unveräußerlichen Menschenrechten als 
Grundlage jeder menschlichen Gemeinschaft, des Friedens und der Gerechtigkeit in der 
Welt― bekannt hat.― 
 
As a result of the discussion on the inviolability of human dignity and its rejection in 
practice – through excluding certain groups of human beings as we see it today - it is 
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necessary at this point to briefly discuss the legal-historical background of the subject of 
the human dignity principle. To whom does it actually apply? The common 
understanding of the fathers of the German Basic Law was that the subject of human 
dignity protection was every living human being regardless of its state of development or 
mental or physical health. Human dignity cannot be dependent on ―die Fähigkeit zum 
geistig-seelischen Werterlebnis‖ or even the ability of self-determination639. This 
consideration was the more so relevant in post-War Germany as the new rulers clearly 
wanted to distance themselves from the Nazi regime‟s “inferior race” theories. These 
theories had led to the massive state-organized killing of Jews and other groups as well as 
widespread forced sterilization, eugenic and euthanasia practices. Nazis believed that 
their targets for extinction were “lesser” human beings or no human beings at all. 
Therefore, in post-War Germany, also the unborn, the handicapped and the comatose life 
are in principle equally subject of the full scope of the constitutional human dignity 
protection. The BVerfG has in various rulings expressly confirmed the full protection of 
article 1.1. of the Basic Law for the unborn life
640
. But it is precisely this notion of 
unlimited human dignity protection for every human being regardless of its stage of 
development that is no longer practiced by the BVerfG as we will see in the next chapter. 
Herdegen, for example, does not accept the inviolability of human dignity prima facie 
and makes a clear distinction between the born and unborn human in this regard
641
. The 
former would in any case qualify, he argues, yet the latter‟s human dignity might not 
always be secured by the Basic Law and might depend on specific circumstances. 
Interestingly though, Herdegen eventually has to unwillingly concede that for all practical 
purposes the human dignity principle as such can only be effectively upheld when its 
starting point lies at conception. He says:  
 
―Die Zuerkennung eines kategorischen Würdeanspruches ab Empfängnis erspart auch 
heikle, an bestimmte Entwicklungsstufen anknüpfende Differenzierungen schon bei der 
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Frage nach einem ‗Ob‘ des Würdeschutzes. Der Menschenwürde des nasciturus 
entspricht die Anerkennung seiner Rechssubjektivität.‖642  
 
When article 1.1. is applied in ordering the relationships between different human beings, 
it should therefore not be used in a way that would disregard the duty to fully respect the 
other‟s dignity as well643, every others‟ dignity, and regardless of the circumstances. This 
is also why the notion of human dignity that constitutes the foundation of the Basic Law 
cannot condone such measures as the death penalty or torture. Both these measures in 
essence reject the human dignity of the person concerned. 
As we will see later, the still unresolved discussion on the foundations of the human 
dignity principle in the Grundgesetz has had a profound impact on the understanding of 
this principle in article 1 of the EU Charter. Still, there is no doubt that the influence of 
the German Basic Law‟s human dignity principle and its clearly identifiable roots in the 
Christian tradition are undeniable and vital for securing the real and lasting inviolability 
of human dignity for all “members of the human family”, as the Universal Declaration 
puts it. Böckenförde, in commenting on the above discussed Herdegen commentary, 
underlines that human dignity as a legal principle is only sustainable when it has a 
nonnegotiable “normative core”, even when ongoing stages of human development 
continuously ask for new solutions and approaches for defending the inviolable dignity of 
the human being: 
 
―Zwar ist der Begriff der Menschenwürde durchaus ein offener Begriff, der in seinen 
konkreten Auswirkungen nicht ein für alle Mal festgelegt ist, vielmehr eine gewisse 
Variationsbreite aufweist und auf neue Herausforderungen entsprechend reagieren kann 
und auch muss. Diese konkreten Auswirkungen fließen aber aus einem festen Kern, dem 
normativen Grundgehalt.‖644 
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2.6. 1950 – Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
The text of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR, Convention) does not mention the term human dignity, 
in spite of the fact that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) does use the notion 
in its case law as we will see in the next chapter. Although Maurer calls this omission an 
“embarrassing absence”, she confirms general agreement in literature that this has not 
decreased the relevance of the legal concept of human dignity for the Convention in any 
way
645
. The Convention‟s drafting history, as well as the catalogue of rights that are held 
to violate human dignity, speak for themselves. Equally relevant is the allusion to the 
Universal Declaration in the Convention‟s preamble. For our discussion the document is 
relevant because its legal-historical background shows how much the post-War 
understanding of human dignity and its violation by the Nazis and the Communists 
shaped the European human rights system and ultimately the legal principle of human 
dignity as we see it in the EU Charter today. 
 
The Convention was signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and drafted by the Council of 
Europe, the latter founded on 5 May 1949 and which currently has 47 members. The 
ECHR entered into force on 3 September 1953 and established the ECtHR in Strasbourg 
to uphold the human rights treaty. The Convention was a direct response not only to the 
Nazi atrocities, as was the case with the Universal Declaration and the Grundgesetz, but 
also meant as a “bulwark‟ against the rising threat of Communism from the East, and the 
totalitarian regimes it led to
646
. There was general agreement amongst Western European 
states that human dignity and the human rights based on it could no longer be guaranteed 
by national jurisdictions alone and required joint international supervision and 
enforcement. Of all current international human rights treaties and mechanisms, it is the 
enforcement system of the Convention that is the strongest and most effective
647
. In the 
case a breach of the Convention is being claimed, both member states and individuals 
may bring an application for review before the European Commission of Human Rights 
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in first instance. The final instance is the ECtHR whose decisions are binding for the 
parties involved. Via judicial interpretation and precedence parts of these judgments can 
become customary law. The Convention requires its signatories to grant the rights 
specified in it to “everyone within their jurisdiction” as article 1 puts it. The term 
“everyone” means that nationality or residence is irrelevant for application of the 
Convention. Whether an individual is a national or resident of a contracting state is not 
what counts, but rather “when they are in some respect subject to the jurisdiction of the 
State from which they claim that guarantee.”648 
 
With regard to the European development of the legal concept of human dignity it is the 
preamble of the Convention that is the most relevant. In the first paragraph the preamble 
explicitly mentions the Universal Declaration whilst subsequently providing the list of 
protected human rights the 1948 UN document calls for. The drafters of the ECHR 
clearly saw their document as a fulfillment of the lofty goals that were set out by the 
Universal Declaration
649
. Since international law generally allows preambles to be used 
for interpretation of the texts of international treaties, the human dignity provisions 
incorporated into the Universal Declaration therefore have direct relevance for the 
Convention itself
650
. We will see this confirmed when discussing the case law of the 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts. This however does not mean that the scope of the 
legal concept of human dignity as the authors of the Declaration viewed it has always 
been exactly the same as the one used by the Strasbourg institutions applying the 
Convention. As was discussed above, the “normative basis” of the Declaration that is 
provided through article 1 and the preamble was necessarily thin because of the wide 
spectrum of cultural backgrounds of the UN members. When it comes to the Convention, 
on the other hand, it is a purely European legal instrument that therefore logically draws 
upon both the Christian as well as the Kantian human dignity understandings. 
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The most relevant documents for the legal-historical analysis of the Convention and its 
relevance for understanding article 1 EU Charter are the so-called ―Traveaux 
Préparatoires‖ in which we find the discussions that were held in the 1949-1950 drafting 
process of the ECHR. Here we see confirmed how the recent events in Europe and the 
new threats it was facing had a decisive impact on the conception of the human dignity 
notion. The Traveaux Préparatoires give us an insight into the “normative core” which 
was meant to underpin the legal concept of human dignity. There is for example the 
rousing speech from the French committee member Teitgen - who saw many of his 
family members end up in the Nazi death camps - which contains a message that is of 
great relevance today. Many of his proposals – including that of the permanent ECtHR - 
found their way into the final text. He remarks, referring to the proposed text of the 
Convention‟s preamble:  
 
―This fundamental affirmation is thus inscribed at the very foundation of our union: 
every man, by reason of his origin, his nature and his destiny, has certain indefensible 
rights, against which no reason of State may prevail. (..)  
When the scourges of the modern world descended – Fascism, Hitlerism, Communism – 
they found us relaxed, skeptical and unarmed. We needed war, and for some of us, enemy 
occupation, to make us realize afresh the value of our humanism.‖651 
 
The Greek representative Antonopoulus observed: 
 
―Man is an end in himself! The city and the State are so many organs constituting the 
means of preserving his dignity, of ensuring the pacific development of his personality 
and of guaranteeing for him human living conditions. 
This, it seems to me, is the common ideology of free Europe, the ideology which, down 
the centuries, has been subject to many attacks but which, from the times of ancient 
Greece – which gave it birth – up to our own time, has shaped that European culture 
without which existence itself cannot be conceived. 
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We must, therefore, fortify the structure and widen the bases of these fundamental 
freedoms which form the veritable ramparts of human dignity.‖652 
 
Finally the remarks of the Danish representative Kraft provide evidence of the 
convictions in which the post-War understanding of human dignity as a legal concept was 
rooted, giving us a deeper understanding of how and why it should be applied: 
 
―I consider this debate to be just as essential to the building up of a new Europe as the 
debate on the general political problems we are facing. That is my opinion, because the 
Europe, whose life and welfare we are gathered here to preserve and protect, through the 
creation of a firmer union, is not primarily a geographical and geopolitical or strategic 
conception, but a Europe with a common spiritual basis in its views on man, his dignity 
and his rights.‖653 
 
It however remains unclear why human dignity wording as such, other than in all other 
documents discussed in this chapter, was not included in the ECHR. The most plausible 
explanation for this seems to be the prominently placed referral to the Universal 
Declaration in the Convention‟s rather short preamble. This suggests that the former 
document – with its strong human dignity emphasis – was meant to serve as the preamble 
to the latter. Repetition of the key considerations – including those on human dignity - 
would then not be necessary. 
 
2.7. 2000/2007/2009 – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
Article 1 EU Charter holds: “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and 
protected.” The human dignity provision is understood as the “mother basic right” or the 
foundation of all rights included in the EU Charter
654
. The word inviolable means - at 
least theoretically – “that human dignity cannot be taken away from any human being. It 
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can neither be forfeited nor renounced.”655 This would also mean that the human dignity 
of the one cannot be balanced against the human dignity of the other. However, as the EU 
Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights‟ commentary rightly points out, in practice 
this balancing of interests cannot be prevented by the EU Charter and will therefore in 
such cases lead to one human dignity claim having to stand back fully, for example in the 
case of the unborn child versus the mother
656
. As we already noted earlier, the 
introduction of article 1 EU Charter has not provided any more clarity on its definition 
and scope, nor will the application of the provision by the ECJ bring forward a 
comprehensive understanding of what the legal principle of human dignity entails and for 
whom.  
 
As we have seen earlier on in this chapter, the EU Charter (as well as the European legal 
concept of human dignity in general) has been strongly influenced by the constitutional 
traditions of the individual member states, especially with regard to the notion of human 
dignity. The EU Charter should be read and interpreted against this background, taking 
into consideration that the variety of legal traditions and opinions on human dignity in the 
EU member states is diverse, even if the “minimal core” McCrudden speaks about can be 
observed to be generally present. 
 
Exactly 50 years after the signing of the Convention on 4 November 1950 in Rome, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was proclaimed in Nice on 7 
December 2000
657
. It would still take 9 years of political deadlock, further negotiations 
and referendums for the proclamation to actually become binding law across the EU 
when the Lisbon Reform Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009
658
. The Lisbon 
Treaty incorporated the Charter in article 6 (1) of the Treaty of European Union (TEU):  
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―The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties.‖ 
 
As of December 1
st
, 2009, all EU institutions are legally bound by the Charter, as well as 
EU member states themselves, but only within the framework of the latter implementing 
EU law in their jurisdictions
659
. According to article 51 (§§1, 2) the EU Charter therefore 
does not replace national procedures for protecting fundamental rights. Nor does it create 
new powers for the European Union. In other words: the EU Charter is relevant only in 
the relation between the citizen and the EU and the relation between the citizen and the 
member state implementing EU law and policy. Article 52 (5) of the Charter – which was 
only added to the 2007 redraft – sets further limits to its application as follows: 
 
―The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by 
legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the 
exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the 
interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality‖ 
 
In combination with the general rules on access to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union as specified in article 263 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), the above means that the direct recourse of European citizens to article 1 EU 
Charter is still limited. The Lisbon Treaty did however introduce new rules for individual 
access to the ECJ in article 263 TFEU which has led to an easing of the rules for 
admissibility of actions brought by individual natural or legal persons
660
. Also relevant to 
the applicability of the EU Charter in this regard is that in 2007 the “European Union 
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Agency for Fundamental Rights” was set up to study fundamental rights at EU 
institutions and in EU member states within the framework of EU law in general, 
however not being empowered to regulate, examine individual complaints or carry out 
systematic monitoring of individual member states. The European Commission has 
instead given itself the task to monitor systematically the application of the EU Charter 
by Union institutions, including itself (?), through annual reports
661
. 
 
Because of the placing in the TEU of the EU Charter reference and the related wording 
“shall have the same legal value as the Treaties” – rather than as a preamble or a full-text 
inclusion in the Treaty itself - the EU Charter has an independent legal standing of 
potentially great significance within the corpus of Union law as a whole
662
. Human 
dignity also finds direct reference in article 2 TEU, although merely referring to the 
subjective and thus weak “values of respect for human dignity”. Even though article 6 (2) 
TEU now provides for the EU to eventually accede to the Council of Europe in order to 
become a party to the ECHR, the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) will remain the 
competent Union institution to enforce fundamental rights, which now includes the EU 
Charter as an additional – yet not the only – available legal instrument. This competence 
of the ECJ and its relation to the Convention and the ECtHR is currently still hotly 
debated. The outcome of this debate together with the limitations to direct individual 
recourse to the EU Charter as discussed above means that it will largely depend on future 
case law of the ECJ how much of an impact article 1 will have on the actual protection of 
human dignity in the European Union.  
 
The discussion about drawing up a specific EU fundamental rights catalogue with treaty 
status as distinct from the Convention (which includes far more parties) had been going 
on for some years already, especially since 1995 as the EU‟s common justice and security 
policies were being developed. Concrete efforts were for example made and failed to 
include a human rights catalogue in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) which amended the 
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EU and EC treaties. A―Comité des Sages‖ was appointed by the European Commission 
in March 1996 that provided a series of concrete recommendations to this extend. It 
called for an explicit recognition and detailed cataloguing of fundamental rights by the 
EU
663
. Instead, the Amsterdam Treaty merely continued the tradition of referring to the 
Union‟s adherence to the fundamental rights as expressed in the Convention, the 
constitutions of the member states and Community law in general. Article 6 (1) TEU 
(old) did however explicitly recognize the EU‟s adherence to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in general (the Lisbon Reform Treaty changed this same article 6 
(1) TEU into its current version). Although surprisingly not specifically referring to 
human dignity as such the said 1999 expert report stressed there was an urgent need to 
explicitly outline the fundamental rights and freedoms within the framework of EU law. 
The experts held that it was not sufficient that these rights could already be found in the 
legal traditions of the member states and in international treaties. The Expert Group 
notes: 
 
―Where rights are concerned, ways and means must be found to make them as visible as 
possible. This involves spelling rights out at the risk of repetition, rather than merely 
referring to them in general terms as contained in other documents.‖664 
 
There was a distinct need to set clear „constitutional‟ limits to the long-established 
principle of the primacy of EU law, especially with regard to its citizens
665
. As the areas 
of involvement of the EU institutions have continued to grow, so has the need to reaffirm 
legal boundaries and create a framework where especially the EU‟s self-declared 
rootedness in the respect for human dignity is strengthened. In the Union‟s relation to its 
citizens there was and is a need to also reaffirm that the institution is primarily designed 
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to serve the human person for its well-being
666
. The EU Charter was therefore needed to 
clarify the obvious, yet not always visible, normative basis of the EU and the relation 
between the Union and its citizens, whereby the latter would receive protection from 
threats of the former
667
: 
 
―The Charter of Fundamental Rights, consequently, not only underlines and clarifies the 
legal status and freedoms of the Union‘s citizens facing the institutions of the Union, but 
also gives the Union and, in particular, the policies regarding the area of ―freedom, 
security and justice‖ a new explicit normative foundation.‖668 
 
The drafting process of the EU Charter itself was unique in the sense that it was not 
written through the usual inter-governmental procedure that has been used for EU 
treaties, but rather by means of a more or less broadly representative “convention”. In 
view of the above discussed, namely the need to reaffirm the boundaries between the 
Union and the individual rights of its citizens, such a drafting process was a welcome 
development for a document as foundational as the EU Charter. The Cologne European 
Council of June 3-4, 1999 assigned this convention the task of drafting the Charter. The 
convention consisted of 15 representatives of governments of EU member states, 16 
members of the European Parliament, 30 members of parliaments of member states and 
one representative of the European Commission. The final draft of the EU Charter was 
adopted by the convention on 2 October 2000 and unanimously approved by the Biarritz 
European Council later that month. The European Parliament and the European 
Commission approved the text on 14 November 2000 and 6 December 2000 respectively. 
The EU Constitutional Treaty signed on 29 October 2004, through which the EU Charter 
was first meant to become binding, was rejected by French and Dutch voters in May and 
June of 2005. With the Constitutional Treaty now defunct, a new treaty had to be 
negotiated. This finally led to the Lisbon Reform Treaty signed in December 2007. The 
Lisbon Treaty is essentially the same document with limited changes and another name to 
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appease French, Dutch and other European voters have rejected the Constitutional Treaty. 
As part of the Lisbon Treaty the EU Charter had then to be re-introduced with some 
changes to the original text. This happened on 12 December 2007 by a “solemn 
proclamation” of the presidents of the European Parliament, the Commission and the 
Council
669
.  
 
The EU Charter is the first of its kind in the history of the European Union and sets out in 
systematic order “the whole range of civil, political, economic and social rights of 
European citizens and all persons resident in the EU.” 670 The EU Charter has so far been 
the most important milestone in the long process of enshrining the legal principle of 
human dignity in European law. It is interesting to see how much of a direct influence the 
Universal Declaration has had on the EU Charter. Like the Universal Declaration, we 
find human dignity prominently placed in both the preamble and in article 1 of the EU 
Charter. Human dignity is now affirmed as one of the founding values of the European 
Union, as the preamble says in the second paragraph: “Conscious of its spiritual and 
moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human 
dignity, freedom (..)”. Article 1 subsequently states: “Human dignity is inviolable. It must 
be respected and protected.” The October 2000 version of the official convention 
Praesidium explanation of the EU Charter refers directly to the Universal Declaration 
where it says that human dignity is not only a fundamental right in itself; it is the true 
foundation of fundamental rights
671
. Human dignity as codified in article 1 EU Charter is 
a basic right and therefore not subject to any limitation. The Praesidium explanatory note 
explains what this foundational attribute of human dignity means in practice: 
 
―It results that none of the rights laid down in this Charter may be used to harm the 
dignity of another person, and that the dignity of the human person is part of the 
substance of the rights laid down in this Charter. It must therefore be respected, even 
where a right is restricted.‖672 
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The slightly adapted December 2007 version of the official Praesidium explanation adds 
a further important insight to the otherwise minimal official records of the EU Charter 
drafting process. The fundamental right to human dignity, the explanatory note quotes the 
ECJ, is an existing part of Union law
673
. The TEU itself weakly confirms this latter point 
by stating in article 2 of the Lisbon-amended current version: “The Union is founded on 
the values of respect for human dignity, freedom (..)”. The use of the word “value” is 
problematic within the context of the current use of this word because it represents 
something clearly distinct from fundamental principles. Basing human dignity on 
“values” rather than principles undermines the inviolability of human dignity. Values can 
be changed through shifting opinions and positive law, fundamental principles cannot. 
Therefore, if, apart from the Union itself, the legal principle of article 1 EU Charter were 
also based on these “values” only, this cannot guarantee the inviolability and thus the 
indiscriminate protection of human dignity. The question then remains to be answered 
whether article 1 EU Charter is not going to have the unintended adverse effect of being a 
threat to human dignity when its application becomes merely dependent on the “values of 
the day”. This brings us back to the Böckenförde-Herdegen debate discussed above. One 
can only hope that because the EU Charter is of recent date, literature and possibly ECJ 
case law will identify a set of unchangeable principles that underpin article 1 EU Charter. 
A powerful thought of the Polish philosopher Józef Tischner highlights the need for this: 
 
―Dialogue is possible only when there is a common grammar. Ethics are the grammar of 
relationships between people, and their principle, human dignity.‖674 
 
Two other European documents can furthermore be seen as having had an important 
impact on the EU Charter, especially with regard to human dignity. The 1989 European 
Parliament Resolution on adopting the “Declaration of fundamental rights and 
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freedoms”675 asserted in article 1 that “Human dignity shall be inviolable” and called 
upon all European institutions to uphold it, clearly inspired by the events of 1989 that led 
to the fall of the Iron Curtain in that same year. With regard to human dignity the 
“Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine” signed in Oviedo on 4 April 1997 is 
probably even more important, as this treaty provides in article 1 for the legal protection 
of  “the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without 
discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with 
regard to the application of biology and medicine.” Even more noteworthy is the wording 
of article 2 of this document under the heading “The primacy of the human being”: “The 
interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or 
science.” The wording of the Oviedo Convention and its heavy emphasis on human 
dignity in the preamble is the most far-reaching legal protection of human dignity in 
Europe until today and it is decisive for the interpretation of article 1 EU Charter and its 
application in practice. Interestingly, the Oviedo Convention represents an understanding 
of human dignity that neither before 1997, nor after its entering into force, has been 
expressed so clearly in human rights discourse in Europe. It would therefore be desirable 
to apply this high standard to the application of article 1 EU Charter. This would clearly 
offer the broadest legal protection of human dignity currently available. 
 
Finally relevant for the drafting process of the EU Charter is the discussion which 
continues until today as to when and through what mechanism the EU should sign the 
ECHR and become a member of the Council of Europe. It has often been argued in 
literature that there is no real need for the EU to have its own catalogue of fundamental 
rights and that instead it should accede to the ECHR which would also allow for a more 
unified approach to human rights enforcement within Europe as a whole. Even though 
article 6 (2) TEU now includes the provision that the EU “shall accede” to the ECHR, not 
all legal hurdles have yet been taken to make this possible and it is not clear when such 
accession will finally take place. Regardless of this discussion, the European Court of 
Justice in Luxembourg has throughout the decades consistently developed a case-law that 
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has closely followed the ECHR and the principles applied by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg in matters pertaining to human rights. The ECJ has also 
itself formulated relevant principles of Union law in this regard. This has subsequently 
led to the Luxembourg court developing its own catalogue of unwritten fundamental 
rights
676
. The latter catalogue does not differ essentially from the EU Charter. Rather, the 
ECJ catalogue has naturally much influenced the content of the EU Charter and thus 
brings the European Convention full circle back to the heart of EU-specific human rights 
law. This is independent of a formal accession by the European Union as such. Apart 
from the practical advantages of EU accession to the ECHR, from the perspective of the 
fundamental rights‟ principles of the ECHR, these have de-facto already been part of the 
EU legal system for decades. This once again underlines the fact that the EU Charter, 
rather than presenting an entirely new set of fundamental rights and freedoms, codifies in 
one systematically ordered document of specific EU legislation what post-War Europe 
has come to understand as the basis of democracy and the rule of law: 
 
―The rights and principles enshrined in the Charter stem from the constitutional 
traditions and international conventions common to the Member States, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and the 
Council of Europe, and the case law of the Court of Justice of the Union and the 
European Court of Human Rights.‖677 
 
2.8. What is covered by ‗human dignity‘ in these documents? 
The answer to this question is one of intense debate as we have already seen in our 
discussion of the extensive literature on this subject. We will see in our analysis of case 
law in the next chapter that the answer to this question is indeed far from conclusive. The 
dignity argument is widely used to support the two opposing sides of the same argument, 
as was already illustrated by McCrudden‟s statement in our introduction. As McCrudden 
points out, an often occurring debate illustrating this well is the legal and political battle 
                                                 
676
 See: Christian Walter, Geschichte und Entwicklung der Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten,, 
in: Ibid. Dirk Ehlers (ed.), Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, p. 12 
677
 Ibid. European Commission, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights by the European Union, p. 3 footnote 7 
 228 
surrounding abortion in the EU
678: those in favor of making abortion a woman‟s human 
right claim that her dignity and physical integrity as a human being gives her the 
undeniable right to choose freely what to do with her body and thus also to have the 
complete freedom to decide whether or not to carry through a pregnancy. Opponents of 
abortion disagree and stress that the dignity and right to life of the human being that lives 
in the mother‟s womb can never be superseded by the woman‟s right to choose what to 
do with her body. This is a classical collision of rights-claims that the vast array of 
human rights‟ treaties and declarations do not answer. An interesting illustration of the 
elusiveness of the answer to the question “what is covered by human dignity” is the 
debate between Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde and Matthias Herdegen
679
 on the 
inviolability of human dignity in article 1 of the German Basic Law and its function as a 
legal principle. Herdegen is of the opinion that it is a flexible principle that in its 
application is dependent on constantly developing socio-cultural realities and 
interpretations. Böckenförde points out that the normative core of article 1 is 
unchangeable and can never be reinterpreted, as was also meant by the authors of this 
provision
680
. Böckenförde is able to bring the disagreement on the scope of protection of 
the human dignity principle back to a central point, namely the question at what stage of 
the development of human life human dignity becomes an inviolable right or from what 
moment human dignity is deemed to exist? That the human dignity of the born human 
should be protected at all times, according to Böckenförde, few question
681
: 
 
―Mir scheint, der Grundgehalt dieser Garantie, was ihren festen Kernbestand ungeachtet 
gegebener Offenheit ausmacht, ist weniger umstritten als es gegenwärtig den Anschein 
hat. Bei verschiedenen Ansätzen, den Inhalt der Menschenwürde zu bestimmen, lässt sich 
dieser Kernbestand mit der von Kant entlehnten Formel „Zweck an sich selbst― oder der 
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vom Bundesverfassungsgericht gegebenen Definition „Dasein um seiner selbst willen― 
umschreiben. Darin sind die Stellung und Anerkennung als eigenes Subjekt, die Freiheit 
zur eigenen Entfaltung, der Ausschluss von Erniedrigung und Instrumentalisierung nach 
Art einer Sache, über die einfach verfügt werden kann, positiv gewendet, das Recht auf 
Rechte, die es zu achten und zu schützen gilt, eingeschlossen. Der eigentliche Streit- und 
Angelpunkt in der Auseinandersetzung um die Relativierung und Antastbarkeit der 
Menschenwürde ist weniger dies als die Frage, ob und inwieweit diese Garantie neben 
geborenen Menschen auch dem noch ungeborenen Menschenleben zukommt.―682 
 
But the paradox of the human dignity discussion is that the lack of clarity in its legal 
scope is at least partly attributable to the fact that the content of the notion of human 
dignity was originally held to be self-evident and thus would be in no need of further 
explanation. Lynn Hunt explains this well in her treatise on the history of human 
rights
683
. Hunt compares the wording of the 1776 Declaration of Independence “We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness” with that of the 1948 Universal Declaration which begins with 
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family (..)”. “Whereas” means the same as “self-evident” since 
the former term refers to “it being the fact that” and thus it is a “legalistic way of 
asserting a given, something self-evident”684. But as for example case law on this subject 
shows, as well as the above described contradicting use of the human dignity argument, 
the self-evident principle underlying human dignity in human rights‟ documents is in 
practice not so obvious any more. Why else, as Hunt once again puts it pointedly, have 
scholars “argued for more than two hundred years about what Jefferson meant by his 
phrase [“We hold these truths to be self-evident.”]?” 685  
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Chapter 3: European case law on human dignity  
 
3.1. Introduction 
The notion of human dignity in its specific legal sense has been tested by courts in post-
War Europe, although not on a very large scale and with mixed results. It is no easy task 
to apply a legal concept or a legal principle that is so broadly used yet so differently 
understood, let alone clearly defined. Béatrice Maurer, in her extensive research on the 
use of the legal concept of human dignity by the European Court of Human Rights, 
remarks pointedly: ―La dignité se présente en effet comme un mystère‖686. The Advocate 
General of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Mrs. Sixt-Hackl, expresses this 
same point in her opinion in the Omega Case
687: “There is hardly any legal principle 
more difficult to fathom in law than that of human dignity.”688 Catherine Dupré in her 
commentary on human dignity case law ads that “While human dignity is generally well 
understood in some national legal orders, it remains a concept which does not fit easily 
into the existing theoretical categories of law and which has no definition at the European 
level.”689 Case law therefore is certainly not conclusive, although essential in better 
understanding human dignity in real life situations and in its legal context. As we have 
seen throughout this research, and this is very much confirmed by the study of relevant 
case law, human dignity as a legal concept or legal principle is passing through an 
ongoing process of development ever since the end of World War II. In concluding this 
chapter, we will against this background discuss the actual application of the human 
dignity legal concept or legal principle by three of the most important courts in Europe 
and find out whether (a) human dignity is applied as the highest principle of law and (b) 
whether the courts have a clear general understanding of what this legal concept or legal 
principle entails in concluding a violation of human dignity. We will go over a selection 
of relevant case law in order to try answering these two questions and focus on rulings of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) in Karlsruhe, the European Court of 
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Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(ECJ) in Luxembourg
690
. The BVerfG has dealt most extensively with the issue due of 
course to the inclusion of human dignity as a constitutional principle in article 1.1. of the 
German Basic Law.  
 
When looking at relevant case law it is important to note on the outset that there is a 
distinct difference, yet unbreakable link, between the legal concept or legal principle of 
human dignity and the right to life and we will see how the courts struggle with this 
dichotomy. Literature and case law fundamentally agree that the concept of the inherent 
dignity of every human being is the basis on which each of the individual human rights 
stand. As Dupré puts it well: “Human dignity is (..) foundational to all types of rights, 
transcending these categories and drawing them together, acting as a reminder of their 
principled indivisibility.”691 Stix-Hackl observes that: “Human dignity, as a fundamental 
expression of an element of mankind founded simply on humanity, forms the underlying 
basis and starting point for all human rights distinguishable from it (..).”692 However, 
claiming human dignity for all is not consistent with reality when the right to life for all 
from conception till natural death is not acknowledged in the same breath. The 
understanding of every human life being endowed with inalienable dignity, as case law 
across the spectrum repeatedly affirms, would logically presuppose that we consequently 
accept the right to life for every human being as well, without which human dignity itself 
is an empty notion. Stix-Hackl observes: “(..) as specific expressions of human dignity, 
however, all (particular) human rights ultimately serve to achieve and safeguard human 
dignity (..)”693 To continue this reasoning, not respecting the individual right to life of 
every human being means that human dignity is thereby not sufficiently safeguarded. 
One sees this problem reflected in the difficulties the courts have in trying to rule on 
mutually conflicting claims to the protection of human dignity and rights. A good 
example of this dilemma is the right to life of the unborn child as rooted in its inherent 
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human dignity versus the right to autonomy of the mother equally rooted in her inherent 
human dignity. Autonomy of the mother is the most often used argument in favor of 
abortion, in most cases expressed through the right to privacy or human integrity (see for 
example article 3 EU Charter; right to integrity of the person). What right prevails, as 
both are rooted in what we consider the inalienable human dignity? Since human dignity 
is regarded as being inalienable, how can it be that the rights of two human beings collide 
although they stem from the same fundamental basis of human dignity that is perceived 
to be “inalienable”? Does this mean that human dignity is not inalienable after all, or that 
one of the two in fact claims a right it does not have, or that is at least subject to the right 
of the other? The same problem occurs, although within a different context, when 
governments have to deal with national security threats or war-like situations where the 
killing of human beings is justified by the right to self-defense. As we will see in the case 
law discussed below, occurrences of these examples often lead to lives being weighed 
against each other, something that goes against the core idea of human dignity. In some 
cases the courts sanction this, in others they don‟t. This is the central dilemma 
surrounding the legal application of the human dignity notion within the realities of 
human life. As we will see, there is no easy solution in sight. 
 
3.2. Recent case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) 
The extensive case law of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (BVerfG) is of 
primary importance for a better understanding of the legal concept and especially the 
legal principle of human dignity in Europe today
694
. As already discussed at length 
above, Germany anchored human dignity in its 1949 constitution as the highest principle 
of law by which the constitutionality of all other rights, laws and actions of the state and 
its institutions have to be judged. It is therefore an actual legal principle directly 
enforceable in court by the state‟s subjects. The principle is above all a mechanism to 
protect the individual human being against the (arbitrary) power of the state. It is for this 
reason that the case law of the BVerfG on the subject of human dignity is so extensive. In 
the German constitutional order, the respect for human dignity is the most important of 
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fundamental rights in which all other rights are rooted
695
. It is a constitutional principle 
that cannot be altered or limited by other rights, the state, its institutions or its citizens 
(see article 79 §3 of the German Basic Law). To uphold this principle, in its case law the 
Court applies the so-called “Objektformel”, derived from the Kantian human dignity 
concept. In this understanding the state, called upon to respect the inalienable dignity of 
every human being, always has to treat the individual human being as a subject and not as 
an object. “At the core of this definition is the concept of autonomy, an exclusively 
human attribute which distinguishes humans from other beings and allows them to be 
active participants in the making of the laws which bind them.”696 It is from this Kantian 
perspective that the case law of the BVerfG is written. 
 
The BVerfG has throughout the decades developed now established case law specifying 
how far the protection of human dignity extends, or in other words: where it starts and 
where it ends. Christian Walter makes a useful division of specific areas in which the 
Court has ruled on human dignity: the beginning of life (A), during lifetime (B), end of 
life (C) and post mortem effects (D). Within category (B) Walter furthermore 
distinguishes between fives areas: physical integrity, minimum conditions for human life, 
conditions for imprisonment and prosecution, privacy and challenges to human dignity by 
modern technologies
697
. Rulings in each of these categories will be discussed below. 
 
Beginning of life 
A number of rulings have confirmed that every human being, also the developing child in 
the mother‟s womb, is entitled to the constitutional right of the protection of its human 
dignity and the right to life. This was for example confirmed by the Court in its 
groundbreaking 28 May 1993 ruling
698
 on the German abortion law where it held that: 
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―The Basic Law requires the state to protect human life. Human life includes the life of 
the unborn. It too is entitled to the protection of the state. The Basic Law does more than 
just prohibit direct interference by the state in the life of the unborn, it enjoins it to 
protect and support such life, i.e. above all to guard it against illegal interference by 
third parties. (..) The obligation to protect is based on Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic 
Law, which expressly requires the state to respect and protect human dignity (..)‖699 
 
and in §§146-147: 
 
―Unborn human life - and not just human life after birth or an established personality - is 
accorded human dignity. (..) 
―The dignity accorded to human life and also that accorded to unborn life exists for its 
own sake. In order for it to be respected and protected, the legal system must guarantee 
the legal framework for its development by providing the unborn with its own right to life. 
(..) This right to life which does not depend upon acceptance by the mother for its 
existence, but which the unborn is entitled to simply by virtue of its existence is an 
elementary and inalienable right stemming from the dignity of the person.‖ 
 
It is clear from this statement by the Court that the personhood of the unborn human life 
is in fact accepted, other than is the case with the ECtHR, which we will see later. In spite 
of these clear words confirming that from the moment of conception a human being is 
entitled to the full protection of articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law, the fact remains that 
the BVerfG has, in this ruling and others, developed a doctrine whereby abortion is 
nonetheless permitted under conditions the Court leaves to the legislature to specify 
within the constitutional framework the Court itself provides
700
. The duty of the state to 
protect the unborn human life because of its inherent dignity remains in force, the Court 
reiterates, as does the inclusion of abortion as a crime in the German criminal code. 
However, the law may allow for situations in which performing an abortion is not 
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unconstitutional and therefore also not subject to criminal proceedings. The German 
parliament introduced the so-called “Beratungsschein” (proof of mandatory consultation 
prior to an abortion whereby the options other than termination have to be discussed in an 
open-ended way), “medical indication” and “criminal indication” as grounds for a legal 
abortion. This has been conditionally accepted by the Court in its 1993 ruling as 
sufficiently counterbalancing the otherwise unconstitutional practice of abortion, when 
certain criteria would be met. The legislator is of the opinion that this procedure fulfills 
the constitutional requirement of the protection of the human dignity of the unborn child 
because it theoretically promotes the idea of the mother carrying out the pregnancy. The 
current practically unlimited practice of abortion in Germany shows how the Court does 
not see articles 1 (human dignity) and 2 (right to life) of the Basic Law being violated as 
a result of the German abortion law. As an indicator, official statistics by the Statistisches 
Bundesamt
701
 show that 110.431 abortions took place in Germany in the year 2010. Of 
these abortions 92.7% took place after a “Beratungsschein” was provided of which it is 
public knowledge they are very easy to obtain. Only 2.8% was related to a “medical 
indication”, such as danger to the life of the mother. 0% of the abortions had to do with 
what is called a “criminal indication”, being cases of rape or incest. This means that 
almost all abortions taking place in Germany involve situations where only social aspects 
play a role. No matter how dramatic and painful the individual situations of mothers with 
unwanted pregnancies often are, the above figures show a worrying reality where the 
BVerfG has not been able to indiscriminately protect the constitutional guarantees to the 
protection of the dignity and life of every human being it repeatedly proclaims. In light of 
the Court‟s established and detailed case law on the equal dignity and right to life of the 
unborn and born human life, one could reason that abortions deriving from medical or 
criminal indications are not unconstitutional. It might be that we have misunderstood 
what the Court is trying to say, but a consistent reading and application of the Court‟s 
established doctrine on human dignity and life leaves serious questions as to why the 
92.7% of abortions in Germany described above are not considered to be in violation of 
articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law, taking into account that these terminations are the 
                                                 
701
 Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 12, Reihe 3, 2010 – Gesundheit/Schwangerschaftsabbrüche, see 
pages 9 and 22 of this study 
 237 
result of entirely subjective considerations where the worth of one life is weighed against 
the other. McCrudden might shed some light here. He observes that the BVerfG in 1993 
made an important shift away from the human dignity doctrine developed in its first 
abortion ruling in 1975 where the Court primarily focused on the life interest of the 
unborn child and gave it precedence
702
. The 1993 decision however gives greater weight 
to the rights of the mother by using the notion of human dignity itself to justify a 
balancing of colliding rights to the protection thereof, pointing out the need to solve this: 
“Its application is subject to requirements of proportionality.“ 703 In their dissenting 
opinion, Judges Mahrenholz and Sommer seem to support this where they observe that 
“the legislature is obliged to strike an appropriate balance between its duty to the unborn 
and the woman's position under the Basic Law” Although they immediately ad that “the 
legislature is given scope to weigh up considerations and make decisions, but the scope is 
restricted, on the one hand, by the prohibition on too little protection vis-à-vis the unborn 
life, and restricted, on the other hand, by the prohibition on too much protection vis-à-vis 
the woman, and ultimately restricted by the principle of proportionality”704, they confirm 
that with this ruling the door was opened to human dignity protection in practice 
becoming a relative principle. This situation is all the more problematic for the 
indiscriminate application of the legal principle of human dignity on a broader scale, 
since the Court continues to rule on its - theoretical - inviolability for every human being 
as having the same worth: ―Jedes menschliche Leben ist als solches gleich wertvoll‖705 
says the Court in its famous 2006 ruling on the German Air Safety Law. If that is so, how 
is it possible the Court allows so many human lives to be ended in violation of this same 
principle? This seemingly discrepancy between case law theory and sanctioned (legal) 
practice is probably best explained by the Court‟s well-known Kantian view on human 
dignity which gives the expression of the absolute autonomy of the individual human 
being primary importance. Exercising this absolute autonomy, the pregnant mother is 
held to also have the right to decide over the fate of the unborn child in her womb as an 
                                                 
702
 See: Ibid. Christopher McCrudden: Human Dignity and the Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, pp. 
717-718 
703
 Ibid. BVerfG, 2 BvF 2/90 of 05/28/1993, §164 
704
 Ibid. BVerfG, 2 BvF 2/90 of 05/28/1993, §377 
705
 BVerfG, 1 BvR 357/05 of 15-2-2006, §85,  
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215_1bvr035705.html 
 238 
intrinsic part of her body, even when theoretically upholding the child‟s constitutional 
rights by following the procedure of the “Beratungsschein”. Human dignity protection 
and the right to life that flows from it herewith has indeed become a relative principle, 
depending increasingly on, as Herdegen argues in his commentary on article 1.1. of the 
Basic Law, “constantly developing socio-cultural realities and interpretations.” 706  
The German situation is however a clear example of how far-reaching the consequences 
would be when the human dignity and right to life of every human life would be 
consistently upheld in the way the Court at least says they should be upheld. There is no 
doubt the Court could then sanction pregnancy termination in the general way it does 
now. As recently as 2006 the Court confirmed its 1993 doctrine in an even broader sense:  
 
―Art. 2 Abs. 2 Satz 1 GG gewährleistet das Recht auf Leben als Freiheitsrecht. (..) Mit 
diesem Recht wird die biologisch-physische Existenz jedes Menschen vom Zeitpunkt ihres 
Entstehens an bis zum Eintritt des Todes unabhängig von den Lebensumständen des 
Einzelnen, seiner körperlichen und seelischen Befindlichkeit, gegen staatliche Eingriffe 
geschützt. Jedes menschliche Leben ist als solches gleich wertvoll. (..)―707  
 
During lifetime 
Two decisions of the BVerfG of 27 February 2002
708
 and 13 March 2002
709
 regarding the 
protection of the human dignity of prisoners reiterate the established case law of the 
Court that the constitutional principle holds such high rank in the German legal system 
that there is basically no limit to the timing of its invocation by the parties involved
710
. A 
prisoner of the German State claimed that he had been subjected to inhuman treatment by 
being forced to share a very small prison cell with another inmate for a certain amount of 
time. A lower court held that he had no recourse since the situation had been already 
repaired and he was now in a cell alone under normal prison conditions. The Court 
                                                 
706
 As cited above. See: Ibid. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, in: Bleibt die Menschenwürde unantastbar?, 
pp. 1216-1227 
707
 BVerfG, 1 BvR 357/05 of 15-2-2006, §85 
708
 BVerfG, 2 BvR 553/01 of 27-2-2002, 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20020227_2bvr055301.html  
709
 BVerfG, 2 BvR 261/01 of 13-3-2002, 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20020313_2bvr026101.html  
710
 See for example §12 of the13-3-2002 decision 
 239 
however held that since it concerned a breach of article 1 of the Basic Law whereby the 
previous situation had indeed violated the human dignity of the prisoner, he did have 
recourse to the provision, regardless of the current situation: 
 
 ― (..) Das Rechtsschutzinteresse ist nicht dadurch entfallen, dass die beanstandete 
Unterbringungssituation nicht mehr besteht. (..) Zudem ist nach der Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts bei schwer wiegenden Grundrechtseingriffen davon 
auszugehen, dass auch nachträglich ein Interesse an der Feststellung ihrer 
Rechtswidrigkeit zu bejahen ist (..) Steht insoweit eine Verletzung der Menschenwürde 
(Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG) in Frage, dann muss ein Rechtsschutzbegehren zur nachträglichen 
gerichtlichen Überprüfung zulässig sein.―711 
 
This is established case law of the BVerfG, for example confirmed in a 23 November 
2005 decision
712
 regarding a similar case of inhumane prison conditions. A 22 February 
2011
713
 ruling concluded along similar lines that the incarceration of various prisoners in 
a small (8 sqm) cell was in violation of their human dignity: ―Aus Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG in 
Verbindung mit dem Sozialstaatsprinzip folgt die Verpflichtung des Staates, den 
Strafvollzug menschenwürdig auszugestalten, mithin das Existenzminimum zu gewähren, 
das ein menschenwürdiges Dasein überhaupt erst ausmacht (..)― (§29). 
 
The famous 11 March 2003 Benetton ruling
714
 of the BVerfG deals with the relationship 
between the constitutional principle of human dignity and the freedom of expression 
through commercial advertising. Benetton had published an advertisement showing part 
of a naked body with the letters “H.I.V. POSITIVE” printed above it. The Center for the 
Prevention of unfair Competion e.V. filed suit against Benetton amongst others claiming 
this advertisement violated the human dignity of people suffering from H.I.V. because it 
stigmatized them. Although the Court held in this case that there had been no violation of 
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article 1 of the Basic Law, it did discuss in detail how the constitutional principle of 
human dignity can never be overruled by the freedom of expression, whereby it once 
again underlines that the human dignity principle is the foundation of all fundamental 
rights and cannot be weighed against other individual rights: ―Die Menschenwürde setzt 
der Meinungsfreiheit auch im Wettbewerbsrecht eine absolute Grenze. (..) Die 
Menschenwürde als Fundament aller Grundrechte ist mit keinem Einzelgrundrecht 
abwägungsfähig.―715 This observation of the Court therefore underlines that a 
fundamental right of one person (in this case the freedom of expression) cannot overrule 
the constitutional obligation to protect the human dignity of another. 
The BVerfG has dealt extensively with questions surrounding the fight against terrorism 
and its effect on fundamental rights, of which its 3 March 2004 ruling on the use of 
acoustic eavesdropping equipment by the police is a prominent example
716
. The case, 
initiated by private citizens, was amongst others directed against the constitutional reform 
of article 13, §§3-6 of the Basic Law, followed by changes in the criminal code as 
decided by the German parliament and allowing for acoustic eavesdropping of citizens 
under certain strict conditions. The plaintiffs held that the revised article 13 violated the 
human dignity principle of article 1 of the Basic Law because it disregarded the right to 
the privacy of one‟s home. The Court first observes that parliament has the right to 
change the constitution as long as such changes do not affect the fundamental principles 
laid down in articles 1 and 20 of the Basic Law (§111). In the case of acoustic 
eavesdropping in general and the changes to article 13 specifically, the Court is of the 
opinion that the human dignity principle is not violated (§114). Concrete situations of 
eavesdropping can however occur that do violate the constitutional principle, especially 
when the principle is not observed that human beings cannot be treated as objects of 
arbitrary state power (§§116-117). It then goes on to explain how the principle of human 
dignity is described in response to violations brought to the Court's attention, whereby 
throughout time diverging situations require individual treatment by the Court: 
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‖Dabei wird der Begriff der Menschenwürde häufig vom Verletzungsvorgang her 
beschrieben. (..) Anknüpfend an die Erfahrungen in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus 
standen in der Rechtsprechung zunächst Erscheinungen wie Misshandlung, Verfolgung 
und Diskriminierung im Zentrum der Überlegungen. (..) Später wurde die 
Menschenwürdegarantie im Hinblick auf neue Gefährdungen maßgebend, so in den 
1980er Jahren für den Missbrauch der Erhebung und Verwertung von Daten. (..) Im 
Zusammenhang der Aufarbeitung des Unrechts aus der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik wurde die Verletzung von Grundsätzen der Menschlichkeit unter anderem bei 
der Beschaffung und Weitergabe von Informationen zum Gegenstand der 
Rechtsprechung. (..) Gegenwärtig bestimmen insbesondere Fragen des Schutzes der 
personalen Identität und der psychisch-sozialen Integrität die Auseinandersetzungen über 
den Menschenwürdegehalt.‖717 
What the Court says here is very relevant for the broader perspective of human dignity 
protection under the EU Charter in two respects: first, the BVerfG makes clear here that 
in most cases the constitutional norm can only be upheld by concluding how human 
dignity was violated in concrete situations. We are reminded here of the revolt of 
conscience in post-War Europe leading to human dignity being enshrined as a legal 
concept but not being defined. It was clear from the atrocities themselves that human 
dignity had been violated. Secondly, and this is linked to the first point, the Court also 
says here that a comprehensive definition of human dignity and the scope of its 
application is not really possible because different phases of history bring different 
collisions with human dignity needing an individual approach each and every time. The 
acoustic eavesdropping decision has been controversial, as the unusually lengthy 
dissenting opinion of judges Jaeger and Hohmann-Dennhardt underlines. The dissenting 
judges fear that by this majority ruling a practice is consolidated whereby constitutional 
reform and unconstitutional laws that violate article 79 §3 are upheld by mere judicial 
interpretation that declares conformity with the Basic Law. This, the judges fear, will lead 
to a gradual discarding of articles 1 and 20 themselves of the Basic Law because it 
undermines the understanding of the human person on which the constitution rests: 
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―Inzwischen scheint man sich an den Gedanken gewöhnt zu haben, dass mit den 
mittlerweile entwickelten technischen Möglichkeiten auch deren grenzenloser Einsatz 
hinzunehmen ist. Wenn aber selbst die persönliche Intimsphäre, manifestiert in den 
eigenen vier Wänden, kein Tabu mehr ist, vor dem das Sicherheitsbedürfnis Halt zu 
machen hat, stellt sich auch verfassungsrechtlich die Frage, ob das Menschenbild, das 
eine solche Vorgehensweise erzeugt, noch einer freiheitlich-rechtsstaatlichen Demokratie 
entspricht. Umso mehr ist Art. 79 Abs. 3 GG streng und unnachgiebig auszulegen, um 
heute nicht mehr den Anfängen, sondern einem bitteren Ende zu wehren.‖718 
 
We have already quoted some parts above of the “Luftsicherheitsgesetz” (Aviation 
Security Act) case in which the BVerfG was asked to rule on the constitutionality of a 
law that would have allowed the German Air Force to shoot down hijacked commercial 
planes being turned by the hijackers into a weapon that is about to be used against a civil 
target. The 15 February 2006 ruling
719
 of the Court discusses some key aspects of the 
scope of the human dignity guarantee of article 1 of the Basic Law. The most important 
consideration of the Court is that the law in question was unconstitutional because it 
violated article 2 §2 in connection with 1 §1 of the Basic Law – the right to life in 
connection with the human dignity guarantee
720
. The Court held that the state (in this case 
the armed forces under the direction of the secretary of defense) can never deliberately 
end the lives of one group of people in order to save the lives of another group of people, 
even when it concerns the sacrifice of a smaller number of people in order to save a 
larger number of people
721
. The Basic Law forbids the state to make an appraisal of one 
life against another life because this would amount to human beings becoming an object 
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of state intervention which the Basic Law was written for to avoid
722
. The Court rejects 
the argument that the disputed law falls under the exception of article 2 § 2 that says: ―In 
diese Rechte darf nur auf Grund eines Gesetzes eingegriffen werden.‖ The strict 
conditions under which such an exception would be allowed have not been met in this 
case, these conditions being that ―(..) das betreffende Gesetz in jeder Hinsicht den 
Anforderungen des Grundgesetzes entspricht. Es muss kompetenzgemäß erlassen worden 
sein, nach Art. 19 Abs. 2 GG den Wesensgehalt des Grundrechts unangetastet lassen und 
darf auch sonst den Grundentscheidungen der Verfassung nicht widersprechen.‖723 The 
Court observes that the disputed law violates the constitutional right to life because crew 
and passengers of the plane would almost certainly die as a result of the state-sanctioned 
downing of the plane in a situation whereby they are in no way responsible for the act 
that has led the state to decide for this use of force. The Aviation Security Act therefore is 
both in material and formal violation of article 2 of the Basic Law, in combination with 
the human dignity principle of article 1
724
. 
 
A 8 November 2006 ruling
725
 of the BVerfG dealt with the question whether the actual 
imprisonment for life of a notoriously dangerous criminal was constitutional, specifically 
with regard to the constitutional principles of human dignity and liberty of person 
(articles 1 §1 and 2 §2 of the Basic Law). The Court held that, as long as the 
―Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip‖ has been observed, the execution of a life-long prison 
sentence is not unconstitutional in a case like the one at hand where the person affected 
has committed a very serious crime and also poses a great risk to society
726
. This guiding 
principle requires the state to apply the law in a way that stands in relation to the act it 
responds to. In this case, the severity of the crime allowed for an equally severe 
application of the criminal code. 
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A 4 February 2009 judgment
727
 concerns the violation of the human dignity principle by 
the state prosecuting authorities in the process of arresting and searching a suspect. A 
professional tax advisor had been arrested on suspicion of fraud and was subsequently 
subjected to harsh internment conditions as well as a full body search including a 
procedure of investigating the anus. The claimant asked the Court to rule this treatment as 
violating his rights to respect of his human dignity and bodily integrity. The BVerfG 
decided that the claimant‟s rights deriving from article 2 §1 in combination with article 1 
§ 1 of the Basic Law had indeed been violated. The circumstances of the case did not 
justify the applied investigative procedure. The authorities had only generally applied the 
law, without taking into consideration the individual constitutional rights of the claimant 
in relation to the reasons for his arrest
728
. The above discussed 
―Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip‖ had not been observed by the prosecuting authorities and 
the lower court. This led the Court to conclude that a procedure that was constitutionally 
sanctioned as such, in this specific case violated the claimant‟s human dignity. 
 
The much debated ―Hartz IV‖ ruling729 of the BVerfG deals with the German Code of 
Social Law and the subsistence minimum income people receiving social welfare from 
the state are entitled to in line with the constitutional protection of their human dignity. 
The Court holds in §133: “The fundamental right to the guarantee of a subsistence 
minimum that is in line with human dignity emerges from article 1.1 of the Basic Law in 
conjunction with article 20.1 of the Basic Law (..)”. It goes on to say that an existence 
minimum “must be safeguarded by a statutory claim.” (§136) The ruling outlines how 
human dignity protection cannot be simply generalized but always has a specifically 
individual dimension to it. The Court reaffirms its established case law whereby on the 
one hand it underlines the special nature of the human dignity principle as having an 
“autonomous significance” and carrying “absolute effect” for each individual (equally for 
children as well), whilst also conceding that each individual situation must be judged on 
its own merits. The Court says that human dignity is never subject to the legislature‟s 
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discretionary power (“freies Ermessen”) yet that the actual way of applying it must be 
“regularly updated”.730 Here we see another example of how with the legal application of 
human dignity there is logically and necessarily a constant tension between the general 
principle and the specific situation. 
 
The ruling of the BVerfG of 11 January 2011
731
 on the German Trans-sexuality Law 
opens a whole new – and problematic - chapter in the enforcement of the constitutional 
human dignity principle. The case concerns a person born as a male, but no longer 
wanting to be a man and therefore now taking on a female identity (“Mrs. L.I.”). After 
having performed what is referred to as the “small solution” to alter his gender, namely 
the change of name in official documents, Mrs. L.I. subsequently entered into a 
relationship with a woman. The couple then wanted to conclude a same-sex civil 
partnership. The German Transsexuality Law however barred them from entering into 
this civil partnership because the law requires that the person having changed its gender 
first undergoes an operation taking away the physical attributes of the original gender as 
well as the capacity to procreate (the “big solution”). It also requires that the new gender 
identity is being lived by the person concerned and has led to public recognition of the 
new sex. The reason for these requirements is to uphold the distinctive nature of same-
sex civil partnerships, namely that it is a legal instrument exclusively meant for people of 
the same gender whereby the relationship itself logically excludes the natural possibility 
of procreation. The Court ruled however that the legal requirement to physically change 
the gender and remove the procreative capacity from the body before being allowed to 
enter into a same-sex civil partnership violated Mrs. L.I.‟ s constitutional right to the 
respect of human dignity and sexual self-determination as derived from article 2 §1 in 
combination with article 1 §1 of the Basic Law.
732
 The Court ruled this in spite of the fact 
that legally speaking the couple would have been able to enter into a civil heterosexual 
marriage since the law is exclusively based on the physical attributes of the gender of 
each of the partners, not their personal preferences. This ruling is highly problematic for 
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various reasons. The Court‟s decision first of all undermines the same-sex civil 
partnership law itself. By nature of the specific relationships it is asked to govern, the law 
has to build upon a set of physical realities or prerequisites which are the reason why this 
law was introduced in the first place. These realities are that the persons involved are of 
the same sex and do not have procreative abilities as a couple. The constitutional human 
dignity argument is used however to claim that it is unfair to require the objective 
physical realities of such relationship to be decisive for the legal instrument as such, 
instead placing the subjective considerations of the persons involved on the foreground. 
This reasoning cannot be considered as a solid basis for any law, let alone as an indicator 
of human dignity violation. The latter always relates to a concrete event – as the Court 
repeatedly says throughout its established case law - that is in disregard of the dignity of 
the human being whereby the way the person feels or experiences this is not what counts, 
but rather the objective reality of how this person is affected. In itself, requiring a person 
by law to undergo a gender-change operation would indeed be in violation of its human 
dignity. But his is not what is happening here. The law merely stipulates the conditions 
that need to be met in order to be able to conclude a certain form of civil partnership. 
Requiring by law that both partners in a same-sex civil partnership should have the 
physical attributes of the same gender is not a violation of their human dignity because it 
is the essence of this law without which there is no point in having such a law. Although 
the Court seems to admit this, it still concludes that in this specific situation the human 
dignity of the claimant was violated by applying that same law: 
 
―Es ist verfassungsrechtlich nicht zu beanstanden, dass der Gesetzgeber beim Zugang zu 
einer eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft auch bei Transsexuellen mit homosexueller 
Orientierung auf das personenstandsrechtlich festgestellte Geschlecht der Partner 
abstellt und die personenstandsrechtliche Geschlechtsbestimmung von objektivierbaren 
Voraussetzungen abhängig macht. Es verstößt jedoch gegen das Recht auf sexuelle 
Selbstbestimmung aus Art. 2 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG, wenn er die 
personenstandsrechtliche Anerkennung eines Transsexuellen an zu hohe und damit 
unzumutbare Voraussetzungen knüpft.‖733 
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This conclusion is contradictory as it recognizes on the one hand the need for the law to 
base on certain objective factual prerequisites, whilst on the other hand concluding that in 
this case asking for these prerequisites to be met violates the claimant‟s human dignity 
principle. It seems the Court has applied the ―Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip‖ in this case 
too, but did so at the peril of undermining the law in a fundamental way. It is unclear how 
the Court sees it possible for this law to be effectively upheld in the future, now that it 
has denied the state the right to enforce its core provision of partners in a same-sex civil 
partnership needing to be of the same sex. 
 
End of life 
End of life questions in relation to the human dignity norm have also been dealt with by 
the BVerfG. A 4 November 2008 decision
734
 of the Court - comparable to the Pretty case 
of the ECtHR which we will discuss later - dealt with the question whether the refusal of 
the state to accommodate the euthanasia of a woman suffering unbearably violates this 
person‟s right to the protection of her human dignity. The Bundesinstitut für Artzneimittel 
und Medizinprodukte (Federal Agency for Medicines and Medical Products) refused to 
provide for the lethal dose of Natrium-Pentobarital the woman had requested to kill 
herself, arguing that the Agency by law was only allowed to provide medication that 
sustains life. The Court avoided answering the question directly by holding itself not 
competent to hear this case due to the fact that the woman concerned had already died 
and her husband did not have the legal competence in this specific case to invoke his 
deceased wife‟s constitutional rights735. It seems the Court here deliberately used a 
technical legal rule to avoid having to answer the currently hotly debated question on 
human dignity and euthanasia. However, as we will see when discussing the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, this case has now landed in Strasbourg where it 
seems the court cannot avoid ruling on the matter itself
736
. 
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Post mortem effects 
We now come to the reach of human dignity protection beyond the end of life. In its 5 
April 2001
737
 ruling on a case involving the use of a deceased politician‟s name and 
image in the election campaign for a far-right party the former would certainly not have 
supported, the Court held that human dignity protection even extends beyond the death of 
a person: 
 
―Geschützt ist bei Verstorbenen zum einen der allgemeine Achtungsanspruch, der dem 
Menschen kraft seines Personseins zusteht. Dieser Schutz bewahrt den Verstorbenen 
insbesondere davor, herabgewürdigt oder erniedrigt zu werden (..). Schutz genießt aber 
auch der sittliche, personale und soziale Geltungswert, den die Person durch ihre eigene 
Lebensleistung erworben hat. Steht fest, dass eine Maßnahme in den Schutzbereich des 
postmortalen Persönlichkeitsrechts eingreift, ist zugleich ihre Rechtswidrigkeit geklärt. 
Der Schutz kann nicht etwa im Zuge einer Güterabwägung relativiert werden.‖738 
  
The problem with this ruling is that the Court raises reputational damage of a deceased 
person to the level of human dignity violation of a living human being. Because of the 
inseparable link between life and dignity discussed in the introduction to this chapter, it is 
at least questionable whether article 1.1. even allows for such post-mortem effect of 
human dignity protection as such. It also seems this is an isolated case. 
 
The above selection of case law of the BVerfG on the application of the constitutional 
human dignity principle is by no means exhaustive but indicates in key areas of conflict 
how article 1 of the Basic Law is applied in practice. Where the Court is clear and 
consistent on the theoretical scope of protection of the human dignity principle and its 
inviolability from conception until after death, it is not clear and consistent on how this 
translates into concrete situations of various life-ending and life-changing procedures it is 
asked to decide upon. Citing the inviolable dignity of every human being, the Court 
rightly rejects eugenic practices, the mistreatment of prisoners and the shooting down of 
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hijacked civil aircraft. At the same time the Court has accepted a well-established 
practice of “non-indicated” socially motivated pregnancy terminations, whilst formally 
explicitly upholding in its case law the inviolability of the dignity of the unborn and its 
right to life. The Court also applies the human dignity principle to deny the state to 
enforce legislation and procedures that in themselves are constitutional. We can conclude 
that in the area of human dignity protection and the right to life the BVerfG is 
increasingly developing a case law that contradicts and ignores the Christian human 
dignity tradition, whilst taking to new heights the modern Kantian idea of absolute 
autonomy. It remains to be seen whether in this light the Court will be able to uphold 
human dignity as “the state‟s highest duty to protect.”  
 
3.3. Case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
It is important to note here once more that the term “human dignity” as such is not used 
in the text of the European Convention itself, the treaty the ECtHR is bound to interpret 
and enforce. As we will see however, the Court does specifically and repeatedly 
(although not very often) refer to the legal concept of human dignity as being defining for 
its deliberations and rulings
739
. As Beatrice Maurer puts it in her study of the Convention, 
the notion of human dignity is so important for judges because – in her opinion - it helps 
them avoid morality: ―Il permettrait, en particulier, au juge d‘échapper à la morale, 
reference qu‗il craint.‖740 
 
The first time the legal concept of human dignity is mentioned by the ECtHR is in its 
judgment in the case of Tyrer v. United Kingdom of 25 April 1978
741
. The corporal 
punishment to which the applicant was subjected under the law of the Isle of Man was 
held to be in violation of article 3 of the Convention and the human dignity of the 
applicant. In §33 of the ruling the Court observes that the harsh treatment of Mr. Tryer 
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“constituted an assault on precisely that which it is one of the main purposes of article 3 
to protect, namely a person‟s dignity and physical integrity.” It would then take 10 years 
for the Court to hand down judgment in its first case where the actual violation of the 
human dignity concept itself was examined in one of the main arguments of the case. In 
this case, Abdulaziz and others v. United Kingdom of 28 May 1985
742
 the Court however 
concluded there had been no violation of the human dignity of the applicants because 
their treatment had not been humiliating or degrading but rather in accord with justified 
procedure under the circumstances of the case. The Court observed: “(..) the difference of 
treatment complained of did not denote any contempt or lack of respect for the 
personality of the applicants (..)”743 
 
It would not be until the mid-nineties that the Court started to make the legal concept of 
human dignity a more central aspect of its rulings. The judgment in Ribitsch v. Austria of 
4 December 1995
744
 stipulates human dignity as the basis for article 3 of the Convention 
and goes on to say that “in respect of a person deprived of his liberty, any recourse to 
physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes  
human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in article 3 of the 
Convention.”745 This principle was reiterated and explicitly referred back to in later 
rulings of the Court, for example in the 9 June 1998 Tekin v. Turkey and the 28 October 
1998 Assenov v. Bulgaria decisions
746
. In the case of Kudla v. Poland the Court in its 26 
October 2000 judgment
747
 ruled that prison conditions are to be in accordance with the 
protection of the inmate‟s human dignity, including the need for the health and well-
being of the prisoner being “adequately secured”. 
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In the case of Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany
748
 we return to a post-War 
discussion on the legally enshrined protection of human dignity that is especially relevant 
because of its historical significance. The three plaintiffs, referring to article 7 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Convention), had complained to the Strasbourg Court that after the unification of 
Germany the German courts had unlawfully punished them for their role in the shooting 
and imprisonment of people trying to flee from the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany) prior to the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. One of the key arguments of the 
plaintiffs was that they were merely following a practice that they never expected would 
be deemed illegal. This defense sounds all too familiar of the defendants at the post-War 
Nuremberg trials (“We were only following orders”) and the Court clearly rejects it. The 
ECtHR underlines that the overarching principle of inviolable human dignity and the 
ensuing hierarchically superior right to life was well-known by the plaintiffs and should 
have been the guiding intention of all their actions as rulers:  
 
―However, the Court points out that the reason of State thus pleaded must be limited by 
the principles enunciated in the Constitution and legislation of the GDR itself; it must 
above all respect the need to preserve human life, enshrined in the GDR‘s Constitution, 
People‘s Police Act and State Borders Act, regard being had to the fact that even at the 
material time the right to life was already, internationally, the supreme value in the 
hierarchy of human rights (see paragraph 94 below).‖749 
 
This case shows how, unsurprisingly, even if the protection of human dignity is written in 
a country‟s constitution and the country has also subscribed to international treaties in 
this regard, this constitutes no guarantee as to its application. Moreover, the Court seems 
to imply that even if the German Democratic Republic‟s laws would not have included 
specific references to the protection of human dignity and life, it would have still held the 
plaintiffs accountable for their orders to shoot those trying to cross the border. Referring 
to the various international human rights instruments in relation to the right to life, the 
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Court holds: “The convergence of the above-mentioned instruments is significant: it 
indicates that the right to life is an inalienable attribute of human beings and forms the 
supreme value in the hierarchy of human rights.”750 Human dignity protection, therefore, 
can equally never be dependent on it being written into law, since it is an “inalienable 
attribute” of the human being. 
 
The much discussed case of Pretty v. The United Kingdom
751
 deals with the protection of 
human dignity through articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (ban on torture) of the Convention 
and euthanasia. The plaintiff saw these rights violated because of the state‟s refusal to 
refrain from prosecuting her spouse in case he would help her to commit the suicide she 
had planned because of her unbearable physical situation. Mrs. Pretty claimed that by 
refusing assistance the state directly caused her inhumane suffering and disregarded her 
dignity and rights under the Convention. The Court rejected her claims on the basis of the 
argument that the right to life and the ban on torture are absolute rights that do not allow 
for exceptions of whichever kind, not even under article 15 of the Convention (derogation 
in times of emergency)
752
. Although there are cases where there is a positive obligation of 
the state to protect against inhuman or degrading treatment
753
, there cannot be a positive 
obligation of the state under article 3 of the Convention to take actions leading to or 
aiding the actual termination of human life
754. “The very essence of the Convention”, the 
Court later underlines, “is respect for human dignity and human freedom.”755 The role of 
the Court hereby is not to offer abstract opinions but “to apply the Convention to the 
concrete facts of the individual case”. The resulting judgments however, establish legal 
precedents that are relevant for application in later cases
756
. The Pretty judgment is thus 
very relevant for the application of the human dignity concept. It confirms established 
case-law of the Strasbourg court that the respect for human dignity is at the core of the 
Convention and its application, even though the term itself cannot be found in the 
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Convention
757. Even more important is the Court‟s assertion that the right to life and the 
ban on torture are inalienable rights. Since human dignity as a legal concept is the basis 
of articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, it can be distilled from the Court‟s observations in 
the Pretty case that the right to the protection of human dignity itself is indeed inviolable. 
It furthermore indicates that the most fundamental concrete application of human dignity 
protection – which we can also read in the Streletz case - lies in the defense of life and 
personal integrity. But as we will see with the Vo. v. France ruling, the Court explicitly 
limits the application of this stated „inviolability‟ to the post-natal human life. The case of 
Haas v. Switzerland
758
 also deals with euthanasia and here the Court confirms its case 
law developed in the Pretty case, that no right to suicide exists under the Convention and 
that the state has no positive obligation to allow for or assist euthanasia. However, in a 
problematic further development of the Court‟s understanding of the right to privacy, and 
hereby explicitely referring to the Pretty case, it does recognize the right of an individual 
to end its own life: ―(..) la Cour estime que le droit d'un individu de décider de quelle 
manière et à quel moment sa vie doit prendre fin, à condition qu'il soit en mesure de 
forger librement sa propre volonté à ce propos et d'agir en conséquence, est l'un des 
aspects du droit au respect de sa vie privée au sens de l'article 8 de la Convention.‖759 
We will see in the still to be ruled on case of Koch v. Germany
760
 if the Court further 
develops its case law in this regard. It should be noted here that the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) on 25 January 2012 adopted a resolution 
rejecting euthanasia as a matter of principle, citing the need to protect the human dignity 
and rights of patients.
761
 
  
The case of Vo. v. France
762
 shows that the Court in Strasbourg, although in principle 
clear on the theoretical non-negotiability of human dignity protection, is not consistent in 
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the actual application to all human beings. The case concerns a woman whose five-month 
old unborn child was aborted “for medical reasons” as a result of an unwanted operation 
for the removal of a contraceptive coil intended for another woman with a similar name. 
Mrs. Vo asked the Court to rule that the fact that French criminal law did not provide for 
recourse in the case of unintentional homicide of an unborn child was in violation of 
article 2 (right to life) of the Convention. The Court refused to affirm the right to life of 
the unborn child in light of article 2 of the Convention, stating that the legal status of 
unborn life is a matter of disagreement between the Council of Europe member states and 
falls within their national competence to decide on: “It follows that the issue of when the 
right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally 
considers that States should enjoy in this sphere (..).”763 The Court then further justifies 
its “hand-off” approach to the reach of the right to life and the protection of human 
dignity under the Convention by holding: 
 
―At European level, the Court observes that there is no consensus on the nature and 
status of the embryo and/or foetus (see paragraphs 39-40 above), although they are 
beginning to receive some protection in the light of scientific progress and the potential 
consequences of research into genetic engineering, medically assisted procreation or 
embryo experimentation. At best, it may be regarded as common ground between States 
that the embryo/foetus belongs to the human race. The potentiality of that being and its 
capacity to become a person – enjoying protection under the civil law, moreover, in many 
States, such as France, in the context of inheritance and gifts, and also in the United 
Kingdom (see paragraph 72 above) – require protection in the name of human dignity, 
without making it a ―person‖ with the ―right to life‖ for the purposes of Article 2.‖764 
 
This is an unfortunate decision of the Court and supported by the flawed argumentation 
that human dignity protection does not apply equally to all human beings, or, in the 
words of the Court, all members of “the human race”. The Court bases this argument on 
the incorrect presumption that the „human race‟ apparently consists of different 
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„categories‟ of humans, namely „persons‟ and „non-persons‟, each as a consequence 
enjoying more or less protection by the law. This statement lacks any scientific basis, 
since science – other than the Catholic tradition for that matter - until now has not been 
able to agree on the exact moment in the development of human life when a „mere human 
being‟ becomes a „human being that is a person‟. Opinions on this matter in the scientific 
community vary widely. The Court itself underlines this fact in the Vo v. France ruling 
where in §§ 39 and 40 it discusses the scientific and legal debate on personhood and 
quotes the 1998 opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies at the European Commission  that concludes: “Existing legislation in the 
Member States differs considerably from one another regarding the question of when life 
begins and about the definition of „personhood‟. As a result, no consensual definition, 
neither scientifically nor legally, of when life begins exists.”.765 Although the Court does 
admit that as born humans do, unborn human beings belong to the same „race‟ and they 
have the „potentiality‟ to personhood and enjoy protection ´in the name of human 
dignity”, it still refuses to extend this protection of the law to them and instead holds, 
without scientific proof to support this statement, that “(..) the unborn child is not 
regarded as a “person” directly protected by article 2 of the Convention and that if the 
unborn does have a “right” to “life”, it is implicitly limited by the mother‟s rights and 
interests.”766 The mother‟s “rights and interests” trump what the Court itself considers to 
be the supreme right derived from the Convention, namely the right to life (see for 
example the above mentioned Sterletz judgment). From a strictly legal point of view 
alone questions can be raised about the actual application of justice when a certain group 
of human beings decides that another group of human beings cannot appeal to the 
protection of their dignity and right to life, even if this decision comes from a court of 
law. Is this not exactly what the post-War European order tried to abolish by forwarding 
the legal concept of the inalienable dignity of every human being? Should the Court not 
have done what the application of justice presupposes, namely that in cases of doubt the 
course of action is chosen afflicting the least harm to those involved? Since neither 
scientifically nor legally there exists a European consensus on when personhood begins, 
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the correct way of applying the law would be to give the weakest party the benefit of the 
doubt and protect its life
767
. The various separate, dissenting and concurring opinions on 
this ruling show that the Court itself was divided on the issue. For example, the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Mularoni joined by Judge Straznika, holding that in this case 
article 2 of the Convention was indeed violated, underlines the contradictory nature of the 
Court‟s majority opinion. Mularoni also affirms that the right to life and with it the 
protection of the dignity of all human beings also extends fully to the unborn life: 
 
―Although legal personality is only acquired at birth, this does not to my mind mean that 
there must be no recognition or protection of ―everyone‘s right to life‖ before birth. 
Indeed, this seems to me to be a principle that is shared by all the member States of the 
Council of Europe, as domestic legislation permitting the voluntary termination of 
pregnancy would not have been necessary if the foetus was not regarded as having a life 
that should be protected. Abortion therefore constitutes an exception to the rule that the 
right to life should be protected, even before birth.‖768 
 
The dissenting opinion of Judge Ress in this case summarizes the problem the Court was 
not willing to decide on: “As this case illustrates, the embryo and the mother, as two 
separate “human beings”, need separate protection.”769  
The case of Tysiac v. Poland
770
 also deals with the question of abortion, this time the 
denial by Polish doctors to perform the termination of a pregnancy about which the 
mother feared it would lead to her eyesight severely deteriorating. Although a team of 
medical specialists concluded there was no direct link between the pregnancy and the 
worsening myopia after delivery, the Court ruled article 8 had been violated because the 
woman‟s right to privacy – and therefore her dignity - had not been respected by denying 
her an abortion under the circumstances. In spite of the fact that domestic procedure and 
law – in such cases normally respected by the Court – gave a conclusive answer, the 
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Court disregarded this and applied the Convention to implicitly give the woman a right to 
abortion. The Court‟s ruling in the case of A, B and C v. Ireland771 is another illustration 
of this same problem. The plaintiffs in this case – two Irish women and a Lithuanian 
woman- argued that the Irish constitutional protection of human life from conception 
onwards and thus the near-total ban on abortion in this country violate a woman‟s right to 
integrity of body and her right to privacy under article 8 of the Convention, but also –
paradoxically- violated article 2 (right to life, due to the stated lethal health risks 
connected to having to travel abroad for an abortion), article 3 (prohibition of degrading 
treatment) and article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention. The 
applicants maintained that the criminalization of abortion in Ireland was an affront to 
women‟s human dignity and deliberately degrading (§163). The Court thus had to weigh 
the human dignity and right to life of the unborn child against the above mentioned 
fundamental rights of the applicants and conclude whether the human dignity of both 
could be equally protected. The Court clearly avoided answering this question, however it 
did underline that there can be no right to abortion under article 8 of the Convention
772
. It 
could be interpreted here that the Court wanted to retract the implicit suggestion to the 
contrary that had come out of the Tysiac case. At the same time, however, the Court 
concluded that Ms. C‟s rights under article 8 were violated because she was allegedly not 
given enough opportunity within the Irish legal system to assess whether she would have 
access to a legal abortion in Ireland due to her health situation. Here the Court clearly 
answers the applicants‟ claim that the lack of access to abortion in Ireland was degrading 
for them. This case shows how the ECtHR is increasingly asked to define the scope of 
human dignity protection where there is an absence of a common European 
understanding that could underpin this concept. 
 
Also the ECtHR has had to deal, like the BVerfG, with human dignity in relation to 
gender change. The case Goodwin v. the United Kingdom concerns a male to female 
transsexual having undergone a physical sex change and as a result experiencing 
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discrimination. In its ruling of 11 July 2002
773
 the Court invoked the legal protection of 
human dignity in its function as essence of the Convention to rule that transsexuals have 
the right to be fully and indiscriminately recognized in their new gender by the society 
they live in. The Court observes in §90:  
 
―Under Article 8 of the Convention in particular, where the notion of personal autonomy 
is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees, protection is 
given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right to establish details of 
their identity as individual human beings (..). In the twenty first century the right of 
transsexuals to personal development and to physical and moral security in the full sense 
enjoyed by others in society cannot be regarded as a matter of controversy (..).‖ 
 
As we see in this case and which represents a general trend in ECtHR (and also the 
BVerfG) case law, autonomy and human dignity are often insufficiently distinguished 
where it concerns the need to always give primary importance to the legal concept of 
human dignity as such, whereby autonomy is only one of the visible expressions of 
human dignity
774
. To be able to act autonomously as a human being cannot be considered 
as a prerequisite for human dignity itself because this would undermine the whole 
concept; many human beings in different stages of life are at least limited in their 
capabilities to act autonomously. Does this make them less human? It would be 
problematic to consider a person (for example a comatose patient) who has (temporarily) 
lost the ability to make use of its autonomy as no longer in possession of its human 
dignity. For a detailed study of the Court‟s case law on personal autonomy as such we 
refer here to an extensive paper published by Nelleke Koffeman for the Dutch State 
Commission for the Constitution in June 2010
775
. The commission was asked to prepare 
possible changes to the Dutch constitution in the light of international and European 
human rights developments. 
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The case of Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria
776
 deals with article 10 of the 
Convention and the freedom of expression after the Austrian government had forbidden 
the continuation of an exhibition of a particularly hateful and vulgar painting of Otto 
Mühl. In spite of a majority of the Court concluding a violation of article 10 of the 
Convention by the Republic of Austria, the various dissenting opinions argue the 
protection of the human dignity of those depicted in the disputed painting as the argument 
against concluding a violation of article 10 convention, thus underlining what the 
majority of the Court held in the Pretty case, namely that articles 2 and 3 – with their 
“embedded” human dignity provision - are inalienable rights that cannot be trumped by 
other Convention rights like for example article 10. Judge Loucaides observes: 
 
”(..) so we must exclude from the legitimate expression of artists insulting pictures that 
undermine the reputation or dignity of others, especially if they are devoid of any 
meaningful message and contain nothing more than senseless, repugnant and disgusting 
images, as in the present case.”777 
 
Judges Spielman and Jebens observe: 
 
“In a word, a person's human dignity must be respected, regardless of whether the person 
is a well-known figure or not. Returning to the case before us, we therefore consider that 
the reasons that led the Court to find a violation (see paragraph 4 above) are not 
relevant. Such considerations must be subordinate to respect for human dignity.”778 
 
The dissenting judges clearly hold on to the established Strasbourg case law stressing the 
hierarchically superior nature of human dignity protection whilst they bring this quality in 
position against other Convention rights, herewith underlining that there is indeed a 
hierarchy of rights amongst which human dignity is first. In a later case, Judge Loucaides 
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concurring opinion continues this line of thought with regard to article 10 of the 
Convention in relation to article 8 (right to privacy), where he says that it cannot be in 
line with established case law of the Court that the right to the freedom of speech would 
lead to there no longer being an appropriate remedy for the protection of human dignity 
in relation to false and defamatory accusations which could ruin a person‟s life779. He 
rightly poses the question whether truth and dignity should be overruled by freedom of 
speech?
780
 It is also interesting to note here that in a partly dissenting opinion in the case 
of Akpinar and Altun v. Turkey
781
 which the Court decided on some weeks later, Judge 
Fura-Sandström goes even further and says that the respect for human dignity extends 
also to the dead, hereby referring to established case law of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court as discussed above:  
 
“(..) the duty imposed on the State authorities to respect an individual's human dignity, 
and to protect bodily integrity, cannot be deemed to end with the death of the individual 
in question where a person is killed by the security forces and the corpse immediately 
subjected to deliberate and cruel acts, as in the present case.”782 
 
In the 2010 case of Gäfgen v. Germany
783
 the Court affirms its case law on human 
dignity protection where it further excludes limitations to this protection as claimed by 
the police officers. The case deals with the gross mistreatment of a prisoner by German 
police and concludes a violation of article 3 of the Convention. The violation of human 
dignity in this case was defended whilst pointing to the “necessity” to take strong 
measures. The Court rejects this argument and expressly follows the reasoning of the 
Frankfurt am Main Regional court in the same case where it holds that: 
 
“The Regional Court observed that the method of investigation had not been justified. It 
rejected the defense of ―necessity‖ because the method in question violated human 
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dignity, as codified in Article 1 of the Basic Law. Respect for human dignity also lay at 
the heart of Article 104 § 1, second sentence, of the Basic Law and Article 3 of the 
Convention. The protection of human dignity was absolute, allowing of no exceptions or 
any balancing of interests.”784 
 
Looking at the recent case of V.C. v. Slovakia
785
 which dealt with a case of unauthorized 
sterilization performed in the process of a caesarian delivery operation in a state hospital, 
the Court once again confirmed the theoretical scope and application of its understanding 
of human dignity protection under the Convention. It concludes a violation of article 3 of 
the Convention by the Slovakian state
786
 and argues: 
 
“(..) in line with the Court‘s case-law referred to above, the position is different in the 
case of imposition of such medical treatment without the consent of a mentally competent 
adult patient. Such way of proceeding is to be interpreted as incompatible with the 
requirement of respect for human freedom and dignity, that is one of the fundamental 
principles on which the Convention is based.”787 
 
On a final note with regard to human dignity relevant case law of the ECtHR, it is 
disturbing to see the large number of cases the Court has decided upon in recent years, 
and those that are still pending, in which violations of article 3 have been concluded. This 
especially concerns the treatment of prisoners by state authorities whereby Russia, France 
and a number of Eastern- and Central European countries are the worst offenders. The 
broadly applicable concept of human dignity protection under the Convention as 
repeatedly stated by the Court seems not to have led to sufficient reform in prisoner 
treatment in certain member states of the Council of Europe. As we discussed above with 
regard to former communist countries in Europe, this insufficient improvement is partly 
due to a lack of transparent investigation and coming to terms with the crimes of past 
regimes in those countries. Russia and Romania are good examples of this problem as 
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reflected in the case law of the Strasbourg court where – when reading the facts of the 
cases - one wonders if the concept of human dignity is at all known to these signatories of 
the Convention. 
 
3.4.Case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) 
Until the entering into force of the EU Charter on 1 December 2009 the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (ECJ) did not have a formal mandate to provide judgment on 
human rights issues in general. The subject of human dignity has therefore not been a key 
component of ECJ case law
788
. Matters relating to human dignity have however been 
discussed in some cases where the observance of fundamental human rights in relation to 
the application of EU law was at stake. This has led to a series of important ECJ rulings 
discussing human dignity
789
. In relation to these judgments it should also be noted that by 
the year 2000, when the EU Charter was first proclaimed, the central role of human 
dignity in the application of Union law was already increasingly established and accepted 
by the Court, preparing the way for the EU Charter to become law
790
. The emergence of 
the legal concept of human dignity in ECJ case law finds its beginning, like is the case 
with the ECtHR, in the nineties. For example, the 9 December 1992 Opinion of Advocate 
General Jacobs in the Konstantinidis case
791
 includes a series of referrals to the legal 
concept of human dignity serving as key arguments for the opinion. Jacobs expresses his 
surprise at the fact that the Convention does not include “a general provision recognizing 
the individual's right to be treated with respect for his dignity and moral integrity (..)” and 
observes that this omission to a certain extend has been repaired by the constitutions of 
the member states
792
. Therefore, he continues, it is possible to infer from these 
constitutional traditions of the member states and the provisions of the Convention itself 
the existence of  “a principle according to which the State must respect not only the 
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physical well-being of the individual but also his dignity, moral integrity and sense of 
personal identity.”.793 In its judgment in the case of P. v. S. and Cornwall County 
Council
794
 the ECJ rules that discrimination based on gender or gender change is “a 
failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the 
Court has a duty to safeguard” and herby refers to the case law of the ECtHR with regard 
to transsexual people.
795
 
 
An important example of the evolvement of human dignity protection into a foundational 
concept of EU law application is the 2001 case of Netherlands v. Parliament and 
Council
796
. In this case, which deals with the implementation of Directive 98/44/EC on 
biotechnological inventions, the ECJ indeed gives itself a clear mandate to provide 
human dignity protection, although limited to the horizontal application: “It is for the 
Court of Justice, in its review of the compatibility of acts of the institutions with the 
general principles of Community law, to ensure that the fundamental right to human 
dignity and integrity is observed.”797 The Court rejects the plaintiff‟s claim that applying 
Directive 98/44/EC would violate human dignity and outlines the various provisions in 
the Directive that ensure that nothing human can be patented. It observes: “It is clear 
from those provisions that, as regards living matter of human origin, the Directive frames 
the law on patents in a manner sufficiently rigorous to ensure that the human body 
effectively remains unavailable and inalienable and that human dignity is thus 
safeguarded.”798 The relevance of this case lies in the explicit responsibility the ECJ takes 
where it comes to the protection of human dignity, even though as a legal concept it was 
never a codified operational principle of law until the EU Charter (the EU treaties only 
referring to it in a general manner). The ECJ‟s Brüstle ruling to be discussed later builds 
on this development in the Court‟s case law. Here we see, as Christian Walter799 
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discusses in detail, how the ECJ has been influenced by the case law of the ECtHR and as 
a result developed a catalogue of human rights and human dignity protection in essence 
not very different from the Convention and the EU Charter. This gives the ECJ an 
existing tradition to lean on when actually applying article 1 EU Charter in the years to 
come. Human dignity protection under article 1 EU Charter is not new to the ECJ. 
 
In the case of Omega v. Bonn
800
 the ECJ was asked to decide on the question “whether 
the prohibition of an economic activity for reasons arising from the protection of 
fundamental values laid down by the national constitution, such as, in this case, human 
dignity, is compatible with Community law (..)”801. The Court concludes that indeed such 
a prohibition is compatible with Community law since it concerns not only a fundamental 
right as enshrined in the German Basic Law, but also a fundamental principle by which 
the ECJ itself is guided
802
. The Court once again confirms its now established case law on 
the question of human dignity protection. It says: “(..) the Community legal order 
undeniably strives to ensure respect for human dignity as a general principle of law. 
There can therefore be no doubt that the objective of protecting human dignity is 
compatible with Community law (..)”803 In the 2007 Laval un Partneri and International 
Transport Workers' Federation and Finnish Seamen's Union cases
804
 the Court explicitly 
confirms this doctrine and refers back to the Omega case as a point of reference for its 
established case law on the matter. In the Omega case, the Court largely followed the 
Advocate General‟s human dignity argumentation discussed above. Stix-Hackl does 
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however underline that human dignity is not a concept that is clearly defined: “As far as 
the constitutional systems of the Member States are concerned, therefore, the concept of 
human dignity enjoys full recognition in one form or another, especially when one 
considers (..) that this concept can be expressed in different ways.”805 She goes on to say 
that the Court, like is the case with the text of article 1 EU Charter, applies “the concept 
of human dignity on a comparatively wide understanding (..)”.806 
 
The Pupino case is another example of the wide-ranging implementation of the legal 
concept of human dignity by the Court since this concept emerged as foundational for the 
implementation of Community law. In its 16 June 2005 ruling
807
, the Court explicitly 
stated that the protection of human dignity is also a basic consideration where it concerns 
the treatment of vulnerable victims in criminal proceedings who are being asked to give 
testimony. The Court held that there was a need of  “guaranteeing to all victims treatment 
which pays due respect to their individual dignity (..)”.808 
 
A landmark case is the matter of Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V. in which the ECJ 
passed judgment on 18 October 2011
809
. The discussion once again focused on the 
correct interpretation of Directive 98/44/EC with regard to the patentability of human 
embryos. The Court affirms the blanket prohibition of patenting human life which it 
already did in the 2001 Netherlands v. Parliament and Council case discussed above. A 
key consideration of the ECJ in the Brüstle case is the legal protection of the dignity of 
the human being which, it says, should be taken into consideration from the moment of 
fertilization of the human ovum. In §35 of the ruling the Courts holds that 
 
―(..) any human ovum must, as soon as fertilised, be regarded as a ‗human embryo‘ 
within the meaning and for the purposes of the application of Article 6(2)(c) of the 
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Directive, since that fertilisation is such as to commence the process of development of a 
human being.‖  
 
The ECJ rules that for the sake of human dignity protection within the framework of the 
Directive the term “human embryo” should be interpreted in a wide sense (see §34) so as 
to avoid any misinterpretation of the prohibition of any sort of patentability of human 
embryos for industrial or commercial, as well as scientific purposes (see §46). This “wide 
sense” is outlined by the Court in its answer to the referring court‟s first question on what 
is meant by a “human embryo” in article 6(2) of the Directive:  
 
―(..) any human ovum after fertilisation, any non-fertilised human ovum into which the 
cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted and any non-fertilised 
human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by 
parthenogenesis constitute a ‗human embryo‘ within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of the 
Directive (..)‖810 
 
§52 of the judgment further specifies the broad application the ECJ here establishes: 
 
“The answer to the third question is therefore that Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive 
excludes an invention from patentability where the technical teaching which is the 
subject-matter of the patent application requires the prior destruction of human embryos 
or their use as base material, whatever the stage at which that takes place and even if the 
description of the technical teaching claimed does not refer to the use of human 
embryos.” 
 
The only exception the Directive and the ECJ allow is “use for therapeutic or diagnostic 
purposes which is applied to the human embryo and is useful to it being patentable” (see 
§46). This provision needs careful reading to understand that the Court only means to 
exclude from the Directive prohibition specific procedures on individual human embryos 
that are exclusively meant to diagnose or treat certain ailments of this human being.  
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This case will be a topic of much debate since it rules on an issue that is key to the 
implementation of human dignity protection under article 1 EU Charter and an issue of 
deep divisions within European society. It touches upon the hotly debated question as of 
what moment unborn human life is eligible for the full and unimpeded protection of the 
law, meaning the acceptance that equal rights to life and freedom apply to both the born 
and the unborn human being as a result of their inherent human dignity. When we 
consistently follow the Court‟s reasoning in the Brüstle case, namely that a fertilized 
human egg cannot be patented because this violates the principle of human dignity 
because it is to be considered a human embryo in the process of the development of a 
human being
811
, it becomes difficult to continue to deny the full and equal protection of 
articles 1 and 2 of the EU Charter - or similar provisions of the German Basic law and the 
Universal Declaration - from the moment of conception for all human beings
812
. This 
would in turn mean that any claimed or perceived constitutional or general legal 
arguments that justify abortion and (destructive) embryonic stem cell research are now to 
be further questioned. If, as the Court holds, the patenting of a human embryo is 
prohibited by European law because this would violate its human dignity, surely the 
deliberate destruction of these same human embryos can no longer be justified because 
this equally violates their human dignity? That the ECJ in this case is not merely ruling 
on a stand-alone situation whereby no legal precedent of the judgment can be claimed at 
all is made clear by the Court itself:  
 
―Die Richtlinie enthält zwar keine Definition des „menschlichen Embryos―, doch 
verweist sie in Bezug auf die Bedeutung dieses Ausdrucks auch nicht auf die nationalen 
Rechtsvorschriften. Der Ausdruck ist daher für die Anwendung der Richtlinie als 
autonomer Begriff des Unionsrechts anzusehen, der im gesamten Gebiet der Union 
einheitlich auszulegen ist.‖813 
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3.5. The ‗minimum core‘ in case law 
We have seen that all three courts, each in their own specific wording, repeatedly affirm 
as established case law the „inalienable‟ or sometimes even „absolute‟ nature of the 
human dignity principle as to be extended to all human beings, especially to be 
guaranteed by the state. McCrudden concludes the same in his analysis of relevant 
European case law until 2008 and observes that the courts have generally applied the 
earlier mentioned “minimum core” when dealing with human dignity questions in their 
rulings
814
. He finds that the ontological, the relational and the limited-state claim are 
mostly confirmed by the courts, however that this fundamental principle to which “the 
positive law should be accountable” camouflages the significantly different theoretical 
conceptions of human dignity and their application in different jurisdictions. This 
“enables the incorporation of just the type of ideological, religious, and cultural 
differences that a common theory of human rights would need to transcend, he notes”815 
McCrudden subsequently confirms what we have already stated before, namely the fact 
that no common conception of human dignity can be identified at this point, even though 
there is general agreement on the “minimum core” itself816. To put it in other words: we 
agree that human dignity is inviolable; we just do not know and agree what this should 
lead to. What we therefore can conclude from analyzing relevant case law is that the 
Courts do not apply human dignity protection equally to all human beings and situations, 
thus making the principle in effect relative. The answers to the two questions formulated 
in the introduction to this chapter are that within its legal context – and despite judicial or 
political proclamations to the contrary -  human dignity is a relative principle, and not the 
highest principle, whereby the courts do not have a clear general understanding of what it 
entails but rather apply the principle on the basis of its claimed violation brought before 
the court on a case by case basis and often led by what Herdegen calls the “flexible 
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principle that in its application is dependent on constantly developing socio-cultural 
realities and interpretations” whilst at other times being led by the much more useful 
“revolt of conscience” that has been, after all, the main engine behind the key moments in 
history when human dignity was further strengthened as a notion relevant in its legal 
context. 
 
 270 
 
 271 
 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
1.1. Evaluation 
As our research in Part I has shown the notion of the dignity of the human being has a 
long history in philosophical and religious thought. Only in post-War Europe the human 
dignity notion developed into a legal concept and a legal principle. Jürgen Habermas 
speaks about the notion of human dignity as the “moral source” for human rights today, 
whereby that notion serves as a “catalyst” to formulate these rights817. Human dignity as 
a relevant philosophical and legal concept was not invented by any parliamentary 
process; it has rather been the emerging realization of the human being throughout 
history that it has a unique and privileged position requiring special treatment. This 
realization, as we have seen in Part II, has always been most strongly present when one 
group of human beings suffered greatly under the yoke of another group of human 
beings. The Holocaust, the Gulag and ethnic cleansing are some of the more recent 
injustices that made people realize the importance of human dignity protection. It was 
first and foremost the revolt of conscience in post-War Europe as a result of Nazism and 
Communism that led to the notion of human dignity to become a concept of legal 
relevance. Jürgen Habermas says ―(..) dass veränderte historische Umstände nur etwas 
thematisiert und zu Bewusstsein gebracht haben, was den Menschenrechten implizit von 
Anbeginn eingeschrieben war – nämlich jene normative Substanz der gleichen 
Menschenwürde eines jeden, die die Menschenrechte gewissermaßen 
ausbuchstabieren.―818  
 
Our philosophical analysis of the roots of article 1 EU Charter indeed points to a long 
process of discovery that started in the Judaic, Greek and Roman traditions. It then 
unfolded and was most prominently developed in the Christian tradition and supported by 
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the humanist and enlightenment (especially Kantian) traditions. This long process finally 
brought the notion of human dignity into the legal-political framework of European 
society. Only the Christian tradition was able to develop the human dignity concept to a 
point where it is held to be a given of each human being, irrespective of physical 
development, race, religion, position or gender. It has at its core the biblical “imago Dei” 
concept and the teachings of the Gospel. Interestingly, it is the atheist philosopher 
Habermas who stresses that it was indeed this Judeo-Christian tradition that first 
identified the notion of human dignity with the incomparable and absolute worth of the 
individual human being
819
. Although it took the Catholic Church long to accept religious 
freedom in its fullest sense, it was the human dignity argument – as expressed in Pope 
Paul VI‟s 1968 ―Declaration on Religious Freedom ―Dignitatis Humanae‖‖ - that 
brought a major shift in the Christian human rights tradition. Pope John Paul II finally 
brought the emerging Catholic doctrine on human dignity to the fore of the Church‟s 
engagement with the world and integrated it into a human rights theory of great depth and 
relevance for today. At the core of John Paul‟s thinking on human dignity lies the 
realization that Man cannot be understood without Christ. Christ as the personification of 
God becoming Man therefore also portrays the perfect image of what it means to be 
human. Only when we begin to understand what it means to be human can we begin to 
understand what human dignity is. What resulted from this development in Christian 
thought as spearheaded by John Paul II was the public affirmation of the unique and 
incomparable worth of every human being from the moment of conception until death as 
the basis for its inalienable dignity and rights. Even when the argumentation leading up to 
this affirmation will be difficult to accept in a secular political and legal environment, the 
end result John Paul II proposes is by no means religiously construed and - aided by 
scientific evidence - entirely accessible through reasoned argument. Robert Spaemann 
calls it the “transcendental-pragmatic” understanding of human dignity whereby only the 
biological affiliation as a “homo sapiens” species is decisive. It is scientifically answered 
and undisputed when the life of a human being starts, namely at the moment of 
conception, whilst – at least for non-Christians – the question as to when the soul enters 
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the human body or when personhood starts is still much debated
820
. John Paul II – 
followed in this by Benedict XVI - proposes a unique notion of human dignity and 
human rights that does not exclude any human being. 
 
Apparently the post-War Christian human dignity tradition is not widely followed. 
Various other interpretations compete for adherence as well. Most important among them 
is an understanding of human dignity that is almost exclusively autonomy-based. As the 
legal concept and the legal principle of human dignity acquired prominence in European 
political and legal discourse over the past decades, it lacked a clear definition of its scope 
and meaning in positive law. As a consequence it is increasingly being applied to a wide 
variety of causes that contradict each other. The example given by McCrudden is still the 
best illustration of this problem where he says that “(..) the dignity argument is often to 
be found on both sides of the argument, and in different jurisdictions supporting opposite 
conclusions.”821 The notion of human dignity, from both the philosophical and historical 
perspective, was however meant to provide a principled moral clarity in applying the law, 
as Jürgen Habermas observes when referring to the notion of human dignity as a 
―moralische Quelle‖822. What we see instead is a consistent application of a modern 
Kantian understanding of human dignity in the case law of the BVerfG
823
, increasingly 
followed by the ECtHR and the ECJ, whereby the absolute autonomy of the 
independently operating person is decisive above all else. Human dignity as a 
foundational and universal attribute of every human life as such is hereby often confused 
with or overruled by the individual autonomy which is only one – and a very important - 
concrete expression of human dignity. The absence of the ability of a human being to act 
autonomously does not however diminish the dignity of that person in any way. The 
almost exclusive focus on individual autonomy – mostly expressed through claiming the 
right to privacy and physical integrity - therefore automatically leads to a selective legal 
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concept or principle of human dignity because individual autonomy alone is an 
incomplete foundation for defining human dignity
824
. The incompleteness in this concept 
of human dignity, according to Catherine Dupré, lies in that the “autonomy based 
understanding of human dignity provides a very simplistic and partial legal picture of the 
complex reality of human lives and experiences.”825 It alone is too abstract and not suited 
to deal with the concrete problems human beings are confronted with in the exercise of 
their human rights and the protection of their inherent dignity. Once again Dupré: “The 
highly autonomous subject of rights born with dignity, who goes through his theoretical 
life, apparently effortlessly asserting his political preferences and living a private family 
life, does not exist in reality. Real lives are complex and messy; people are not all born in 
dignity.”826 Whilst Dupré does not reject the primordial importance of Kant‟s dignity 
understanding as it is dominant in human rights discourse today, she rightly points out its 
limitations that are especially visible in the case law of the cited European courts. It is 
interesting to see that Dupré seems to echo in secular terms Jacques Maritain‟s 
fundamental critique of Kantian ethics of many years before. In his work on moral 
philosophy, Maritain discusses how Kant, although clearly formed and inspired by the 
Christian tradition and its understanding of the human being, set out creating an 
“architecture of ethics” founded on an entirely autonomous morality withdrawn from the 
order of finality and disconnected from what is external to the human being itself. In 
Kantian thought, not God and striving for love of neighbor and doing good is the object 
of morality, but duty is, and duty is ruled by practical reason alone. This has lead to a 
human dignity understanding which Maritain describes as follows: 
 
“We have said that the Kantian notion of the autonomy of the will requires that the 
absolute ultimate end be excluded from the proper and constitutive domain of ethics. It is 
so because the Practical Reason, or the pure rational will (these two notions are 
apparently identical for Kant) is absolutely autonomous, that is to say, it is not submitted 
to any other law than that which it gives itself, or rather, which is one with itself. In other 
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terms, the dignity of the person is such that, in the words of Rousseau, it can only obey 
itself.”827 
 
When the dignity of the person is construed in such a way that it can only obey itself and 
is thus deliberately oblivious of that which exists beyond, the logical consequence is an 
egocentric perception of life ultimately colliding with the dignity of other human beings. 
This makes human dignity a too abstract concept out of touch with human reality: an 
autonomy that has no other end than itself, and therefore lacks the transcendent element, 
logically leads to an incomplete understanding of the reality of human life. The individual 
human life is however not abstract, it is concrete from its first day and always changing: 
“(..) dignity is not only about being, but also, very importantly, about the process of 
becoming.”828 Although the Kantian notion of human dignity in itself provides essential 
arguments in its legal context, it does not provide a sufficient theoretical basis for 
understanding and protecting human dignity. This has led to the unavoidable 
consequence that – as we can see in the case law of the BVerfG - certain groups of 
human beings – unable to express their autonomy - are excluded from the protection of 
their human dignity and right to life, something which the post-War revolt of conscience 
movement had tried to avoid once and for all. As our research has shown, it is only the 
post-War Christian understanding of the human being and the resulting notion of human 
dignity that truly accepts its inviolability for every human being.  
 
1.2. Conclusion 
In concluding this research the question therefore arises whether the legal principle of 
human dignity as included in article 1 EU Charter is really a principle that can be upheld 
in a court of law and as a foundational principle of the democratic state? Apart from the 
provisions of article 52 EU Charter, there is the overriding and much graver problem that 
both the definition of the human dignity principle in article 1 EU Charter and the scope of 
its protection remain unclear. When the legal concept of human dignity was first 
introduced in post-War Europe through the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration, 
                                                 
827
 Ibid. Jacques Maritain, Moral Philosphy, p. 103 
828
 Ibid. Catherine Dupré, Unlocking Human Dignity: towards a theory for the 21
st
 Century, p. 201 
 276 
the drafters of these texts deliberately steered clear of defining its definition and scope. 
Although all shared in a revolt of conscience at the sight of Nazi and Communist gross 
violations of human dignity, no agreement was possible what philosophical foundations 
the post-War legal and political order should be based upon in order to avoid such 
atrocities from ever happening again. The authors of the various human rights 
instruments after 1945 instead were left to revert to an understanding of human dignity 
that derived from the experiences of it being violated. What had violated human dignity 
was considered to be self-evident. What may be self-evident in the revolt of conscience is 
however not enough for agreement on a legal principle and its application. It becomes 
clear from the analysis of the case law discussed above that the current human dignity 
debate and the development of European and national (case) law on the subject is very 
limited in its ability to provide transparent and consistent human dignity protection. 
 
Against this background Europe has gone through a process in which the notion of 
human dignity evolved from a limited legal concept to a broadly applied legal concept 
and principle, yet without a clear definition. As a consequence, its application in law 
becomes subject to shifting majority opinions. But as Joseph Ratzinger rightly points out, 
“the majority principle always leaves open the question of the ethical foundations of the 
law.”829 We inevitably return to Hannah Arendt‟s sobering conclusions about the 
limitations to the “inalienable dignity and rights” of the human being. Also today the 
reality of human dignity protection is that “this can only be done through the guarantee of 
participation in a political community.”830 Where a human being does not have a 
recognized place and voice in such a political community it also loses anybody “willing 
and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever (..).”831 This is not mere theory: In Europe 
itself, as a result of pre-natal screening techniques, 92% of all children with the Down 
syndrome are aborted
832
, only because their lives are considered by others to have „no 
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quality‟ or to constitute a burden. In a number of European countries, the human dignity 
violations against prisoners, especially those being stateless, without legal status or 
regarded as a „threat to national security‟ are still numerous today. Also Hannah Arendt 
does not see “the lacking voice in a political community” as a mere theoretical 
possibility, but as a problematic reality resulting from the fact that modern man sees the 
guarantee of the right to have rights or for the individual to even belong to humanity and 
have dignity as coming exclusively from humanity itself. But it is by no means certain 
whether this is possible, Arendt rightly observes
833
. “A conception of law which 
identifies what is right with the notion of what is good for - for the individual, or the 
family, or the people, or the largest number - becomes inevitable once the absolute and 
transcendent measurements of religion or the law of nature have lost their authority. And 
this predicament is by no means solved if the unit to which the „good for‟ applies is as 
large as mankind itself. For it is quite conceivable, and even within the realm of practical 
political possibilities, that one fine day a highly organized and mechanized humanity will 
conclude quite democratically - namely by majority decision - that for humanity as a 
whole it would be better to liquidate certain parts thereof. Here, in the problems of factual 
reality, we are confronted with one of the oldest perplexities of political philosophy, 
which could remain undetected only so long as a stable Christian theology provided the 
framework for all political and philosophical problems, but which long ago caused Plato 
to say: "Not man, but a god, must be the measure of all things.””834 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Register, British Medical Journal Online: bmj 2009; 339:b3794; doi:10.1136/bmj.b3794. The statistics of 
continental Europe and Northern America are similar 
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ANNEX 
 
Abstract - English 
 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) became law 
with the entering into force of the Lisbon Reform Treaty on December 1
st
, 2009. The 
legal principle of human dignity is now enshrined in EU law through article 1 EU 
Charter. The legal concept, or Rechtsbegriff, of human dignity has served as the basis of 
the European human rights system only since the end of World War II. There is however 
no basic agreement on the definition and scope of human dignity, neither as a 
philosophical notion, nor as a legal term. Article 1 EU Charter could therefore prove 
problematic in its application because it is open to broad and contradictory 
interpretations. Human dignity is increasingly invoked on both sides of an argument that 
deals with the protection of apparently conflicting fundamental human rights. In order to 
be able to effectively protect human dignity under the EU Charter, it is therefore 
necessary to achieve a better understanding of the roots and realities of this principle as it 
has been developing within the EU. Otherwise, as a consequence the stated legal 
principle itself can become a threat to that which it is trying to protect.  
 
This research should contribute to a better understanding of the legal principle of human 
dignity now enshrined in EU law as well as the legal concept of human dignity in Europe 
in a broader sense. It aims to provide an insight into the genesis, application and 
consequences of article 1 EU Charter and the legal concept of human dignity in general, 
by analyzing the main post-War schools of thought and related historical and legal-
historical developments that have shaped the notion of human dignity in Europe until 
today. The focus will be on the post-War history of Europe and the Christian and Kantian 
schools of thought that provide the most prominent philosophical foundations for the 
notion of human dignity in its legal context as it developed in Europe after 1945. It was 
only in response to the horrors of Nazism and Communism ravaging the European 
continent and many parts of the world in the 20
th
 century that various European political 
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and legislative initiatives were introduced to avoid a repeat of this massive and organized 
disregard of fundamental human rights. Still, definition and scope of human dignity in its 
legal context remain unclear and much debated. In concluding the research the question is 
therefore posed whether the legal principle of human dignity as included in article 1 EU 
Charter can really be upheld in the court of law and as a foundational principle of the 
democratic state? Within the current framework of human dignity discourse and human 
rights application in Europe it is concluded that upholding this principle is unlikely to 
succeed. 
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Abstract - Deutsch 
 
 
Die Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (EU Grundrechtscharta) wurde mit 
dem Inkrafttreten des Reformvertrags von Lissabon am 1. Dezember 2009 geltendes 
Recht. Die Menschenwürde ist nun als Rechtsnorm im EU Recht, Artikel 1 der EU 
Grundrechtscharta verankert und basiert auf dem Rechtsbegriff der Menschenwürde, der 
seit dem 2. Weltkrieg die Grundlage der Europäischen Menschenrechtsentwicklung 
bildete. Dennoch gibt es bis heute keine Übereinstimmung in Bezug auf Definition und 
Anwendungsbereich der Menschenwürde –  weder als philosophischen Begriff noch als 
rechtlichen Terminus. Artikel 1 der EU Grundrechtscharta kann sich auch deshalb als 
problematisch erweisen,  da seiner Anwendung zu undeutliche und einander 
widersprechende Interpretationen zugrunde liegen. Beim Schutz von offensichtlich 
einander widersprechenden grundlegenden Menschenrechten beruft man sich zunehmend 
auf die Menschenwürde, um dementsprechend unterschiedliche Positionen mit ein und 
demselben Argument zu legitimieren. Um die Menschenwürde in der EU 
Grundrechtscharta wirksam schützen zu können, ist es notwendig, die Entwicklung und 
den tatsächlichen Charakter dieser Norm besser zu verstehen. Es wäre sonst möglich, 
dass das festgeschriebene Gesetz selbst zu einer Bedrohung für das werden könnte, was 
es zu schützen gilt.  
 
Diese Forschungsarbeit leistet einen Beitrag zu einem besseren Verständnis der 
Menschenwürde als Rechtsnorm, die nun im EU Recht verankert ist, und in einem 
weiteren Sinne zum Verständnis des Rechtsbegriffs der Menschenwürde in Europa. Ziel 
dieser Arbeit ist es, Genese, Anwendung und Auswirkungen von Artikel 1 der EU 
Grundrechtscharta sowie den Rechtsbegriff der Menschenwürde im Allgemeinen 
aufzuzeigen. Den Analysen liegt eine Auswertung der wichtigsten Rechts-Schulen der 
Nachkriegszeit und der damit verbundenen historischen und rechts-historischen 
Entwicklungen, die den Begriff der Menschenwürde in Europa bis heute geformt haben, 
zugrunde. Der Fokus liegt auf der europäischen Nachkriegsgeschichte, auf den 
christlichen und „kantischen“ Schulen des Denkens nach 1945, auf die die wichtigsten 
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philosophischen Grundlagen für die Entwicklung des Begriffs der Menschenwürde in 
seinem rechtlichen Kontext zurückgehen. Verschiedene politische und legislative 
Initiativen in Europa sind eine Antwort auf den Horror des Naziregimes und des 
Kommunismus, der den europäischen Kontinent und viele Teile der Welt im 20. 
Jahrhundert verwüstet hat, um eine Wiederholung dieser massiven und organisierten 
Missachtung der Menschenwürde zu verhindern. Dennoch sind Definition und 
Geltungsbereich der Menschenwürde im rechtlichen Bereich unklar und vieldiskutiert. 
Abschließend bleibt die Frage offen, ob die Rechtsnorm der Menschenwürde, so, wie sie 
in Artikel 1 der EU Grundrechtscharta verankert ist, in der Rechtssprechung und als eine 
grundlegende Norm eines demokratischen Staates wirklich aufrechterhalten werden 
kann?  Der gegenwärtige Diskurs über Menschenwürde und die Anwendung von 
Menschrechten in Europa lässt den Schluss zu, dass es unwahrscheinlich ist, dass diese 
Norm Bestand hat. 
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1993-1994 Mitglied des Rates der Juristischen Fakultät der Universität 
Leiden 
 
 
Kurzlehrgänge; Zertifikate 
2008 Internationalen Kurs über „Leadership“ absolviert, Hydra 
Leadership Seminar; 
1997-2003             Zahlreiche juristische Weiterbildungskurse; 
2002              Kurs über „Ausgezeichnetes Management”; 
2000 NMI-Zertifikat, Mediation Institut der Niederlande (NMI) 
Akkreditierungskurs für Mediatoren; 
1998-2000 Abendkurse in Philosophie  
1996 Juristische Fakultät der Universität von Notre Dame (USA), 
Sommerkurs über Rechtsgeschichte; 
1995              Universität von Notre Dame, Phoenix Institute   
              Sommerkurs über „the Study of Western Institutions”; 
1994, 1995             Harvard - Arbeitsseminare über Verhandlung (2); 
1994              Universität von Notre Dame, Phoenix Institute   
              Sommerkurs über „the Study of Western Institutions ” 
1993 Institut Schloss Hofen (Österreich), Sommerakademie für 
internationales Recht und internationale Beziehungen; 
1992, 1993 Clingendael-Institut für internationale Beziehungen 
(Niederlande), Arbeitsseminare über diplomatische 
Verhandlungen (2) 
 
Sprachen:   Lesen   Sprechen  Schreiben 
Holländisch   Muttersprache  Muttersprache  Muttersprache 
Englisch   fließend  fließend  fließend 
Deutsch   fließend  fließend  fließend  
Französisch   fließend  fließend  gut 
Spanisch   gut   gut              Grundkenntnisse  
 
 
 
